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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
MARKET VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
by 
Islam Elshahat 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Clark Wheatley, Major Professor 
This research investigated the general association between corporate 
environmental performance and the firms’ annual returns independent of any particular 
environmental event. The association analysis was based on the most recent 
environmental data for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. The results indicated that while 
some environmental variables were significantly associated with firms’ returns, the 
majority were not. The results also indicated that environmental concerns were more 
likely to be associated with increase in the firm value than were environmental strengths; 
however, there were no mean differences between firms whose environmental 
performance increased as compared with those whose performance deteriorated. Overall, 
the results provided support for the perspective that environmental strengths require firm 
expenditures that place additional financial burdens on firms, resulting in lower stock 
returns.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  At a global level, countries around the world are collectively dealing with 
environmental crises by formulating and enacting rules and regulations to sustain the 
environment. The enactment of Kyoto Protocol was designed to control the emission of 
harmful gases that negatively affect the Ozone layer leading to unsafe climate changes. 
At the national level, each country involved in any environmental protection agreement 
has been encouraging as well as enforcing the rules and the regulations, which are both 
financial and non-financial in nature in order to motivate firms to incorporate 
environmentally friendly strategies or at least reduce the negative environmental impact 
to a reasonable amount.  
An example of such an effort in the United States was the enactment of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [CERCLA], 
or what is commonly known as the “superfund” law. This law imposed a tax on the 
chemical and petroleum industries and empowers the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry (ATSDR) to directly respond to chemical releases or threatened releases 
that may endanger the surrounding environment. Some countries assigned the duties of 
environmental protection to a specialized department within the government structure. In 
the United States, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (established 
in the 1970) is responsible for controlling and regulating pollution activities and 
protecting human health by sustaining the surrounding natural environment: air, water, 
and land.  
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At the corporate level, firms have been aggressively trying to redefine their 
products as environmentally friendly. In the case of energy consumption and gas 
emissions, the automobile industry made a major shift in the last few years towards the 
production of more environmentally friendly vehicles that use safer energy such as 
electricity instead of the traditional fuel engine. The redefinition of products also refers to 
firm’s inclusion of environmental factors in their overall strategies and policies. These 
may result from the need to comply with the regulatory authorities’ rules and regulations 
or from a desire to serve the new emerging market segment interested in environmentally 
friendly products. Lastly companies are diligently working to build and maintain the 
image of being good corporate citizens who protect the environment and remediate the 
effects of the firms’ operations.  
At the individual level, the focus on environmental factors can be divided into two 
different areas. As the result of public awareness, environmentally friendly products are 
experiencing good sales growth. In other words it can be inferred that individuals will, to 
a certain extent, favor environmentally friendly products. The second area, according to 
the capital markets literature, is that investors have responded to environmental events 
and that they value and respond to environmental disclosures.   
Concern over pollution and the potential deterioration of the Earth’s environment 
are of significant concern - particularly to the governments and people of developed 
nations. Industrial waste and pollutants are seen, by some, as negatively impacting the 
sustainability of life. Quantification of pollution and the ability to measure environmental 
liabilities has thus become an area of focus for the accounting profession.   
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The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has contributed by setting and 
shaping accounting rules and regulations which define how companies account for and 
report events related to the environment. The FASB’s statements, such as SFAS 51 
(Accounting for contingencies), emerging issues task force2
 In 1980, in response to the pollution of the Love Canal
 89-13 (Accounting for the 
Cost of Asbestos Removal), emerging issues task force 90-8 (Capitalization of Costs to 
Treat Environmental Contamination), and emerging issues task force 93-5 (Accounting 
for Environmental Liabilities) all focus on the measurement of environmental liabilities.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] has also promulgated regulations in this 
area. For instance, the SEC mandates environmental disclosures (ED) in the 10-k reports 
(primarily in items 103 and 303). 
3 and the environmental 
contamination at the Valley of the Drums,4
                                                          
1 SFAS 5 defines "loss contingency" as an existing condition, situation or set of circumstances  that revolve around 
the  uncertainty of the possible loss or expense that  an enterprise may face which may  ultimately be resolved when 
one or more future events occurs or fail to occur. SFAS 5 requires that an estimated loss or expense from a loss 
contingency will be accrued by a charge to income if it is probable that an asset has been impaired, or a liability 
incurred, provided that the amount of such an asset impairment or liability incurrence can be reasonably estimated. If a 
loss is not probable or not estimable, then a footnote disclosure of the contingency shall be made when there is at least 
a reasonable possibility that a loss may have been incurred, with an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss if it 
can be made. 
2 The Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) was formed in 1984 in response to the recommendation of the FASB's task 
force on timely financial reporting guidance and the FASB Invitation to Comment on those recommendations. The 
mission of the EITF is to assist the FASB in improving financial reporting through the timely identification, discussion, 
and resolution of financial accounting issues within the framework of existing authoritative literature. 
3 Hooker Chemical Company dumped 21,800 tons of waste into an abandoned canal in New York between 1942 and 
1953. The thick clay walls of the canal seemed to be the perfect place for dumping waste. Eventually, the land was 
covered with more clay and the dumping ceased. The land slowly developed into a small town, known as, Love Canal.  
The "impermeable" clay walls of the canal were penetrated and weakened by when the building of streets and plumbing 
lines occurred. While, the effects of chemical waste dumping were being noticed as early as 1950s, it was not until the 
1970s that the public would notice the skin irritation on the children and pets that had played or spent time near the 
field by the school as well as rocks that would explode when dropped. The Hooker Chemical Company was found 
responsible for the contamination in Love Canal 
 the US congress enacted the Comprehensive 
4 This incident took place in Bullitt County, Kentucky, near Louisville. By the mid 1960s 23 acres of land had 
become a collection point for toxic wastes. The matter caught the attention of state officials after some of the drums 
that had been strewn there caught fire and burned for more than a week, this was in 1966. I t was not until 1979 that the 
EPA initialized an emergency clean up of the land. Having realized the dangerous nature of the chemical waste, the 
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Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [CERCLA]. The purpose of 
the act is to protect people, families, communities and others from heavily contaminated 
toxic waste sites that have been abandoned. In other words, the act provides broad federal 
authority to clean up releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances that may 
endanger public health or the environment. Approximately 70% of the Superfund cleanup 
activities historically have been paid for by firms identified as potentially responsible 
parties (PRPs). Several attempts were made to reform the Superfund legislation, and in 
1986, such an attempt was successful. The resulting 1986 Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act increased Superfund appropriations and provided for studies and 
new technologies to be used. In 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed a new 
Superfund reform bill, which was seen as an additional improvement to existing 
legislation by both environmentalists and industry lobbyists. The proposal was, however, 
not approved by Congress. 
In 1996, The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA] issued 
Statement of Position 96-1, Environmental Remediation Liabilities [SOP 96-1]. The 
AICPA perceived that there was a pervasive lack of understanding on the part of 
companies and their independent accountants concerning the magnitude of the 
responsibility associated with environmental remediation. SOP 96-1 referenced the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement (FASB) of Financial Accounting 
Standards No.5, Accounting for Contingencies as the framework for the accounting 
treatment of environmental liabilities. The Statement of Position 96-1 consists of two 
parts: part one provides background by describing the various laws that may give rise to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
state reassigned the clean up to more specialized parties in 1983 and lasted for 7 years. However, problems would 
continue to be reported for several years to come.  
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environmental liabilities while part two provides an authoritative guide on the 
recognition, measurement, display, and disclosure of such liabilities. The SOP does not 
address accounting for pollution control costs for current operations, costs of future site 
restoration, or closure costs required upon termination of operations or the sale of 
facilities. The FASB is now considering these issues as a distinct project. The SOP 
reflects the increasing emphasis on accounting for and disclosure of environmental 
remediation liabilities. Hence, both public and private companies and their accountants 
should be increasingly vigilant in both areas as to protect themselves from the possibility 
of litigation.  
According to Dunlap and Scarce (1991), public opinion poll results indicate that 
the “public views business and industry as the major contributors to environmental 
problems,” and “that business and industry will not voluntarily protect the environment.” 
Opinion polls also indicated that “sizable minorities report having at least occasionally 
avoided buying products from companies with poor environmental records.” Epstein and 
Freedman (1994) found, for instance, that 82.17% of investors desired environmental 
disclosures. Those individual investors considered annual report information about the 
environmental activities more desirable than information about any other social activity. 
In March of 2009 Chairman Henry A. Waxman of the U.S. House of 
Representatives’ Energy and Commerce Committee and Chairman Edward J. Markey of 
the Energy and Environment Subcommittee and Select Committee on Global Warming 
released a draft of clean energy legislation. The Waxman-Markey discussion draft, “The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,” is comprehensive energy legislation. 
The authors claim that the legislation will create millions of new clean energy jobs, save 
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consumers hundreds of billions of dollars in energy costs, enhance America’s energy 
independence, and cut global warming pollution. Opponents of the legislation claim that 
passage of the bill will cost hundreds of billions of dollars in taxes, harm America’s 
energy independence and result in the loss of millions of jobs, all without having any 
measurable impact on the global environment. The legislation has four titles: (1) a “clean 
energy” title that promotes renewable sources of energy and carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies, low-carbon transportation fuels, clean electric vehicles, and 
the smart grid and electricity transmission; (2) an “energy efficiency” title that increases 
energy efficiency across all sectors of the economy, including buildings, appliances, 
transportation, and industry; (3) a “global warming” title that places limits on the 
emissions of heat-trapping pollutants; and (4) a “transitioning” title that protects U.S. 
consumers and industry and promotes green jobs during the transition to a clean energy 
economy.  
Worldwide efforts to preserve the surrounding environment have taken the form 
of collective actions. Air pollution that leads to the green house effect (world rising 
temperature) caught the world’s attention and motivated countries, especially the 
developed ones, to come together and address possible solutions to this problem. In 1992, 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, an international environmental treaty was drafted at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), most commonly 
known as the “Earth Summit.” The treaty was intended to achieve "stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic changes with the climate system." In 1997 at Kyoto, Japan, the treaty was 
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codified as the KYOTO protocol5
hydrofluorocarbons
 to be in force by February 2005.  The Protocol 
establishes legally binding commitments on the reduction of four greenhouse gases 
(carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride), and two groups of 
gases (  and perfluorocarbons) produced by "Annex I" countries, as 
well as general commitments for all member countries. These binding commitments 
target a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of five per cent of 1990 
levels. The period for achievement of this target is over the five-year period 2008-2012. 
National limitations range from 8% reductions for the European Union and some others 
to 7% for the United States, 6% for Japan, and 0% for Russia. The treaty permitted an 
increase of the green house gases mission by 8% for Australia and by 10% for Iceland. 
In the environmental performance literature there has been a vigorous debate 
about the association between the corporate environmental performance and the financial 
performance. One school within the literature supports the traditional perspective, which 
suggests that the expenditures on environmental improvements present additional costs 
that, generally, create no additional value to the firm. Another school supports the 
relatively newer perspective, which suggests that expenditures on environmental 
improvements and pollution controls would lead to additional value to firms. A third 
school suggests that corporate environmental performance and financial performance do 
not have any association.  
This research addresses the overall association between firms’ environmental 
performance and capital market valuations. Unlike prior studies that have examined the 
capital market’s response to environmental events, this study is aimed at investigating the 
                                                          
5 The distinction between the Protocol and the Convention is that while the Convention encouraged industrialized 
countries to stabilize GHG emissions, the Protocol committed them to doing so. 
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long term association between corporate environmental performance and firms’ annual 
returns independent of any particular environmental event. The sample is based on 
publicly traded firms valued by United States’ capital markets.  
The environmental performance measures are based on the KLD database which 
provides information about firms’ environmental performance based on 13 variables. Six 
variables, referred to as environmental strength variables, are related to firms activities 
and efforts to preserve the surrounding environment or to reduce/control pollution, the 
remaining seven variables, referred to as environmental concern variables, are related to 
the negative impact on the environment caused by the firms operations. The longitudinal 
association analysis is based on the most recent environmental data for years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
I have addressed environmental performance by using both single variables and 
an overall index. First, individual environmental performance measures are regressed 
against the sample firm’s annual returns; second, these individual measures were added 
together making an overall environmental profiling measure. The interaction between 
independent measures when combined to make this index was investigated using 
principal component analysis and independent measures results and overall environment 
profiling measure results are compared. Furthermore, I examine the association between 
changes in firms’ environmental performance and security returns. 
This research contributes to the environmental performance literature by, first, 
presenting evidence on the nature of the general association between environmental 
performance and firm market value rather than focusing on the short term effects of 
particular environmental events. Second, this research provides evidence of how 
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environmental attributes interact when combined into a single overall measure. The 
results of this study may provide guidance to the regulators and standard setters with 
respect to identifying the way that capital markets respond to corporate environmental 
performance.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two reviews 
the current literature on environmental disclosure and corporate performance as well as 
the capital market reaction to environmental events. Chapter Three addresses the 
hypotheses and the methodology employed in testing the hypotheses. The results are 
analyzed in Chapter Four, while Chapter Five offers a discussion of the findings and the 
resulting conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Annual reporting is one of the primary means through which firms communicate 
information to stakeholders. These annual disclosures are of such great importance that 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates that publicly traded firms are 
required to report any valuable information to the investors - the full disclosure principle. 
Information is considered valuable if it could affect investors’ decisions regarding 
whether to buy, hold, or sell their ownership in the organization. Knowing how valuable 
the disclosures are, firms engage in various activities to affect the policy making process 
in order to serve their own interests and to enhance their chances for economic survival 
and success. For example, unlike prior studies that investigated why the U.S. public 
accounting profession would promote legislation reform, Roberts, Dwyer, and Sweeney 
(2003) studied the detailed analysis of how the public accounting industry gained 
political power by focusing on the strategies it utilized to successfully influence a 
reduction in legal liability. They examined the AICPA and Big 6 Political Action 
Committee (PAC) contributions to individuals; senators from 1988 to 1996; and to 
individual members of the House of Representatives from 1994 to 1996. The general 
objective of the corporation’s political strategy is to influence the policy outcomes such 
that the firms’ chances for economic survival and success are enhanced.   
Dominant firms, such as the big 4 accounting firms, rely on federal regulations for 
economic survival; therefore they tend to maintain a proactive political strategy. This 
analysis is based on the Hillman and Hitt (1999) model of corporate political strategy. 
The model presents the proactive political strategy as a sequential three stage decision 
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process, which are: general approach; level of participation; and strategies and tactics. 
The analysis started by searching through multiple electronic sources, such as issues of 
the Journal of Accountancy and the CPA Journal from 1988 to mid 2000, and through the 
reference lists of all the source materials found to obtain a comprehensive set of data 
sources. They then analyzed the information by comparing specific case items with the 
Hillman and Hitt model’s descriptions and quantitatively categorized documents, records, 
statements, and actions in terms of the components of the model. Finally, they organized 
the results by mapping out the findings into the structure of the model. The data are 
consistent with Hillman and Hitt’s description of a relational approach to general political 
strategy that is long term and spans multiple issues.  
Mixed results are reported, however, regarding firms’ levels of participation. The 
authors find that the AICPA and the Big 6 firms engaged both individually and 
collectively in the process of securities legislation reform, appearing to lead to a 
coalition-building strategy. Hillman and Hitt (1999) suggest that highly credible firms 
employing a relational approach are more likely to adopt informational and constituency 
building strategies and tactics. Although they find evidence consistent with the 
informational and constituency building approach, they also find evidence that the 
AICPA and the Big 6 firms utilize financial incentive strategies and tactics.  
They also examined the AICPA and Big 6 PACs' contributions to individual 
senators from 1988 to 1996 and to individual members of the House of Representatives 
from 1994 to 1996. Two empirical tests were performed, the first test, regression 
analysis, investigated the rationality of the AICPA and the Big 6 PAC contributions; the 
second test, logistic regression, assessed the effectiveness of the contributions in helping 
12 
 
to gain passage of the reform act. Results suggest that the profession’s PACs appear to 
contribute rationally in their efforts to affect the passage of the Private Securities 
Legislation reform. The AICPA and the Big 6 PACs contributed to the Senators and 
House members who were assigned to committees that directly influence the design of 
legislation. Furthermore, the significant association between those contributions and the 
voting behavior in both the Senate and the House provides evidence of the rationality of 
the profession’s PAC contribution expenditures as well as a measure of their 
effectiveness. 
Over the past few years environmental disclosure practices increased significantly 
in firms’ annual reports and the fact that some regulatory agencies, such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), are mandating environmental disclosures, has made 
environmental disclosure an essential part of firms’ reporting activities. Niskala and 
Pretes (1995) investigated the changes in corporate environmental disclosure practices 
among large Finnish firms. Specifically, they investigated the willingness of firms to 
disclose environmental information in the years 1987 and 1992. They selected 1987 
because it was the first year the Brundtland Report6
                                                          
6 The Brundtland Commission, formally known as the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) was convened by the United Nations in 1983. The commission was created for the purpose of addressing the 
growing concern "about the deterioration of the human environment as well as the natural resources and the 
consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development." The commission main objective was: (1) to 
propose long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable; (2) To recommend ways and means of co-
operation among countries to deal with the global environmental concerns. 
 was published, and thus is considered 
to be the beginning of the environmental movement of the late 1980s. They selected 1992 
because it was the most current data available at the time of the study. Niskala and Pretes 
used a content analysis approach developed by Guthrie (Guthrie & Parker, 1989) to 
determine whether or not the disclosures contained any qualitative, quantitative or 
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financial reporting. Qualitative information includes verbal disclosures. Quantitative 
information refers to environmental measures such as emission levels and forest materials 
consumed in production by volume. Financial information includes environmental 
information expressed in monetary terms. The aforementioned was done in an effort to 
standardize the data collection to facilitate analyzing general environmental disclosures; 
environmental policy disclosures; and disclosures of financial environmental information 
in the annual reports. Based on the Finnish business magazine classification, Niskala and 
Pretes identified nine industrial categories: chemicals and plastics; construction; energy 
production; electricity and electronics; forestry and forest products; industrial 
conglomerates; metals and metal products; oil trading, and transportation, with direct or 
significant environmental impact. The largest 100 firms in these categories (based on 
sales), were selected for the initial sample, of which 75 were included in the final sample.  
The results of this study indicate that there is a significant increase in 
environmental reporting practices between 1987 and 1992. Most of the disclosure 
increases are in qualitative, rather than quantitative (financial) form. Also, financial 
environmental disclosure seems to be the most effective method concerning the reporting 
of environmental investments and operating expenditures resulting from environmental 
protection activities. The results are consistent with prior research that indicates 
environmental reporting is associated with industry classification (polluting versus 
non/less polluting industries).  
Harte and Owen (1991) studied voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports of British companies.  Their analysis of the annual reports was performed in two 
steps. The first step was to determine whether or not environmental matters were 
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mentioned within the statements of objectives. The second step was to determine whether 
the disclosures were financial/nonfinancial in nature, or specific narratives. Their overall 
sample was composed of 30 firms, 24 of which were surveyed by questionnaire (Harte et 
al., 1991). The questionnaire requested a list of five companies perceived as consistently 
good at disclosing ethical and environment information. Respondents identified 24 
companies, and the other six were added by the researchers based on their findings that 
these six firms were considered to be innovators of green reporting practices. They 
conducted a comparison of disclosures within firms’ annual reports where the latest 
annual reports available by the end of June 1990 were compared to previous year’s 
annual reports. Results indicate that there is a general increase in firms’ environmental 
disclosure over time; firms are willing to shed light upon their own standards, without 
going into details; and some companies are willing to emphasize external industry 
standards, again without any specific details.  
The second part of Hart and Owen's analysis focused on firms in the water 
industry. The water industry is heavily regulated by external bodies, so beside the basic 
requirements of environmental accountability, external standards are independently 
required. The analysis focused on 10 newly privatized water companies of which eight 
provided their 1990 financial reports. Four aspects of environmental performance were 
considered: the quality of drinking water, the quality of rivers, the quality of bathing 
water, and the use of water assets.  
Overall, the results indicate that firms report environmental performance 
information pertaining to the quantity rather than the quality of water. However, the 
analysis suggests that the need to comply with external standards influenced firms’ 
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environmental disclosures since the reporting of environmental information was greater 
than some years prior.  
Campbell (2004) studied the volume of voluntary environmental disclosure, 
specifically the voluntary reporting "attitude," of 10 companies in five industries over a 
period of 27 years (1974 through 2000). Environmental disclosure was defined as a 
company’s attitude, policy or behavior towards its environmental impact in terms of 
emissions, pollution, cleaning up, and re-landscaping or energy efficiency. 
Environmental disclosure was measured using the word count technique which is thought 
to encounter fewer errors than other counting techniques such as sentence count or page 
proportion count. The sample was chosen from the FTSE 100 index7
Using regression analysis, the study yielded results showing that the mean volume 
of environmental disclosure increased by the late 1980s. Campbell conducted a cross-
sectional analysis to address the differences in voluntary environmental disclosure across 
industries by comparing environmental disclosures of environmentally sensitive 
industries to those of less sensitive industries. The results reveal a positive association 
between the extent of environmental disclosure and industry classification. Campbell (as 
well as Berthelot, Cormier and Magnan, 2003) suggest that the variability in both 
 by selecting two 
companies from five industrial sectors: retail, brewing, petrochemicals, chemicals and 
intermediates, and aggregates. After excluding six observations due to the unavailability 
of annual reports, the longitudinal sample was composed of 264 firm-year observations. 
                                                          
7 FTSE 100 is an index of the 100 most highly capitalized UK companies, representing about 81% of the market 
capitalization of the whole London Stock Exchange. Even though the FTSE All-Share Index is more comprehensive, 
the FTSE 100 is the most widely used UK stock market indicator. 
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longitudinal and cross-sectional disclosure behaviors can be explained by the firms’ need 
for social legitimacy. 
Pollution incidents have also been found to be positively associated with an 
increase in the level of environmental disclosure. Walden and Schwartz (1997) 
investigated changes in the levels of environmental disclosures, in four industries: the 
chemical, consumer products, forest products, and oil industries, subsequent to the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill8.  Environmental disclosures were categorized as either financial 
or nonfinancial disclosures.  Environmental disclosure changes were measured using 
content analysis where levels of disclosures were tested using a quantity score (QS), to 
measure differences in the frequency of environmental disclosures, and a disclosure score 
(DS), to measure differences in the quality of environmental disclosures within various 
sections of the annual report. The sample was drawn from the list of firms analyzed in the 
CEP reports9
The authors conducted comparative statistical analysis of the data for 1988 and 
1989, and for 1989 and 1990. Their findings suggest that significant positive differences 
exist in the levels of environmental disclosures from year 1988 to 1989 and from year 
 for years 1988, 1989, and 1990. The final sample included 53 firms. Eleven 
of the sample firms were from the chemical industry, eleven from the consumer products 
industry, sixteen from the forest products industry, and fifteen from the oil industry.   
                                                          
8 The Exxon Valdez oil spill, one of the most devastating human-caused environmental disasters ever to occur at 
sea, occurred in the Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 23, 1989. The vessel spilled 10.8 million U.S. gallons 
(about 40 million liters) of crude oil into the sea, and the oil eventually covered 1,300 square miles (3,400 km2) of 
ocean.  
9 Firms in this study are chosen from industries previously analyzed through reports published by the Council on 
Economic Priorities' (CEP) Corporate Environmental Data Clearinghouse (CEDC). The CEDC monitors, gathers, and 
analyzes information on corporate environmental performance for firms in the Fortune 500. 
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1989 to 1990, in both financial and nonfinancial disclosures using both assessment 
measures.  
An industry comparison conducted for years 1988 and 1989 also indicates that a 
significant increase took place in the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure in 
across all four industries. The levels of nonfinancial environmental disclosures, however, 
significantly increase in 1990 over 1989 only in the oil and consumer products industries. 
The financial environmental disclosures increased in the oil and forest products. All four 
industries have significant increases in their levels of financial environmental disclosures 
(in terms of both quantity and quality). The findings of this study contribute to the 
understanding of the nature of environmental disclosures in the following respects: first, 
71% to 96% of the environmental disclosures appear in the nonfinancial section of the 
annual reports for years 1989 and 1990 and are not audited. Their content is thus left to 
the discretion of management. Second, the environmental disclosures appear to be time 
and event specific, as firms reacted to public policy pressures in response to the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
Fry and Hock (1976) investigated the content of and reasons for, firm’s 
environmental disclosures. They investigated whether or not firms reporting on their 
social performance are those ones receiving the most public pressure to do so. They also 
investigated which industries are more likely to emphasize social responsibility in their 
annual report, and whether there is an association between social responsibility and 
profitability. A sample of 135 firms, drawn from fifteen industries ranging from banking 
to consumer products to mining, was analyzed to measure three general variables. Those 
variables are: social responsibility, social responsiveness and public image. Social 
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responsibility was measured by an analysis of photographs or text, where an overall 
rating was provided to each report which consisted of 1 point for each paragraph and half 
a point for each photograph related to social responsibility. Social responsiveness factors 
were identified as assets, earnings, sales, equity, and return on investment. Public image, 
was assessed by performing a ranking survey addressed to business students.  
The results show that sales, net income, return on assets, and public image are all 
significantly related to the extent of social responsibility disclosures in the annual reports 
but return on investment is not. The results also indicate that larger firms (in terms of 
sales) tend to make more social responsibility disclosures. Public Image is found to be the 
second most important variable in determining the level of social responsibility 
disclosure and industry classification tends to affect the degree of social responsibility 
disclosures positively. In other words, firms operating in industries that adversely affect 
the environment tend to be under higher public scrutiny, which positively influences their 
social responsibility disclosures.  
 
2.1 Environmental Disclosure 
Environmental disclosures can be communicated, via a number of methods: 
through mandatory, voluntary, or external non-firm environmental disclosures. Each of 
these methods has its advantages and disadvantages relative to the information value to 
stakeholders. Each method also has its own interpretation and design in the body of 
research that has studied this issue. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) for example, 
propose that an unjustified negative market reaction results when investors believe that 
management has not revealed all available information. More specifically, Milgrom 
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(1981) addresses the notion of news favorableness within the context of information 
economies, which refers to the study of situations in which different economic agents 
have access to different sets of information.  
Milgrom highlights the importance of information disclosure through four 
modeling applications. The first is the security market model, where more favorable news 
regarding firms’ future earnings leads to higher stock prices for the firm. The second is 
the principal-agent model, where the principal designs the compensation for his agent and 
more favorable evidence (news) about agents’ efforts leads to larger compensation 
(bonuses). The third application model is the “games of persuasion” model, where 
decision-makers (buyers) expect that any product information withheld by the interested 
party (salesman) is unfavorable for the product and thus that withholding information 
dissuades buyer from making purchases. The fourth model is an auction model 
highlighted by the notion that winning an auction at a low price (i.e. low bids by 
competitors) signals a low value for the object being sold.  
Grossman (1981) studied the consequent effect of withholding information and 
concludes that a negative market response will result. He argues that prices, to some 
extent, reflect and transmit information to market participants. In some situations, 
however, such price mechanisms don’t exist, such as when product quality is unknown. 
In these cases it is in the interest of sellers of good quality products to distinguish 
themselves from sellers of poor quality products because if sellers are unable to 
communicate quality to buyers, all products will be sold at the same (low) price. This is 
commonly known as the “lemons problem.”  
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Grossman considered two cases to address the importance of information in a 
monopoly context. He suggested that monopolists have an incentive, as a function of the 
product’s true quality, to reveal the quality even when it is poor. The first case is when 
the seller himself can make statements about product quality that can be verified ex-post 
(after the sale). The results indicate that monopolists won't be able to mislead consumers 
about the quality of the product because consumers will assume that the monopolist’s 
product is of the worst quality if there is less than full disclosure. The second case is 
when the product quality statements are too costly to communicate or to verify.  
In this case, where the quality statements cannot be guaranteed, Grossman assumed that 
monopolists would offer a warranty as a proof of product quality. The results indicate 
that because consumers are risk-averse, if the seller provides less than a full warranty, 
consumers will assume a low-quality product and may not make the purchase.  
Dye (1985) studied why management might withhold information that is not 
proprietary in nature. Proprietary information is defined as any information whose 
disclosure potentially alters the firm’s future earnings or senior management's 
compensation. According to the prior literature, firms can make credible statements about 
their private information in such a way as to compensate for withholding that private 
information. Dye, however, suggests that even when such credible announcements of 
private information are possible, there are distinctions regarding the amount of 
information disclosed to the public.  
Dye highlighted three perspectives that explain managements’ disclosure failure. 
The first perspective is based on investors' imperfect knowledge where managers may 
successfully choose not to disclose adverse information. The second perspective flows 
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from the observation that nonproprietary information may not be disclosed if it is part of 
the private information array. The third perspective stems from the principal-agent 
problem. The model supporting the third perspective indicates that disclosures may 
actually increase the principal-agent problems between management and shareholders. 
Dye suggests that investors cannot determine whether information is being withheld by 
management, and in the absence of this determination the expected unjustified negative 
market reaction may not take place. 
In a similar vein, Verrecchia (1983) investigated managers’ attempts to exercise 
discretion in disclosing information that may negatively affect their firm’s value. 
Investors, however, have rational expectations about managers’ motivation to withhold 
unfavorable information. Thus, investors will seek information from external sources 
which creates disclosure-related costs that lead to information-noise by extending the 
range of possible interpretations of withheld information (whether favorable or 
unfavorable).  
Verrecchia concludes that since investors are unable to interpret withheld 
information unambiguously as ‘bad news’, then they will discount the value of the firm to 
the point that the managers are better off disclosing all information investors may need. 
Acquiring external sources of information, such as external non-firm environmental 
disclosures, requires investors to devote time and effort which, in turn, leads to what Lev 
(1988) refers to as inequality in capital markets. Inequality in capital markets is defined 
as the inequality of opportunities and/or the existence of systematic and significant 
information asymmetries across investors which lead to an “information imbalance.” 
Information imbalance results in higher transaction costs, lower trading volume, and 
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fewer participants in the capital market - or what can be referred to as greater market 
inefficiency. Lev suggest that in order to reduce information asymmetries, a public policy 
mandating the disclosure of financial information should be designed and implemented to 
mitigate the inequality in capital markets. Lev concludes that mandating a disclosure 
policy should be aimed at improving the effectiveness of accounting bodies as well as 
providing a justification for the regulation of information disclosure.  
We can conclude from the above, that more, rather than less disclosure is the 
optimal choice. Indeed, the primary focus of research in the area of environmental 
accounting has been to assess the association between firm characteristics and 
environmental disclosures.  
Cormier and Magnan (1999) identified the determinants of voluntary corporate 
environmental disclosure using a cost benefits framework. These determinants are: 
information costs; financial conditions; and environmental performance. Environmental 
disclosure was measured using the Wiseman environmental disclosure index. Information 
costs were measured using five variables: risk (market beta); reliance on capital markets 
(a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the firm issued securities in the prior three years, 
otherwise coded 0); trading volume (measured by dividing annual trading volume by the 
total number of shares outstanding); concentrated ownership (a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if the firm is controlled by an individual or family, otherwise coded 0); and 
subsidiary of another firm (a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the firm is a subsidiary for 
another firm, otherwise coded 0). Financial Conditions were measured with three 
variables: accounting return (the return on assets ratio); markets return (the market 
adjusted annual stock return); and financial leverage (the debt-to-equity ratio). 
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Environmental performance was measured by four dichotomous variables: fines and/or 
penalties, orders to conform or remediation, lawsuits, and violation of pollution emission 
standards.  
Their sample is composed of 33 firms, and data was collected for the eight year 
period 1986 through 1993. The sample contains firms within three industrial sectors: pulp 
and paper; oil refining and petrochemicals; steel, metals, and mines. The analysis was 
conducted using several techniques. 
Regressions were run for each individual year as well as for the entire eight year 
period. Tobit analysis was used to permit dependent variables equal to zero. Logit 
analysis was also used because the dependent variable relies on subjective judgment and 
thus errors may exist in the measurement. Results using Logit and Tobit are consistent 
with the results obtained using regression analysis. The results indicate the following: 
first, there are patterns towards more environmental disclosure; second, information 
costs, risk, reliance on capital markets, and trading volume are positively associated with 
firm environmental disclosure and concentrated ownership is negatively associated with 
disclosure; third, the evidence reveals a positive association between financial conditions, 
when measured by ROA or leverage, and environmental disclosures; fourth, 
environmental disclosure is positively influenced by firms' environmental performance; 
fifth, firms in the pulp and paper industry disclose more environmental information than 
do firms in the other two industries; and sixth, large firms with newer fixed assets tend to 
report more environmental information while firms subject to SEC regulation disclose 
less. 
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Patten (1991) examined whether firms’ voluntary social environmental 
disclosures are related to either public pressure or firm profitability. It is argued that firms 
use social disclosure as a mean to address public pressure towards environmental 
responsibilities. Based on the annual surveys of Ernst and Ernst (1977) and (1978), 
disclosures are considered to be socially related if they fall within one or more of seven 
categories: environment, energy, fair business practices, human resources, community 
involvement, products, and other disclosures.  
Patten were measured disclosures, using the page proportion count technique 
(1/100th of page intervals, included in the annual report). Twenty-eight firms with social 
disclosures ranging between 1/10 to a quarter-page were excluded. 47 firms with 
disclosures of a quarter-page or more were classified as high disclosure firms, while 81 
firms with disclosures less than 1/10 of a page were classified as low disclosure firms. 
Size and industry classification were used as explanatory variables; where industry 
classification was used as a proxy for public pressure, and size was measured using the 
log of revenues. Profitability of firms was measured using 5 proxies: return on assets; 
return on equity; five-year average ROE; one-year lagged ROA; and a dichotomous 
variable assessing the decrease in current year net income from the previous year, coded 
1 if yes or 0 if otherwise. Based on the 1985 Fortune 500 listing, a sample of 156 
companies was drawn from eight different industries, namely, petroleum refining, 
chemical, forest and paper products, electronics, industrial and farm machinery, metal 
products, and computer and rubber products. The sample selection process was intended 
to include firms from high-profile and medium- or low- profile industries. In addressing 
the association between social disclosures and profitability, independent models were 
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used to assess profitability based on the five measures. The regression analysis reveals a 
significant positive association between both size and industry classification and the level 
of social disclosure, while no significant association exists between social disclosures and 
any of the profitability measures. 
Alnajjar (2000) proposed that social responsibility disclosures may be made by 
firms that are not held responsible for environmental damages or contaminations; rather, 
they have a more sophisticated understanding of how to control and affect public opinion 
to secure a good social image for the firm. He examines the association between 
individual corporate characteristics and social responsibility disclosures (SRDs). In order 
to enhance the understanding of the underlying forces for SRDs, the analysis investigated 
the areas, as well as, the types of SRDs. More specifically, he investigated the association 
between firm characteristics, namely corporate size, profitability, and industry 
classification in different areas of SRDs (i.e. community, employees, environment, 
product related activities, and the type of SRDs, whether monetary, quantitative, or 
narrative). The study addresses five main hypotheses: first, corporate SRD is a function 
of corporate size; second, corporate SRD is a function of corporate profitability; third, 
corporate SRD is a function of industry category; fourth, the explanatory variables 
influence variations in the major areas of disclosure; and finally, the explanatory 
variables influence variations in the types of disclosures.  
The Fortune 500 database was used to identify the sample for the analysis. Annual 
reports were obtained for 451 firms. Industry classification was based on Fortune’s 
industrial index for 1990 which provides a list of 27 industries. Content analysis was used 
to quantify the social responsibility disclosures in firms’ annual reports using a total of 47 
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disclosure items, 32 items were based on the disclosure items used by the National 
Association of Accountants, while 25 items were based on Beresford’s 1974 survey. The 
47 disclosure items were reclassified into four major areas of disclosures, 17 items were 
related to community; 17 items were related to employees; 10 items were related to 
environment; and 3 items were related to product activities. Three corporate 
characteristics were used in the analysis: corporate size (measured using 2 proxies: the 
log of assets and the log of revenues); profitability (also measured using 2 proxies: return 
on equity and return on assets); and industry classification. Disclosure types, whether 
monetary, quantitative, or narrative disclosure, were assessed by assigning 1 point for 
each type of disclosure found in the annual reports, otherwise 0.  
The results indicate that a significant positive association exists between SRD and 
firm size, using both proxies, which supports the first hypothesis. The results fail, 
however, to support the second hypothesis, where a significant but negative association 
exists (using both proxies) between SRD's and profitability. The third hypothesis is 
partially supported, in that only one industry group shows a significant association 
between SRD and the industry group category. The fourth hypothesis, proposing that the 
power of corporate characteristic variables that influence the amount of disclosures vary 
significantly among the four disclosure areas is supported. Specifically, firm size is 
significantly associated with all areas of disclosure; the influence of the remaining 
corporate characteristics, profitability and industry classification, on SDRs depends, 
however, on the area of disclosure.  
Corporate size is the only variable affecting environmental protection disclosures; 
corporate size and industry classification affects community involvement and product 
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safety disclosure; size and corporate profitability affects the human resources area. The 
results also support the fifth hypothesis since monetary and quantitative disclosures 
showed significant differences based on corporate size while narrative disclosures do not. 
Blaconniere and Patten (1994) examined the market reaction to chemical firms 
after the Bhopal incident.10
Content analysis was used to determine the extent of environmental disclosure in 
the 10Ks based on the presence, or absence of statements relating to five areas of 
environmental concern, namely, current or proposed regulations, environmental standards 
compliance, current or past environmental controls expenditures, future environmental 
controls expenditures, and lawsuits. Environmental disclosures were assessed by 
assigning 1 point for each disclosure area presented or discussed in the annual report, 
 They define regulatory costs as costs incurred by firms in 
response to or as a result of proposed or enacted government regulations. In their 
analysis, two firm specific factors were used to proxy for expected changes in regulatory 
costs: significant involvement in the chemical industry, which was measured as the ratio 
of chemical segment revenues to the total revenues off of the firm, and the extent of 
environmental disclosure in the 10K report. Particularly, they addressed three main 
hypotheses: first, that firms in the chemical industry, other than Union Carbide, 
experienced a negative market reaction following the Bhopal incident; second, that firms 
with larger segment involvement experienced a more negative market reaction following 
the Bhopal incident; and third, that firms with more extensive environmental disclosures 
experienced a less negative market reaction subsequent to the Bhopal incident.  
                                                          
10 Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India 1984, A pesticide facility release tons of toxic methyl isocyanate gases that led to 
a huge death toll in the surrounding area. The Bhopal incident is frequently cited as the world's worst environmental 
disaster because the death toll was 8,000 - 10,000 within the first 72 hours of toxic gas emission. 
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otherwise 0. A sample, of 47 firms, is used in the analysis. Each and every firm in the 
sample met the following criteria: industrial membership (firms within SIC chemical 
industry codes); availability of stock price data; financial statement disclosure (the firm 
must have disclosed chemical or industrial gas segment revenues of at least 10% of total 
revenues in the footnotes of the 10K report prior to the incident); and no confounding 
events (earnings, dividends announcements). An event-study methodology was used to 
test the first hypothesis where cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for a five day 
window (0 - +4) as well as “Pseudo CARs” for a randomly selected five day window 
within the period from January 3, 1984 to December 31, 1985 (this is because the Bhopal 
chemical leak was not anticipated and thus the market reaction would occur only after the 
event). 
Overall results show a significant negative market reaction within the chemical 
industry following the Bhopal environmental incident. Cross-sectional analysis was used 
to test the second and third hypotheses. The results indicate that a significant positive 
association exists between segment involvement and the severity of the market reaction 
while a significant negative association exists between environmental disclosure and 
market reaction. The results are robust to several sensitivity tests such as using 
multivariate regression and eliminating litigation disclosure. 
Blaconniere and Northcut (1997) investigate the impact of the Superfund 
amendments and reauthorization act11
                                                          
11In response to the love Canal environmental crisis in New York the comprehensive environmental response, 
compensation and liability act (commonly known as superfund act) was enacted in 1980. In light of environmental 
protection concerns the act was designed and authorizes the EPA to identify parties (firms) responsible for 
contaminating sites, and compel them to clean up these sites. The superfund act was amended in 1986 by the Superfund 
amendments and the authorization act (SARA) which increased superfund funding, direct taxes affecting chemical 
firms, and expanded disclosure requirements for firms releasing hazardous wastes into the environment. 
 known as SARA on firms’ stock prices. Two types 
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of environmental information are considered in the analysis: the extent of environmental 
disclosure in the financial statements prior to SARA and the firm-specific estimates of 
Superfund liabilities based on EPA data. They investigate the impact of legislative events 
on stock prices. They propose two hypotheses: first, that firms with more environmental 
disclosure in their financial statements experience a smaller negative market reaction to 
SARA events that do firms with less environmental disclosure; and second, that firms 
with more exposure to future superfund cleanup obligations experience larger negative 
market reactions to SARA events. Content analysis was conducted to assess the extent of 
environmental disclosure in the financial statements by observing the presence or absence 
of statements related to disclosure areas such as current or proposed disclosure; 
compliance to environmental standards; current or past environmental control 
expenditures; estimates of future environment control expenditures; and actions or 
lawsuits against the company. The Control variables in the model are: the sensitivity of 
firm returns to chemical industrial returns; the ratio of chemical-related revenues to total 
revenues; and firm size.  
A sample of 72 firms was collected based on the following four conditions: the 
firms must belong to the chemical and allied products industry or at least be involved in 
chemical operations; security price data must be available; Superfund data must be 
available, and financial data must be available. An event study methodology was 
employed where returns were cumulated over a 3 day window. Two sets of legislative 
events leading to the amendment of the Superfund act were considered. The first set was 
composed of 26 events from February 22nd 1985 to October 20th 1986. The second was 
composed of 17 events that involved legislative actions. The second set was used to 
30 
 
increase the power of the tests. The  authors assess the market reaction to the legislative 
events by calculating abnormal returns around both sets of event dates. They further 
examine the effect of environmental disclosures in the financial statements that may have 
affected the impact of the legislative events.  The results indicate that: chemical firms 
experience an overall negative reaction to the announcements of specific legislative 
actions leading to the SARA; more environmental disclosures included in firms financial 
statements reduces the severity of negative market reaction; and firms identified as a 
potentially responsible party (PRP) experience more negative market reactions. Overall 
the results indicate that environmental disclosures included in the financial statements 
and estimates of environmental costs based on EPA announcements are value relevant in 
explaining firm-specific market reactions, however, environmental disclosures in 
financial statements are value relevant only in the presence of environmental information 
from the EPA. 
Barth, McNichols, and Wilson (1997) examine factors influencing firms’ 
environmental liability disclosure decisions in industries with substantial Superfund site 
involvements. They hypothesize that environmental disclosures are associated with five 
factors: regulations, which include enforcement activities; management’s information, 
which include site and location uncertainty; litigation and negotiation concerns; capital 
market concerns; and other regulatory influences.  Environmental disclosure was 
measured using content analysis composed of 13 disclosure items related to four areas. 
The first three items are related to the number of Superfund and other environmentally 
impaired sites on which a firm had been named a PRP. The next three items are related to 
firms’ estimates of remediation costs. The next 4 items are related to accruals for 
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environmental liabilities, and the final 3 items are related to possible insurance recovery. 
All items are dichotomous in nature, if the item was mentioned in the firms’ annual 
reports it was coded as 1, otherwise 0.  
Based on the content analysis, four dependent variables were constructed, 
“d_total”, which represents a comprehensive disclosure measure that equally weights the 
13 disclosure variables; “d2”, which represents the statement of whether or not the firm is 
considered a PRP on one or more of the Superfund sites; “d4”, which represents the firms 
range or qualitative assessment about the remediation cost estimates; and “d7”, which 
represents the statement of whether or not the firm accrues environmental liabilities. The 
fifth dependent variable, “VOLDIS”, was set equal to 1 if the firm voluntarily disclosed 
its accrued environmental liability, otherwise 0.  
The sample was obtained from Haz-Site reports provided by Environmental Data 
Resources Inc. and the Records of Decision filed with the EPA. The final sample of 257 
firms was composed of firms from four different industries: utilities, automotive, 
chemicals, and appliances. These industries are identified by Barth and McNicolas (1994) 
as industries with the greatest number of firms named as PRPs. The results, using 
regression analysis, indicate that all of the proposed factors, except site uncertainty, are 
significantly associated with firm environmental disclosure decisions. 
Freedman and Patten (2004) studied whether or not the toxic release inventory 
system [TRI]12
                                                          
12The Toxic release inventory system contains information regarding more than 650 toxic chemicals and compounds 
that are used, manufactured, treated, transported, or released by, certain covered industry groups as well as federal 
facilities, into the environment, as required by Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act (1986). TRI contains release-transfer data by facility, year, chemical, and medium of release, as well as treatment 
and source reduction data.TRI data are available at the EPA. 
, used as a pollution performance measure, would affect stock market 
prices in response to President Bush’s 1989 proposal for amendments to the 1970 Clean 
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Air Act. The authors hypothesize that firms with worse air pollution performance 
suffered more negative marketing reactions to the announcement of President Bush’s 
proposal than companies with better air pollution performance. Using the toxic air 
releases reported by the TRI in 1987, a sample of 112 firms was selected. Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) were calculated around the press conference on June 12th 1989 
when the proposal was announced. The results indicate that firms with higher toxic air 
releases tend to suffer more negative market reactions, which indicate a significant 
positive association between the amount of air pollution and the reduction in stock prices. 
The authors conclude e that TRI serves as a regulatory mechanism affecting stock market 
prices.  
Freedman and Patten also investigate whether or not firms’ environmental 
disclosures reduce the market’s negative reaction to pollution disclosures. They 
hypothesize that the level of firm specific environmental disclosure is not significantly 
associated with market reactions to the announcement of President Bush’s proposal for 
changes to the Clean Air Act. Similar to prior studies, content analysis was conducted to 
identify the extent of disclosure in firms’ annual reports. Each firm was assessed in terms 
of eight disclosure areas, “1” point was awarded for each disclosure area included in the 
10-K report. Disclosure scores were expected to range from 0 to 8, however, actual 
content analysis scores ranged from 0 to 7 with a mean of 2.39 and a median of 2. The 
results demonstrate that firms with lower levels of environmental disclosure in their 
annual reports tended to experience more negative market reactions to the clean air act 
proposal. Furthermore, the study provides evidence that the market rewards higher 
environmental disclosure at times of poor environmental performance. This finding also 
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suggests that firms may use environmental disclosure as a mechanism to manipulate 
negative market reactions to poor environmental performance.  
Karpoff, Lott, Rankine (1999) examined the association between firm size and 
determinants of fines; damage awards; remediation costs; and market value losses 
imposed on companies that violate environmental laws. Their analysis was conducted 
using an event study methodology and regression analysis.  They examine 283 cases in 
which publicly traded firms were investigated, accused, or settled charges of 
environmental violations from 1980 through 1991. Their sample was obtained from a 
search of The Wall Street Journal Index under its “Environment” and “Environmental 
Crime” listings. Using the 77 events in which firms were investigated, convicted, or cited 
for environmental violations, they investigated the association between legal penalties 
and firm size. Their results indicate that no significant association exists between size and 
legal penalties. The paper fails, however, to explain the variation in the legal penalties, 
consistent with the arguments that such penalties are highly variable and not predictable 
in nature. The results also suggest  that firms investigated or charged with environmental 
violations experience statistically significant and economically meaningful decreases in 
their common share values. The response to environmental violations is an abnormal 
stock return of –1.58%, while announcements that charges had been filed caused an 
average abnormal stock return of –1.92%. On average, firms violating environmental 
laws suffer statistically significant losses in their market value. The losses are of a 
magnitude similar to the legal penalties imposed, indicating that legal penalties and 
reputational losses are the most important variables in disciplining and preventing 
environmental violations.  
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Given these concerns regarding market efficiency and the continuous increase in 
environmental disclosure importance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
mandates a minimum level of environmental disclosure, Item 103 and 303 in the 10-k 
annual report13
McGuire, Sundgre and Schneeweis investigated the extent to which social 
responsibility predicted financial performance as well as whether or not prior financial 
. The SEC requirements are designed to ensure the disclosure of basic 
environmental information that may affect stakeholders’ decisions as well as help 
alleviate information asymmetry.  
 
2.2 Environmental Performance 
McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) provide a brief summary of three 
theoretical relationships between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial 
performance. Their first argument suggests a negative relationship between social 
responsibility and financial performance since high social responsibility results in 
additional costs that put the firm at an economic disadvantage compared to other less 
socially responsible firms. Their second argument suggests a positive association 
between social responsibility and financial performance where improved employee and 
customer goodwill is considered an important outcome of social responsibility. Their 
third argument suggests that, although the costs of improving environmental performance 
can be significant, other costs may be reduced and/or revenues may increase.  
                                                          
13Item 103 “Legal Proceedings” contains two exceptions: (1) losses resulting from any administrative or judicial 
proceeding involving federal, state, or local environmental laws, if the amount of the losses exceeds 10 percent of the 
company’s current assets and (2) monetary sanctions greater than $100,000, if a governmental authority is a party to the 
proceeding. Item 303, “Management Discussion and Analysis” that requires companies to discuss in their filings with 
the SEC any known material trends, events, and uncertainties that would cause the companies’ liquidity, capital 
resources, and results of operations, as reported, to not be indicative of future operating results or financial condition.  
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performance predicted social responsibility. Using Fortune magazine's ratings14
In other studies of environmental performance, Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) 
studied the association between environmental management efforts, “environmental 
reward” and “environmental crises”, and the firm financial performance. They also 
 of 
corporate reputations, environmental performance was measured using accounting and 
stock market based measures as well as measures of risk. Two sets of CSR ratings are 
used, first, the average results of a ranking survey for the period from 1983 to 1985 for 98 
firms and second, the 1983 CSR rating for 131 firms. This was done to facilitate the 
analysis of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and previous and 
subsequent financial performance. Financial performance variables were averaged over 
two periods: 1982-1984 and 1977-1981. The nature of the relationship between CSR and 
financial performance is investigated by comparing the 1982-1984 financial performance 
ratings to the average Fortune rating for 1983-1985. Analysis of 1983 ratings in relation 
to the both 1977-1981 and 1982-1984 financial performance variables permitted an 
evaluation of the relationship between prior financial performance (1977-1981) and 
subsequent financial performance (1982-1984), relative to CSR.   
The results show that firms' prior performance, assessed by both stock market 
returns and accounting based measures, is more closely related to corporate social 
responsibility than subsequent performance. The results also indicate that measures of 
risk are more closely associated with social responsibility than previous studies have 
suggested. 
                                                          
14Fortune has conducted the survey since 1982 and summary results were published each January. The survey covers 
the largest firms in 20-25 industry groups. Over 8,000 executives, outside directors, and corporate analysts are asked to 
rate the ten largest companies in their industry on eight attributes: financial soundness, long-term investment value, use 
of corporate assets, quality of management, innovativeness, quality of products or services, use of corporate talent, and 
community and environmental responsibility. Ratings are on a scale of 0 (poor) to 10 (excellent).  
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investigate the market valuation of environmental performance over time. This study 
addressed three hypotheses: the first hypothesis proposes that environmental performance 
affects financial performance in the market valuation firms; the second hypothesis 
proposes that the importance of strong environmental management varies across 
industries, more specifically, strong environmental performance has a stronger positive 
impact on firms' financial performance for historically clean industries than dirty 
industries; and the third hypothesis proposes that environmental management is 
becoming an increasingly important dimension of firms’ management and operating 
strategy.  
The NEXIS database of newswire services was searched for positive events using 
keywords such as “environment” within five words of “award” while environmental 
crises were identified using keywords such as “oil”,  “chemical”, “gas leak”, or 
“explosion” along with the words “spill” and “environment”. Data were collected for 
publicly traded firms on NYSE or AMEX, for the period 1985 to 1991. The authors 
employed an event-study methodology, using 3 day windows (the day prior to the event 
date, the event date, and the day after the event), to evaluate the market response to 
different types of events. They find a significant positive stock return following strong 
environmental performance. Using environmental awards as a proxy, the average market 
valuation of the firms rose by approximately $80.5 million following the award 
announcement. This indicates that a significant positive association exists between 
environmental performance and firms' market values. On the other side, significant 
negative returns were reported following weak environmental performance when 
environmental crises were used as a proxy. For spills and other mishaps, the average 
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market valuation of firms declined by approximately $390 million, indicating a 
significant negative association between environmental performance and firms’ market 
value.  
The authors performed an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) using cumulative 
abnormal returns for the dependent variable and industry classification, and the SIC code 
as the classification variables. None of the covariates were statistically significant, 
indicating that the market reaction to positive environmental events has not changed 
significantly over time. First-time award announcements are associated with greater 
increases in the market value, although smaller increases are observed for firms in more 
environmentally polluting industries, possibly indicative of market skepticism.  
Rao (1996) addressed the debatable relationship between ethics and profitability 
by investigating the association between companies’ unethical behavior-in terms of 
environmental pollution-by publicly traded U.S. and multinational firms, and their stock 
performance. He hypothesizes that the expected stock prices adjust negatively to firms’ 
unethical behavior and that the adjustment will persist for an appreciable period of time. 
A sample, of 14 firms, was obtained from the Wall Street Journal Index that considered 
firms with public announcements of environmental pollution during the period 1989 to 
1993. An event-study methodology was used for the analysis. Once the event was 
identified, holding period returns (HPRs) were calculated on a monthly basis for periods 
both before and after the event. Forty nine months of HPRs were calculated for each 
sample firm and the thirty earliest observations before the event were used to estimate the 
regression parameters.  Rao's results indicate that actual stock performance for companies 
with unethical environmental performance is lower than the expected market adjusted 
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returns, 12 months before the announcement to six months after the announcement, 
indicating the existence of a significant negative reaction to the announcement of 
unethical environmental behavior.  
Lorraine, Collison and Power (2004) examined the effect of environmental 
performance publicity, such as fines for environmental pollution, as well as, 
commendations for good environmental achievements, on companies’ share prices. Four 
hypotheses were addressed, first, that there is a relationship between environmental news 
and firms’ stock price; second, that good environmental news is associated with an 
increase in the firms’ share price; third, that bad environmental news is associated with a 
decrease in share price; and fourth, that the cross-sectional variation in unexpected 
returns is related to environmental news; the size of the fine to sales ratio; and/or the 
industry classification.  
The companies involved in the study were selected form articles in the Financial 
Times, The Times, and press releases from the Environment Agency (EA) in the UK. The 
final sample included 32 firms with environmental events of which 9 had good news and 
23 had bad news. Using the DATASTREAM database, daily stock prices were obtained 
for each of the 32 events from the 31st of December 1993 to the 31st of August 2000. The 
authors employed an event-study methodology to analyze the firms’ stock returns.  
Unexpected returns were calculated for the 21 day period, starting 10 days before 
the official announcement date of the event and lasting until 10 days after. The results 
indicate that there are no significant abnormal returns, either positive or negative, on the 
event announcement date. Significant negative abnormal returns were revealed, however,  
a week after the announcement date. To assess the individual impact of good and bad 
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news events, the sample was divided and t-tests were carried out for the subsamples of 
good news versus bad news. The results indicate that no significant abnormal returns are 
associated with good news. This suggests that the market does not respond to this type of 
information. The results for bad news indicate, however, that the market reaction is 
consistent with the overall sample analysis where negative significant abnormal returns 
are observed one week after the announcement date.   
One possible explanation for the delayed market reaction is that stock market 
participants may have needed more time to respond to the environmental performance 
news contained in announcements.  Another factor was that many of the fines imposed by 
the EA were on unquoted companies and the impact of this news could not be considered 
in the study. Hypothesis 4 was examined using regression analysis. The cross-sectional 
results lend support to the activities of EA: the relative size of the fines negatively 
impacts the firms’ market value. However, according to Craig Deegan (2004), the study 
presents limited evidence and low power due to the small sample, and this limits the 
generalization of the results. 
Muoghalu, Robinson and Glascock (1990) study the deterrent effect of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)15
                                                          
15The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was enacted in 1976, as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act of 1965, and is considered as the principal U.S. Federal law governing the growing volume of municipal and 
industrial disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste. The objective of the RCRA is to limit environmental damage by 
providing a system for controlling hazardous waste, which can be achieved by focusing on protecting human health and 
the environment from the potential hazards of waste disposal; conserving energy and natural resources; reducing the 
amount of waste generated; and ensuring that wastes are managed in an environmentally-sound manner. 
 and the Superfund act on firms’ 
stock returns. The deterrent effect of both acts stems from the potential for lawsuits 
against firms engaged in environmental violations; mandates for site cleanup; and 
reimbursements for expenditures and/or damages related to pollution. The authors 
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propose that firms perceive illegal disposals as retaining an expected positive net present 
value however penalties reduce the profitability of these illegal disposal activities. Thus a 
necessary condition for a lawsuit is to generate deterrence, in other words the penalties 
must outweigh the benefits obtained from waste mismanagement. The sample used in the 
analysis was composed of 128 firms experiencing lawsuits against them, as well as 74 
case settlements announced between 1977 and 1986.  
Based on Moody’s industry classification, the sample was partitioned into three 
main groups: 68 firms in the petrochemicals group, 11 firms in the pollution management 
and control group, and 49 firms in the “others” group. The others category was comprised 
of firms from the full sample that were not in the petrochemical and pollution 
management subsample. The authors use an event-study methodology to measure the 
abnormal returns and expectedly negative returns suffered by stockholders between 1977 
and 1986. Abnormal returns for each firm are computed on the basis of a 121 day event 
window (-60, 0, 60).  
The results indicate that negative abnormal returns are associated with the 
incidence of lawsuits being filed, however that abnormal returns at the disposition of the 
suits are statistically insignificant. This suggests that lawsuits impose a lump-sum penalty 
on firms when information about the suit becomes publicly available.  
Hamilton (1995) investigated whether pollution data released by the EPA, in the 
Toxic release Inventory (TRI) reports, are considered of value to both journalists and 
investors. TRI data published by the EPA was used as a metric to measure companies’ 
waste generation and pollution reduction activities. Specifically, he investigates the 
extent to which TRI data provided news to investors by examining whether or not its 
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release generated abnormal returns associated with changes in the expectation of 
pollution costs. Hamilton also explores the degree to which the release of the data is 
treated as news by investors. This was done by examining whether or not firms’ TRI 
figures were mentioned in newspapers. TRI data published in 1989 included 893 publicly 
traded companies that were linked with facilities reporting TRI data, of which 436 firms 
were used in the final sample.  
An event-study methodology was used following the model developed by Dodd 
and Warner (1983). Abnormal daily returns were calculated for the TRI release date, June 
19, 1989. Also, logistic regression analysis was used to assess the second hypothesis. The 
results reveal significant negative abnormal returns on the day of the TRI announcement 
where firms reporting to the EPA lost an average of $4.1 million in stock values. Firms 
with prior disclosure and/or external disclosure sources of poor environmental 
performance, however, experience a smaller negative effect at the TRI announcement. 
The study provides weak results regarding the relevance of TRI information to the media 
indicating that the majority of publicly traded firms reporting TRI to the EPA don’t 
receive media coverage. 
Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy (1998) investigate the role that capital markets may 
play in creating an incentive or appling pressure on firms to improve their environmental 
performance. Since July 1990, the Ministry of Environment of British Columbia has 
published a list of polluters classified into two categories: firms out of compliance 
regarding environmental standards or permits and firms of concern to the Ministry 
because their environmental performance is near the regulatory threshold, or because 
their level of pollution is abnormally high in a sector of activity which is not regulated. 
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The authors investigate how investors react to firms that appear successively on more 
than one environmental pollution list. They examined the impact of the first five lists of 
polluters on the equity value of 19 firms appearing on any of these first five lists. Firms 
were identified either as “out-of compliance” or as “of concern”. The selected sample 
also allows for firms with several plants to appear more than once on the same list if 
many of their plants are either non-complying or of concern. A standard event-study 
technique was used. A three day event window (-1, 0, +1) was considered, where DAY 0 
refers to date the lists were published.  
In their analysis, Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy first consider the entire sample of 
firms appearing on each list. Their results indicate that there are no statistically abnormal 
losses on any day of the event window. They then examine the firms that are of concern 
versus those that are out-of-compliance. Again the results show no statistically significant 
abnormal losses in either category. Furthermore, they examined firms that appeared only 
once versus those appearing several times. In this instance, the results reveal statistically 
significant abnormal losses on day -1 and day +1 for firms appearing more than once. 
Finally, they investigate how investors react to successive appearances on different lists, 
that is, firms that appeared on all lists whether being of concern or out-of compliance. For 
these firms, significant abnormal losses are found for the second list on day +1. These 
results indicate that investors require strong signals about firm’s environmental 
performance before revising the expected value attributed to the firm.  
Konar and Cohen (1997) study the validity of environmental disclosure as a 
regulatory mechanism. They specifically examine firms’ subsequent environmental 
performance after experiencing a significant negative abnormal stock market reaction due 
43 
 
to new information on toxic chemical emissions. They hypothesize that a change in the 
financial performance of a firm as a result of the provision of new pollution information 
will provide incentives that will affect the attitude of the firm towards environmental 
performance. The authors used 2 measures of TRI related performance: the absolute level 
of emissions per thousand dollars revenue in order to control for size differences, and 
firm rank within its industry category, normalized by the number of firms in the industry, 
where ranks were determined by the level of emissions per dollar revenue. Based on the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) dataset, environmental performance was 
assessed using two measures: oil and chemical spills and government-imposed fines for 
environmental violations. Both variables are measured as the average of two time 
periods, 1988-1990 and 1991-1993. The study identified all firms with significant 
negative abnormal returns associated with the EPA announcement of TRI emissions in 
1989. The sample is composed of 130 firms with available stock prices on the CRSP 
database. “Top 40” refers to the 40 firms in the sample that experienced the largest 
negative abnormal returns.  To conduct the comparison between the “Top 40” firms and 
industry peers, an industry matched control sample of 455 firms was selected. A TRI 
emission level comparison was then conducted for 1989 and 1992. The three year time 
gap was intended to allow for firms’ investment in pollution abatement programs to take 
effect. The average TRI emissions for two time periods: 1988-1990 and 1991-1992 were 
also compared.  
The results of this study indicate that firms experiencing significant negative 
market reactions due to the disclosure of poor environmental performance tend to reduce 
their toxic emissions more than industry peers; make significant attempts at improving 
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their environmental performance by reducing the number and severity of oil and chemical 
spills; and have a lower chance of receiving higher fines from the government in 
subsequent years. They conclude that environmental disclosure and consequent financial 
market responses serve as a market based regulatory mechanism for improving firms’ 
environmental performance. Thus, providing information to the public may be an 
effective way to reduce environmental externalities beyond a regulatory standard. 
Bosch, Eckard and Lee (1998) study the association between EPA enforcement 
activities and firms’ stockholders returns. They address the issue of firms recovering 
pollution control costs from customers and whether it is affected by foreign competition 
or not. Firms subject to EPA enforcement will proceed in one of four ways: the firm 
becomes the target of an investigation and is possibly penalized by the EPA, a “targeted 
firm”; the outcome of the investigation may be that firms lose to the EPA and accept their 
decisions, “losers”, or firms will win and get cleared from the charges, thus becoming 
“winners”; however firms who lose may choose to challenge the EPA decision, 
“challengers.” The initial sample was drawn from the Wall Street Journal index for the 
period 1970 to 1990. Searching for EPA announcements yielded a total of 525 cases 
involving 244 firms. The final sample was composed of 77 firms with 171 observations. 
An event-study methodology was used to assess market reactions to the EPA 
enforcement activities over a 21 day event window (-10, 0, 10). The results reveal a 
negative market reaction to EPA announcements.  “Losers” experience a negative market 
reaction, however they benefit from compliance with the EPA decisions in several ways 
such as facing lower costs, greater ability to recover costs from customers, and the ability 
to negotiate more favorable settlements. For “challengers”, no significant negative 
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abnormal returns are found, which is explained by the fact that firms challenging EPA 
decisions might be signaling information regarding a high probability of winning their 
challenge. Surprisingly, no positive returns are reported for “winners”, which may be due 
to market expectations. The second part of the analysis concerns firms' abilities to 
recover costs from customers. The results reveal that losses are weakly associated with 
the presence of foreign competition. The authors conclude that untargeted domestic 
competitors may hinder firms’ cost recovery.  
 
2.3 Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental Performance 
Another focus of research in this area has been on the association between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance. The results of these studies, 
however, are mixed. Voluntary disclosure theory suggests that firms with superior 
environmental disclosures will disclose more performance indicators so as to distinguish 
themselves from average or low performers, at the same time poor performers will 
disclose less information, if any, in an effort to avoid negatively affecting their market 
value. This suggests a positive association between environmental performance and the 
level of discretionary (voluntary) environmental disclosure. The legitimacy theory, 
however, suggests the opposite. Here, social disclosure is a function of social and 
political pressures facing the corporation. Poor performers are subject to more political 
and social pressure, and tend to increase their environmental disclosures to reduce the 
negative impact of the poor performance. 
According to Chan-Fishel (2002) environmental disclosure rules and regulations 
formulated by accounting standard setters and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
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(SEC), are not yet comprehensive enough to fully reflect firms’ environmental 
performance. This is because firms may choose not to report important environmental 
facts as long as they are not required to do so. This study reviews the SEC’s filings of 
publicly traded companies in 4 industrial sectors: automobile, insurance, oil & gas, 
petrochemicals and utilities, in the United States and conducts a survey and analysis of 
those companies’ climate change related disclosures. A sample of 87 publicly traded 
companies was reviewed in the survey. The sample is composed of 23 automobile and 
truck manufacturing firms, 14 property and casualty insurance firms; 18 integrated oil 
and gas firms; 15 firms in the plastics and rubber-based chemical industry; and 14 electric 
utilities firms. Some of the firms surveyed were not based in the United States, however, 
they were all publicly traded in the United States capital markets.  
The study examined firms’ 2001 10-K filings or, for foreign companies, 20-F 
filings. With the exception of the insurance industry, companies were surveyed as 
classified by YahooFinance. Firms were classified as reporting companies if they 
specifically mentioned the words climate change or global warming. Firms that 
mentioned greenhouse gas or carbon dioxide emissions, but failed to discuss them in the 
context of climate change, were not deemed to be providing climate change disclosure. 
The survey examined the climate change related disclosures with firms’ annual reports. 
The survey examined specific regulations (in which the company describes specific 
climate change related regulations); the impact on markets (in which the company 
provides an analysis of the potential impact of climate change on its market); the impact 
on the firm (in which the company provides an analysis on the potential impact of climate 
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change on its operations); and the firm’s response (in which the company reports on its 
potential or actual responses to climate change).  
The results indicate that 26% of the companies surveyed provide climate change 
reporting, but most climate reporters are European-based companies. European, Japanese, 
and Canadian firms report at a rate of 56% as compared to a 15% rate for U.S firms. 
About half of all electric utilities and integrated oil & gas companies’ discuss climate 
change in their most recent annual SEC filings. Among automobile and truck 
manufacturers, less than 20% of companies discuss the impact of climate change on their 
businesses, although many firms inform investors about matters involving carbon dioxide 
emissions. The petrochemical and insurance sectors provide the least disclosure (only one 
out of 15 petrochemical companies, and one of the 14 property and casualty insurance 
companies discuss global warming in their annual SEC filings). Reflecting the materiality 
of climate change policies, the utilities industry has the most climate disclosure amongst 
the five sectors surveyed. About half, 9 out of 17, companies provide climate change 
related reporting in their most recent SEC annual report. Disclosure in this sector also 
tends to be of relatively high quality. Approximately 26% of companies surveyed report 
on climate change, but very few of them provide quantitative information. Common types 
of qualitative information that are provided in the SEC filings included discussions of 
climate legislation/regulations; the financial impact of these policies on the industry 
sectors; the impact of climate change on the business operations; and firm responses to 
these policies.  
 Belkaoui (1976) investigates the impact of pollution control expenditure 
disclosures on stock market prices. A sample of 100 firms from different industries was 
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collected. The sample is composed of two groups of 50 firms each. The group of interest 
contains firms that disclosed pollution control information in their 1970 annual report, 
while the other group represents a control group matched by industrial classification and 
firm size. Belkaoui proposes that the impact of pollution control expenditures on stock 
market prices can be explained by two competing theories: the first is the efficient 
markets theory, which suggests that pollution control expenditure disclosures might be 
followed by both changes in the expected earnings as well as changes in the risk class and 
discount rates; the second theory is the naive investor theory, which suggests that 
investors consider changes in the earnings per share and accounting data to be  more 
important than other specific information such as pollution control expenditures and 
consequently do not respond to that information.  
An event-study methodology was employed to test these conjectures, using a 24 
month window comprised of 12 months before (T-12) and 12 months after (T+12) the 
annual report filing date. The results of the study reveal that during the period when 
pollution control expenditures are disclosed, firms underperform the market. These same 
firms, however, outperform the market for a period of 4 months after the expenditure 
disclosure. The results also indicate that the advantage (outperformance) over the market 
decreases from T+2 to T+4 then becomes a disadvantage (underperformance) indicating 
an immediate but temporary response to the pollution control expenditure disclosure. 
This final decline in stock performance is explained by the two hypotheses noted above. 
Based on the efficient markets hypothesis, stock prices decrease when investors holding 
the shares find it profitable to sell their stock (extra supply) leading to a decrease in stock 
prices. Based on the naive investor hypothesis, the short term effect of the expenditure 
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disclosure attracts ethical investors seeking shares with better social images, however, 
such a predisposition is only temporary. 
Jaggi and Freedman (1982) investigate the informational content of pollution 
disclosures in annual financial statements for the years 1973 and 1974. Their null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in investor reactions to firms with or without 
pollution disclosures included in the financial statements. They suggested that the results 
could be interpreted in light of two hypotheses, the “ethical investor hypothesis”, which 
maintains that investors  are governed by ethical conditions and act favorably to pollution 
abatement expenditures, or  the “rational investor hypothesis,” which  suggests that 
investors are likely to respond negatively to the pollution abatement expenditures since 
they assume that firms using their resources to discharge social responsibilities are likely 
to experience reduced profitability. The rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest 
that pollution disclosures are of information value to investors. If the investors’ reaction 
is negative, it would support the “rational investor hypothesis.” If, however, the reaction 
is positive, it would support the ethical investor hypothesis.  
In 1973, as a result of the national environmental policy act of 1969, the SEC 
required firms materially affected by pollution regulations to include pollution 
information in their 10K reports. All firms, in the chemical; paper and pulp; oil refining; 
and steel industries available in the COMPUSTAT database were studied. Only 84 firms 
disclosed environmental information. Twenty-one firms did not. T-tests were conducted 
to determine whether the two groups differed with regard to size, structure, asset 
turnover, or profitability. The results indicate no significant differences between the 
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groups except for firm size (measured by either total assets or sales). The results, 
however, reveal significant differences in investor reactions to the groups.  
An event-study methodology was then used to assess investor reactions. The Wall 
Street Journal Index was screened to verify the month in which pollution information was 
disclosed. Prior studies such as Belkaoui (1976), Ingram (1978), and Anderson and 
Frankel (1980) used the last month of the fiscal year as the event month. Jaggi and 
Freedman, however, defined the event month as the month the firms filed their 10K 
reports with the SEC. The results provide support to the alternative hypothesis that 
investors’ reactions to the disclosing group are different from their reactions to the non-
disclosing group. Since the reaction was positive (consistent with Belkaoui, 1976), the 
results provide support to the ethical investor hypothesis.  
Freedman and Jaggi (1988) investigate whether pollution disclosures are 
influenced by the economic performance of firms and whether the association between 
pollution disclosures and economic performance differs based on size as well as across 
industries. They suggest that the pollution disclosure decision is a complicated process 
that is influenced by numerous factors that could be financial or nonfinancial in nature, 
however, only the financial variables were considered as reflecting on the economic 
health of the firm.  An index was developed to assess the pollution disclosure. Firms’ 
annual reports for the years 1973 and 1974 were examined for the amounts of emissions 
and the capital expenditures for pollution abatement regarding past, current, and future 
activities. Higher weights were assigned to items if they provided more information about 
firms’ compliance with the regulatory requirements. The weights were 2.5 for EPA 
standards for pollution emissions and firms’ performance; 2 for future capital 
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expenditures; 1.5 for current capital expenditures; 1.5 for past capital expenditures; 0.5 
for descriptive with percentage; and 0.5 for descriptive. ROA, ROE, Cash Based ROA, 
Cash Based ROE, operating ratio based on total assets, and operating ratio based on total 
equity were used as economic performance indicators. The sample was drawn from 
industries recognized by the Council of Environmental Quality in 1977 as highly 
polluting industries. These industries were paper and pulp, oil refining, steel, chemical, 
and electric utilities. Firms from the utilities industry are not, however, included in the 
final sample since it is a highly regulated industry and publicly disclosed economic 
performance is guided by special regulations. All firms belonging to these industries and 
having financial information available on the COMPUSTAT database are part of the 
sample. Pearson product-moment correlation as well as Spearman rank correlation 
techniques are used in the analysis.  
This study reveals no significant association between pollution disclosures and 
economic performance. Each industry subgroup is tested individually to assess the degree 
of the correlation across industries. Results indicate that only two economic indicators are 
significantly correlated with pollution disclosure, ROA within the oil refining industry 
and Cash Based ROE within the paper industry. The sample was regrouped based on firm 
size, using both total assets and sales, where firms falling within the top quartile were 
considered to be "large" and those in the bottom quartile "small." firms. The authors 
concluded that there is no association between economic performance and pollution 
disclosure for small firms but a significantly negative association exists for large firms. 
Ingram and Frazier (1980) also study the relationship between firms’ 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure contained in the annual reports. 
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They argue that for disclosures to be useful there should be a correspondence between the 
disclosures and the actual events. Thus their hypothesis proposes that the content of 
firms’ environmental disclosure is associated with the firms’ environmental performance. 
Firm environmental performance was assessed using the performance index constructed 
by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) assessing the level of harmful emissions. 
The CEP index covers 50 firms in four different industries, electric utilities, iron and 
steel, petroleum refining, and pulp and paper. Forty of the firms were selected and 
evaluated. Environmental disclosure was measured using content analysis based on 20 
categories in four main dimensions: evidence; time; specificity; and theme.  
The relationship between firms’ environmental performance, using CEP index 
scores, and the content of the firms’ environmental disclosures, using the content analysis 
scores, is first estimated by product-moment correlation. The results reveal a weak 
positive correlation for all activities except litigation, which has a negative (weak) 
correlation. Multiple-regression analysis is then used to determine the multivariate 
association between content analysis scores and the CEP index scores. Again, the authors 
find no significant association between environmental performance and any of the 
categories of environmental disclosures.  
Following the environmental performance research design of Ingram and Fazier 
(1980), Wiseman (1982) examines the quality of environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports by investigating the association between voluntary environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance. Voluntary environmental disclosure is measured using 
content analysis constructed by Wiseman covering 18 items related to four categories: 5 
items related to the economic factors category, 2 items related to the environmental 
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litigation category, 5 items related to the pollution abatement activities category, and 6 
items related to the environmental disclosures that did not fall into the other three 
categories. A score was assigned to each item based on whether the disclosure was 
quantitative (3 points), qualitative (2 points), or mentioned in general terms (1 point). 
Firm environmental performance is measured based on the CEP published environmental 
performance. The sample is based on the CEP index that was composed of 50 firms in 
four different industries: electric utilities, iron and steel, petroleum refining, and pulp and 
paper. No significant association between environmental performance and the Wiseman 
environmental disclosure index is found. 
The same association and research design was employed by Freedman and 
Wasley (1990) and Bewley and Li (2000).  Freedman and Wasley (1990) investigate the 
relationship between pollution performance and pollution disclosures made in annual 
reports and in the 10-K reports filed with the SEC. The association between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure in the annual reports addressed 
the association between environmental performance and voluntary environmental 
disclosures. The association between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure in the 10K reports addressed the association between environmental 
performance and mandatory environmental disclosures. Two hypotheses are investigated, 
first, that there is no association between the environmental disclosures made by firms in 
their annual reports and their actual environmental performance and second, that there is 
no association between the environmental disclosures made by firms in their 10-K reports 
and their actual environmental performance.  
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Environmental performance is measured using the disclosure index developed by 
the CEP. The CEP evaluated the environmental performance of firms from four highly 
polluting industries: steel; oil; electric utilities; and paper and pulp, on a plant-wide basis. 
Environmental disclosures are measured by using the Wiseman indexing procedure 
developed in 1982.  The sample is based on the CEP environmental performance report 
regarding 50 firms in the previously mentioned four industries. The Spearman rank 
correlation technique is used in the analysis. The results indicate that neither voluntary 
environmental disclosures nor mandatory 10-K disclosures are significantly 
representative of actual environmental performance. The authors conclude that for 
environmental disclosures to be useful to financial statements users, more environmental 
disclosures need to be made in the annual reports and that mandatory 10-K disclosures 
should be improved.  
Bewley and Li (2000) investigate the influence of firm-specific factors such as: 
outsiders’ knowledge about the firm’s environmental problems; pollution propensity; 
political exposure; auditor quality; and financial performance on corporate environmental 
disclosures. The voluntary disclosure theory suggests that firms disclose ‘good’ news and 
withhold ‘bad’ news. The authors argue that different groups of stockholders use 
environmental information differently, thus it is reasonable to assume that management 
targets different audiences by reporting specific/customized environmental disclosures. 
The study distinguishes between disclosures of general environmental information and 
financial environmental disclosures. Financial environmental disclosures refer to either 
specific dollar amounts of environment-related items or accounting policies for 
environment related activities. Financial disclosures are measured in two ways: the first 
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measure assesses the extent of financial disclosure while the second measure is a simple 
indicator of the presence or the absence of such disclosures. General environmental 
disclosures include qualitative aspects of corporate environmental performance and 
attitudes and actions towards environmental pollution controls. This type of disclosure is 
also measured in two ways. The first measure is the total number of disclosures and the 
second is non- financial disclosures only. Total environmental disclosures are measured 
using content analysis developed by Wiseman in 1982. Financial performance is 
measured using return on assets (ROA). The sample, composed of 188 firms, was drawn 
from the 863 Canadian firms used in the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants’ 
study, Environmental reporting in Canada: A survey of 1993 reports.  
This study focused mainly on manufacturing firms, since manufacturing activities 
consume natural resources and energy more than other type of firms and thus may cause 
more environmental damage. Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used as well as 
Logit analysis. Consistent with the voluntary disclosure theory, the results suggest that 
both financial and general environmental disclosures are associated positively with 
pollution propensity and political exposure. Only general environmental disclosures are, 
however, positively associated with outsiders’ knowledge of the firm’s environmental 
exposure. Control variables, auditor quality, and financial performance, are not found to 
have any significant association with either type of disclosure. Audit quality and general 
environmental disclosures are not significantly associated while a modest positive 
association is found between audit quality and the extent of financial disclosure.  
Fekrat, Inclan and Pertoni (1996) studied the scope and the accuracy of 
environmental disclosures made in corporate annual reports. The scope addressed 
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whether a significant difference in mean disclosure scores exists among firms within 
different industries and/or countries. The accuracy addressed whether or not 
environmental disclosures are associated with environmental performance. Two 
hypotheses are addressed, the first hypothesis proposes that there is no significant 
difference in the mean disclosure scores among different industries; the second 
hypothesis proposes that there is no significant difference in the mean disclosure scores 
among different countries. The entire 222 firms on the UN data base were contacted. Of 
these, 168 major international companies replied and are included in the analysis. The 
sample covers six industries operating in 18 countries. The six industries are chemicals, 
forestry and related products, metals, motors, petroleum and petrochemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals; these industries are considered to be the ones with the most 
environmental problems. Environmental disclosures were quantified using a coding 
procedure similar to Wiseman environmental disclosure index (1982).  The CEP ranking 
was generated, based on the toxic release data and the Superfund Potentially Responsible 
Party (PRP), as a proxy for firms’ environmental performance. A subsample of 26 firms 
monitored and ranked by the CEP is used to investigate the association between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance. Mean ED scores are compared 
across industries and countries using analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Also, the 
association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance is 
examined using Spearman rank correlations.  
The results of the study reveal significant variations among companies in different 
industries and countries regarding the amount of environmental performance information 
they disclose in their annual reports to shareholders. Consistent with Wiseman (1982), 
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firms’ disclosure does not seem to correlate with actual environmental performance. The 
previous results suggest that contrary to the voluntary disclosure hypothesis, an 
environmental disclosure gap exists amongst international firms in environmentally 
sensitive industries. In other words, international firms are not competing to match one 
another in providing comparable environmental disclosures in their annual reports. This 
can be explained by the fact that some firms do not use the financial markets as a primary 
source of capital, so they tend to be less concerned with the effects of information 
disclosure on financial markets. These findings are consistent with Feltham and Xie 
(1992). 
Hughes, Anderson, and Golden (2001) examine whether or not environmental 
disclosures can be used as a valid indicator in determining firms’ environmental 
performance and whether or not the disclosure differences can be used to differentiate 
between actual environmental performance levels. They also address how additional 
disclosure standards, such as Staff Accounting Bulletin No.92,16
                                                          
16SAB 92 includes 8 disclosure examples that may be required under SFAS No. 5 for contingencies related to 
environmental or product liability. SAB 92 cautions registrants that “a statement that the contingency is not expected to 
be material does not satisfy the requirements SFAS 5. 
 affect disclosure within 
the notes section of the annual report between 1992, Pre-SAB 92, and 1993, Post-SAB 
92, as well as affecting disclosures in other sections. Four hypotheses are addressed. 
First, that the annual report disclosures within the president’s letter, the Management’s 
discussion and analysis, and notes sections differ between firms ranked as good, mixed, 
and poor environmental performers; second, that environmental disclosures can be used 
to distinguish good, mixed, and poor environmental performers; third, that due to 
additions of disclosure requirements, annual report disclosures within the notes section 
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are greater in 1993 than they were in 1992; and fourth, that environmental disclosures 
increase from 1992 to 1993 in annual report sections that are not subject to changes in 
disclosure requirements.  
In 1991 the CPE published evaluations of 100 US-based corporations in the Better 
World Investment Guide. Fifty-one of these firms are included in the sample. To measure 
firms’ disclosure within the president’s letter, MD&D and the financial statements notes 
Wiseman’s content analysis was used. A disclosure is coded 4 if the environmental 
impact is clearly defined in terms of monetary or actual physical quantity, 3 if the impact 
on the company or its policies is clearly defined, 2 if disclosure is limited to passing 
comment of environmental effects within discussions of other topics, and 1 if the 
disclosures are immaterial to the financial conditions and results of operations. CEP 
ranking of firms’ environmental performance was coded as good, mixed, and poor. Good 
if positive environmental programs are applied, mixed if positive programs are applied 
but the firm still faced environmental problems, and poor if the firm has major 
environmental violations or had a history of opposing environmental policies.  
The first hypothesis is tested, using one way ANOVA for each category and topic 
for each year. Section disclosure scores were computed using the weighted disclosures 
and performances groups. Significant differences are limited to disclosures within 
categories of economic factors, litigation, and their related topics. Furthermore, least 
significant difference (LSD) and Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) are used 
to check for the source of the differences. The results of both tests indicate that 
significant disclosure differences occur between good and bad environmental performers, 
as well as, between mixed and poor performers, however no significant disclosure 
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differences are reported between good and mixed environmental performers. Finally, 
step-wise discriminant analysis is used to determine whether environmental disclosure 
levels distinguish firms with different environmental performance. No significant 
association is found between firms’ environmental disclosure and actual environmental 
performance. There is no significant increase in environmental disclosure within the 
notes section for good performers, but there is for both mixed and poor performers. There 
is no significant disclosure increase in either the president’s letter or the MD&D.  
To further test the fourth hypothesis, disclosure topics most likely to be affected 
by SAB No.92 were identified, the topics include future expenditures for environmental 
equipment; facilities and remediation; future estimates of operating costs for 
environmental equipment; facilities and remediation; accrued liabilities; and estimated 
costs of litigation. The results suggest that companies faced with additional required 
disclosures in one section of the annual report tend to increase disclosure only in other 
areas to maintain disclosure consistency. 
Patten (2002) examines the association between environmental performance and 
the extent of environmental disclosure in firms’ 1990 annual reports. Environmental 
performance is measured by company specific toxic releases, as reported by TRI. The 
extent of the environmental disclosure is measured in 2 ways: quantity wise (using lines 
count), and content wise (using content analysis). The content analysis measured the 
extent to which eight different aspects of environmental concern were discussed or 
mentioned within the environmental disclosure section. Environmental concern aspects 
are environmental regulations; firms’ attempts to attain the reduction of environmental 
degradation; firms’ concerns for the environment; firms’ environmental compliance 
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status; current or past pollution control or abatement expenditures; future pollution 
control or abatement expenditures; current or past operating costs for pollution control or 
abatement; and future operating costs for pollution control or abatement. Litigation 
related disclosures are not included as they tend to be less discretionary than other 
environmental disclosures. The final sample is composed of 131 observations. Ordinary 
lease squares regression analysis is used in the analysis.  
The first interaction variable is designed to capture potential differences in the 
impact of the TRI variable across larger and smaller firms (Big*TRI).  The second 
interaction variable captures differences in the impact of the TRI variable across firms 
from environmentally sensitive as opposed to non-environmentally sensitive industries 
(IND*TRI). The results indicate a significant positive association exists between both the 
size and industry classification variables and the extent of disclosure, and a significant 
positive association exists between toxic release levels and environmental disclosure. 
This suggests a negative association between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure. Big*TRI was not statistically significant, however, a 
significant negative association was found for IND*TRI. This indicates that the firms 
from environmentally sensitive industries show less variation in disclosure scores than 
the firms from less environmentally sensitive industries. The results of the regression 
analysis using environmental disclosure line counts as the dependent variable yield the 
same results.  
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) provides an integrated analysis of how management’s 
overall strategy affects environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and 
economic performance. They address the following questions: how are the firms’ 
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environmental performance, environments disclosure, and economic performance 
interrelated, and does the joint estimation of these relations significantly differ from 
independent ordinary least squares estimations? Environmental disclosures are assessed 
using content analysis that incorporates disclosures of four key environmental indicators: 
total amount of toxic wastes generated and transferred or recycled; financial penalties 
from environmental law violations; potential responsible party designation; and instances 
of oil and chemical spills. Weights were assigned for different levels of precision such 
that quantitative disclosures are coded 3, non-quantitative but specific disclosures are 
coded 2, and quantitative disclosures are coded 1. Environmental performance is 
measured using the ratio of toxic waste recycled to total toxic waste generated. Economic 
performance is measured using industry adjusted annual returns. A cross sectional sample 
of 198 U.S. Standard & Poor’s 500 firms, are employed in the study. In their analysis, the 
authors compare independent OLS estimations of the relation between the three corporate 
functions with the joint estimations using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and  three stage 
least squares (3SLS) simultaneous equation models.  
The results of the analysis reveal statistically significant differences in estimating 
the interrelations between environmental disclosure; environmental performance; and 
economic performance. The OLS results suggest that only the association between 
economic performance and environmental performance is significant while the other 
interrelations are not. The joint estimation, however, reveals a significant positive 
association between good environmental performance and good economic performance, 
and also with more extensive quantifiable disclosure of environmental disclosures of 
specific pollution measures and occurrences. 
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Cho, Roberts, and Patten (2009) investigate whether or not self-serving biases are 
present in the language and verbal tone in corporations’ environmental disclosures. They 
argue that the degree of bias in the disclosure narratives is based on firms’ environmental 
performance. Two hypotheses are addressed: the first hypothesis proposes that optimism 
exhibited in 10K report environmental disclosures is negatively related to firms’ 
environmental performance. The second hypothesis proposes that certainty exhibited in 
10K report environmental disclosures is positively related to firms’ environmental 
performance.  
The hypotheses are developed based on Merkl-Davies and Brennan's (2007) 
impression management framework which divides corporate impression management 
strategies into two broad categories: concealment and attribution. In this framework, 
disclosures accomplish concealment by emphasizing good news and hiding bad news. 
Merkl-Davies and Brennan define attribution as a “defensive framing tactic that shifts the 
blame for negative outcomes away from firms’ themselves.” Which in a corporate 
context, “entails managers attributing positive organizational outcomes to internal factors 
(“entitlements”) and negative organizational outcomes to external factors (“excuses”).  
Environmental performance is measured using environmental concern ratings 
provided by KLD research and Associates, Inc. Environmental disclosures are assessed 
based on two criteria, optimism and certainty. Content analysis software DICTION17
                                                          
17DICTION was developed by Hart, communication researcher, and focuses on the subtotal power of word choice 
and verbal tone (Hart, 1984). Similar to other content analysis software is DICTION relies on word frequency count, 
however, it is unique from several perspectives: first, DICTION relies on word counts based on linguistic theory; uses 
elements of artificial intelligence that have been underutilized in the accounting literature; falls within the scope of 
systematic linguistics; and is automated (making it more valid and reliable than other software packages) It has its 
theoretical basis in linguistic semantics and its independently attested establishments in the applied linguistic literature. 
 is 
used to determine optimism and certainty scores for the disclosures. Optimism refers to a 
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language “endorsing some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting the positive 
entailments”. Certainty refers to language that indicates “resoluteness, inflexibility, 
completeness, a tendency to speak ex cathedra.” To be included in the sample, firms had 
to meet four criteria: first, they must be listed in the KLD corporate social and 
environmental performance database for year 2002; second, they must have their fiscal 
year ending between June 30, 2002 and December 31, 2002; third, they must be listed in 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index for fiscal year 2002; and finally, firms must have 10K 
reports for the year 2002 and these reports must include section-one environmental 
disclosures.  
The final sample is composed of 190 firms, of which 43 are from environmentally 
sensitive industries, namely, oil and gas extraction, chemicals, paper, primary metals, 
petroleum refining, metal mining. Control variables used in the analysis are firm size, 
capital intensity, profitability and company age. Ordinary least squares multiple 
regressions are used in the analysis. The authors find a negative association between 
firms’ environmental performance and the optimism score of the firms’ environmental 
disclosures. They also find a positive association between firms’ environmental 
performance and the certainty score of the firms’ environmental disclosures. These 
results support the argument that poor environmental performers use a more optimistic 
tone and less certain language in the wording of their environmental disclosures. 
In summary, the prior literature studying the association between environmental 
disclosure and environmental performance provides mixed results. Several reasons may 
be cited for such discrepancies. As identified by Patten (2002), these reasons may include 
inadequate sample selection and/or inadequate measures of environmental performance. 
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The use of the Wiseman Index may also be problematic since the CEP assessed only a 
small group of companies in only four industries. Also, the CEP didn’t use the same 
criteria and methodology to assess corporate environmental performance across 
industries. 
 
2.4 Association between Environmental Performance and Stock Prices (financial 
performance) 
The association between environmental performance and financial performance, 
measured by stock price changes, has been addressed by several studies. This line of 
research supports the perspective that the cost of having a high level of corporate social 
responsibility is more than offset by the increased benefits in employee morale and 
productivity (Solomon and Hansen, 1985). A positive association has been identified in a 
number of studies such as Anderson and Frankle (1980) and Belkaoui (1976). However, 
additional studies such as Ingram and Frazier (1980) and Jaggi and Freedman (1982), 
have found a negative relationship. Fryxell and Wang (1994) argue that an inaccurate 
measure for a construct may lead to this kind of conflicting result. They reported that the 
strong association between the Corporate Reputation Index (CRI), a commonly used 
measure for assessing social performance, and the firm’s financial performance results 
stem from the fact that the Corporate Reputation Index is heavily weighted by the 
financial position of the firm. 
Anderson and Frankle (1980) study the capital markets reaction to voluntary 
environmental disclosure. Specifically, they analyze the capital markets' response to 
firms’ voluntary disclosures reported in the 1972 annual reports of Fortune 500 firms.  
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They hypothesize that equally risky portfolios have equal expected returns and that 
information produced by voluntary social disclosure does not change investors’ 
expectations or the allocation of economic resources. Their sample is obtained from a 
survey conducted by Beresford (1974) that was addressed to firms from the Fortune 500 
for years 1971 and 1972. The final sample is composed of 314 firms and is grouped by 
whether the firms did (201 firms), or did not (113 firms) disclose environmental 
information.  
Beresford’s survey attempts to categorize firms’ social disclosure. He describes 
various areas of disclosure made by firms disclosing social information. These areas are 
environmental control, minority rights, personnel responsibility, community activities, 
and product improvement. These areas coincide with the areas defined by the NAA 
Community Report on social reporting. The returns of portfolios composed of securities 
for socially disclosing firms are compared to the returns of portfolios of equivalent risk 
composed of the securities of non-disclosing firms. The results indicate that firms that 
disclose social events outperform those that do not disclose. Anderson and Frankle 
conclude that social disclosure has information content and that the market reacts to these 
disclosures positively, however, the market doesn’t anticipate social disclosure prior to its 
release in the annual reports. 
Another perspective suggests that the costs of being socially responsible force 
firms into an unfavorable financial position as compared to firms that are not socially 
responsible. Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985) investigate the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and profitability. They initially aim at developing an 
instrument to measure the degree of orientation to social responsibility and then use that 
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instrument to assess how CEOs view their firm’s social responsibilities. They use 
Carroll’s (1979) definition of corporate social responsibility that is composed of four 
main components: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary concerns. They employ a 
survey instrument to assess corporate social responsibility. They use a forced choice 
methodology survey to minimize the social desirability of responses. Respondents were 
asked to allocate up to 10 points for each of 20 sets of statements made using corporate 
social responsibility where each set contains four statements, each of which corresponded 
to one of Carroll’s 4 components. Non-economic components of the survey were derived 
from previous studies such as Eilbirt and Parket (1973), Corson and Steiner (1974), 
Paluszek (1976), Holmes (1977), and Ostlund (1977).  Only items rated as important by 
respondents in the former studies were considered, also industry-specific items were 
omitted to facilitate the generalizability of results.  
To test the reliability of the survey, Cronbach alphas were calculated for each of 
the four categories of social responsibility and were all higher than 0.8. The final 
questionnaire included two additional questions that asked whether or not the 
respondent’s organization was engaged in social forecasting and whether or not the 
respondent’s organization had a corporate social responsibility committee on its corporate 
board. The questionnaire was sent to the 818 CEOs listed in Forbes 1981 annual directory 
and resulted in 241 usable responses.  
Factor analysis is conducted for the 80 items in the survey. The resulting pattern 
and structure of factors supports the validity of the four-part corporate social 
responsibility construct. It produces, however, an unexpected inverse relationship 
between economic and ethical dimensions implying that the emphasis (loadings) on one 
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of the factors came at the expense of the other one. The relative weights of each of the 
components, assigned by the surveyed executives, were: economic = 3.5, legal= 2.54, 
ethical = 2.22, and discretionary concerns = 1.3. Afterwards the four components are 
rearranged into two categories to assess corporate social responsibility: “concerns for the 
society” (the three non-economic components) and “concern for economic performance” 
(one-year and five-year ROA).  
No significant association is found between concerns for society and financial 
performance using either long-term or short-term ROA. In regards to long-term 
profitability, no significant differences are reported between firms that employ social 
forecasting and firms that do not. Also, no statistically significant differences are found 
between firms with a corporate social responsibility committee on their boards and firms 
without such a committee. 
Spicer (1978) also tests the association between firms’ economic and financial 
indicators and firms’ corporate social performance. The economic and financial 
indicators of investment value are measured using 5 different measures, which are 
profitability, size, total and systematic risk, and the price/earnings ratio. Firms’ social 
performance is assessed based on firms’ pollution control activities which are measured 
using CEP's ratings. The CEP ratings are based on the efficiency of air and water 
pollution control systems. The ratings provided by the CEP studies for years 1970 and 
1972 are used to develop two pollution indices. The first index is a pollution index based 
on the percentage of the companies’ pulp and paper productive capacity (tons/day) with 
adequate pollution-controls. The second index is a pollution index based on the 
percentage of a companies' pulp and paper mills with adequate pollution controls. Spicer 
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proposes that better pollution control records are positively associated with profitability, 
firm size, and price/earnings ratios, while negatively associated with total risk and 
systematic risk.  
The final sample is composed of 18 firms in the pulp and paper industry. These 18 
firms were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and are representative of the larger 
firms in the pulp and paper industry (13 firms have 50 to 100 percent of their sales from 
the paper industry while the other 5 firms have between 25 and 50 percent). The 
hypotheses are investigated using two non-parametric statistical techniques: the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which provides a measure of the association 
between two variables measured in or transformed into ranks; and the Mann-Whitney U 
test, which provides a test for determining whether two independent samples are drawn 
from the same population.  
Two time periods are utilized in the analysis. The first is a six-year period from 
1968 to1973 and the second consists of two overlapping three-year periods from 1969 to 
1971 and from 1971 through 1973. The results, using the Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
Coefficient, indicate that firms with better pollution control records tend to have higher 
profitability, larger size, lower total risk, lower systematic risk, and higher price/earnings 
ratios than companies with poorer pollution control records. However, it was reported 
that there is a marked reduction in these associations over time which suggests that such 
associations may be a relatively short-lived phenomena under situations where public 
pressure leads to legislative mandates with respect to pollution abatement. 
Freedman and Jaggi (1988) examine the association between pollution and 
economic and market performance of pulp and paper firms after the clean water act 
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amendments were enforced. They address two main hypotheses: the first hypothesis 
proposes that there is no association between pollution and the economic performance of 
pulp and paper firms over a short-term period, while the second hypothesis proposes that, 
there is no association between pollution and the market performance of pulp and paper 
firms over a short period of time. Pollution is measured in terms of water quality. Three 
measures are used in determining water quality: biochemical oxygen demand, total 
suspended solids, and pH water acidity-alkalinity. These three measures are used to build 
a pollution index that measured the changes in pollution emissions. 
Economic and market performance is assessed using five indicators: net income; 
return on equity; return on assets; cash flow/equity; and cash flow/assets. The sample 
consists of 13 firms included in the CEP study for the year 1978, whose primary product 
was pulp and paper. The EPA pollution reports were filed on a plant basis. 81 plant 
locations were identified for the sample firms. Pearson correlations were used to assess 
the degree of association over the different time periods. First, the pollution performance 
of 1978 is correlated with the 1978 economic performance of the firm; second, the 1978 
pollution performance is correlated with an average of economic performance for the 3 
year period 1975 through 1977; third, the 1978 pollution performance is correlated with 
an average of economic performance for the 3 year period 1978 through 1980.  
The authors find no significant associations for the 1978 to 1978 comparisons 
except for net income (negative and marginally significant at the 0.09 level). For the 1978 
to 1975-1977 period, net income and cash flow are negative and significant (0.05 level). 
The 1978 comparisons reveal a significant (negative) association only for net income. 
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The results also indicate that firms with high pollution levels are associated with higher 
risk as well as a lower price-to-earnings (PE) ratio.   
Mahapatra (1984), and Jaggi and Freedman (1992) find, however, no correlation 
between firm environmental performance and firm financial performance. Mahapatra 
(1984) investigates the long term market response to pollution control expenditures and 
corporate social responsibility performance. Pollution control expenditures are perceived 
as negative financial events because while they don’t generate income, they increase 
production costs, increase the non-productive asset base and increase financing needs. 
Two scenarios are constructed addressing this association, the “ethical investor” and the 
“rational economic investor.” Mahapatra argues that it is possible to assume that social 
responsibility and any form of social awareness behavior arise from the transition of 
organizations from rational, means-oriented, efficiency-guided process of administration 
to a value-laden, adaptive response process of institutionalization. Four main hypotheses 
are proposed: the first hypothesis is that industries spending more on pollution control 
activities, as a percentage of overall capital expenditures, have low systematic risk. The 
second hypothesis is that industries spending more on pollution control activities, as a 
percentage of overall capital expenditures, have higher profitability. The third hypothesis 
is that industries spending more for pollution control, as a percentage of operating cash 
flows, have low systematic risk. The fourth hypothesis is that industries spending more 
for pollution control, as a percentage of operating cash flows, have higher profitability.  
A sample of 67 firms was drawn from the chemicals, iron and steel, paper, 
petroleum refining, primary non-ferrous metals, and textile industries. One major 
constraint of the sample selection methodology is that the author required all firms to be 
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listed on the New York exchange continuously over the period 1967 through 1978. A 
random sample of 60 companies was selected from COMPUSTAT as a control group. 
The Spearman rank correlation test was used to conduct the analysis. The results indicate 
that a significant negative association exists between pollution control expenditures and 
systematic risk, providing support for the first hypothesis. The association in regard to 
profitability, however, is insignificant, which is inconsistent with the results of Spicer 
(1978) and Bragdon and Marlin (1972).  
Pollution control expenditures and operating cash flows appear to have no 
correlation. Freedman and Jaggi (1992) study the long term relationship between the 
economic performance and the pollution performance of pulp and paper firms. Pollution 
is measured at the plant level while economic performance is measured using both 
company performance as a whole and segment performance for the segment specifically 
affected by pollution abatement. Two hypotheses are proposed; the first hypothesis is that 
there is no association between long-term pollution and economic performance of firms 
in the pulp and paper industry, while the second hypothesis is that there is no association 
between long-term pollution and economic performance of the pulp and paper segment of 
firms in the pulp and paper industry.  
Pollution performance is measured in terms of water pollution. Water pollution 
was gathered from EPA pollution reports.  The EPA consistently uses three measures of 
pollution in determining pollution performance of pulp and paper mills: biochemical 
oxygen demand (BOD), total suspended solids (TSS), and pH (water acidity - alkalinity). 
Economic performance is assessed based on the profitability and cash flows of the firms 
72 
 
where five ratios were used as proxies for firms’ economic performance: return on 
equity; return on assets; cash flow to assets; cash flow of equity; and debt-to-equity.  
The initial sample is composed of 13 firms whose primary product is pulp and 
paper. Three of these firms were, however, acquired by other pulp and paper companies 
after 1983. In light of the changes in the sample size, two time horizons are considered in 
the analysis: years 1978 through 1983, and years 1978 through 1986. The relationship 
between pollution performance and economic performance is first examined by 
determining the association between the percentage change in pollution measures and the 
percentage change in accounting ratios for the firms as a whole over the period of 1978 
through 1983. The association between the percentage change in pollution measures and 
the percentage change in return on assets and return on sales for the pulp and paper 
segments of these firms is then assessed. Better pollution performance is not found to be 
associated with negative economic performance for either the firm as a whole or for the 
pulp and paper segment. 
Yamashita et al. (1999) examines the relationship between environmental 
conscientiousness scores (EC) and stock returns. EC refers to the legal environmental 
obligations as well as corporations' environmental policies and similar “progressive” 
activities. Fortune magazine assigned a score to each company ranging from zero (poor 
performers) to 10 (good performers) based on 20 key environmental issues including, not 
only toxic release production and/or violation of environmental laws, but also 
environmental programs and ratings by credible environmental groups such as the CEP. 
Fortune reported 10 leaders, 10 most improved, and 10 laggard firms from 130 U.S. 
based manufacturing companies. Initially, the authors conduct an event study of the stock 
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price reaction to the published EC scores. The S&P 500 index is used as a benchmark to 
estimate normal returns. The results indicate that the capital markets weakly reward 
environmentally conscientious companies. However, companies with the worst EC scores 
also had lower average performance. Further, the release of information about a 
company’s EC has no significant impact on stock price. In the short term, these results 
suggest that environmental performance is not a very important concern for stock 
investors but that improvement in EC scores can result in small positive gains.  
The second part of this study involves an examination of the relationship between 
companies’ environmental performance and their capital market performance in the long-
term. The authors conduct a correlation analysis of long-term EC scores and stock 
returns. EC scores are measured using two sources: “The Better World Investment 
Guide” (1991) by the CEP as well as the CEP SCREEN Service (1995). Forty-nine of the 
firms given environmental progress scores by the CEP are used in this analysis. A rank of 
1 was obtained by companies that had positive programs for recycling, alternative energy 
sources, and waste reduction. A rank of 2 was assigned to companies with mixed records 
of positive environmental programs and regulatory infractions, fines, complaints, etc. A 
rank of 3 was given to companies that had poor public records of regulatory violations 
and/or they had major accidents and/or lobbying against sound environmental policies. 
The CEP SCREEN ranks are provided based on evaluating 13 areas of firms’ 
environmental performance. Long term ranks are assigned based on how the ranks 
changed from the CEP GUIDE to CEP SCREEN. In the long term, there is an 
insignificant positive association between EC and stock returns. There is, however, a 
strong tendency for companies with poorer EC scores to have lower stock returns. It 
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appears that the EC of companies is not strongly related to their financial condition as 
there is no association between EC scores and company size, debt/asset ratio, and 
earnings growth. Dividends yield and volatility of stock returns, however, have some 
relationship with companies’ EC scores. Rewards for improving the EC score by one 
rank are associated with a 2.66% increase in the 10 year average of risk adjusted return. 
Kreander et al. (2005) examines the financial performance differences between 
“ethical investment funds” and “non-ethical investment funds”. Ethical investment funds 
are funds that steer securities selection away from firms that operate in the alcohol, 
pornography and tobacco industries, while non-ethical traditional investment funds are 
investment funds without any restrictions on securities selection. The authors address 
three main questions in this study. First, do the selected funds provide the same financial 
return as an international benchmark portfolio? Second, are there any significant financial 
performance differences between ethical and non-ethical investments funds? And third, 
does the timing ability differ between ethical and non-ethical investment funds?  
Financial performance was measured using 3 financial ratios: the Jensen measure, 
which evaluates the returns earned by a fund relative to the risk adjusted return achieved 
on a benchmark portfolio; the Sharpe ratio, which is the reward for total risk ratio; and 
the Treynor measure, which is the market reward to market risk ratio. The sample 
includes 80 investment funds from seven different countries and is composed of 36 UK 
funds, 22 Swedish funds, 8 German funds, 4 Dutch funds, 4 Norwegian funds, 4 Swiss 
funds, and 2 Belgian funds. The 40 ethical funds are matched based on four criteria; age, 
size, country, and investment universe. This matching process is similar to the strategy 
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adopted by Mallin et al. (1995) and Gregory et al. (1997), with the exception that these 
studies do not match consistently for investment universe. 
The financial performance of the 80 funds is examined from January 1996 
through December 1998. 156 observations are studied for 40 ethical and 40 non-ethical 
matched pairs of funds. Financial performance measures are calculated for all funds and 
then T-tests are conducted to compare the performance of the ethical and non-ethical 
groups. The results demonstrate that there is no statistical difference in performance 
between ethical funds and the market benchmark, or between ethical funds and their 
matched group of non-ethical funds. The evidence suggests, however, that ethical funds 
are less risky than non-ethical funds. Hence, there is no support for the hypothesis that 
ethical funds are worse at timing the market movements than non-ethical funds. The 
authors conclude, therefore, that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
financial performance of the different groups. 
Only few studies, such as Sauer (1997), Dibartolomeo and Kurtz (1999), Garz et 
al. (2002), and Statman (2000) investigate the performance of SRI indices. SRI funds are 
comprised of stocks that were selected applying a social and ethical environmental 
criterion, which means that securities selection is subject to limitations. Statman (2000) 
investigates the performance of the Domini 400 Social-index and reports that the Domini 
400 performance index is comparable to the S&P 500-index. Garz et al. (2002) analyzes 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) for Europe and reports a slightly significant 
but small out-performance compared to the DJ STOXX 600-index. 
Schröder (2004) assesses and evaluates the performance of socially responsible 
investments funds (SRI), from the U.S., Germany, and Switzerland, as well as SRI equity 
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indices. The performance analysis conducted for the SRI funds jointly tests the 
performance of the underlying assets as well as the quality of the fund management, 
however, the performance analysis of the SRI indices avoids this and other 
methodological problems and shows clearly whether SRI equities have a better or worse 
outcome than traditional investments that use the whole investment universe. The data 
was collected using the Thomson Financial DataStream database. Investment funds are 
composed of 30 U.S. funds and 16 funds from Germany and Switzerland. SRI indices are 
drawn primarily from the database. Some, however, are provided by the suppliers of 
these entities such as the Calvin and Dow Jones sustainability indices.  The performance 
of the SRI investment funds and indices is evaluated using Jensen’s alpha via three 
different regression approaches. Jensen’s alpha is measured to assess the extra return that 
is not explained by the risk exposure of the firm.  
The first approach employs benchmark indices comprised of a blue chip index 
and a small-cap index. The second approach expands the first by adding the market 
timing activities of the fund management. The third approach includs instrumental 
variables for conditional performance estimation. Results of the analysis indicate that 
most German, Swiss, and US SRI investment funds do not significantly underperform the 
benchmark, the SRI indices also exhibit a positive Jensen's alpha and they do not 
underperform their benchmark indices. Schroder reported that the difference between 
funds in the US versus those in Germany and Switzerland is that the former are more 
invested in blue chip stocks while those in the latter seem to be focused on smaller 
companies. Overall, the results indicate that socially screened funds seem to have no 
clear disadvantage in performance when compared to conventional funds.  
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As discussed above, Muoghalu et al. (1990), Hamilton (1995), Konar and Cohen 
(1997), and others, study the immediate market reaction regarding particular 
environmental incidents. Ziegler et al., (2007), however, points out deficiencies inherent 
in those prior studies. In regards to the portfolio comparison approach, the influence of 
sustainability performance variables on economic performance can hardly be separated 
from the influence of other variables since the latter are not considered in these 
approaches. In reference to event studies, it should be emphasized that short-term 
reactions can become weaker or more severe due to many other variables that conjointly 
affect the firm’s stock prices within the event window.   
Ziegler et al, examine the effect of different sustainability performance variables 
of European corporations on the average monthly stock returns over the period 1996 
through 2001. Sustainability performance is based on evaluating the environment and 
social risk of the industry. Environmental risk is seen as stemming from the use of natural 
resources and the emission of air pollutants and hazardous wastes that do not result from 
energy use. Social risk is based on evaluating the burdens for social stability and the 
damage to individual rights and values, including workplace conditions, production of 
unhealthy goods, and the violation of ethical norms. They conduct cross-sectional 
regressions of the average monthly stock returns of environmental and social 
performance based on 2 approaches: the first approach is based on the parameter of the 
asset pricing model while the second approach is based on the multifactor model of Fama 
and French (1996). Sustainability performance is measured in two ways, as the average 
sustainability performance (in terms of environmental and social risks) of the industry in 
which a corporation operates, and as the relative sustainability performance (in terms of 
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environmental and social activities) of a corporation within a given industry relative to 
other peer companies and industries.  
The sustainability performance data was provided by the Swiss bank Sarasin & 
Cie in Basle. Sarasin & Cie has evaluated the environmental and social criteria of 
approximately 300 European corporations comprising approximately 80% of the MSCI 
stock index for Europe. The technique developed by Sarasin & Cie use criteria that 
conform with international standards of sustainability reporting, such as the guidelines 
developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (2000). The results of this research indicate 
that the environmental performance of the industry has a significant positive impact on 
firms' monthly stock returns. In contrast, social performance has a significantly negative 
influence on stock returns. Relative sustainability performance concerning both 
environmental and social activity variables within a given industry is found to have no 
significant effect on stock performance. 
 
Based on the above literature, I conclude the following:  
1- The impact of ED on stock valuation is inconclusive. 
2- The association between EP and stock valuation is questionable. 
3- The Environmental disclosure area is not well structured as to reflect the 
true/actual financial performance which is demonstrated by the weak association 
between EP and ED.  
 Hence, in this dissertation, I address the association between environmental 
performance and stock prices in a broad perspective, in an attempt to avoid the problems 
with sampling and research design that are evident in prior studies. A general association 
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between environmental performance and stock prices is examined in individual variables 
and overall rating variables. The results of the study highlight the relative importance of 
independent factors as well as the conjoint effect when considering an overall rating 
effect. The study provides guidance that may be useful to regulators as they attempt to 
improve/implement environmental disclosures that are of relevance to stakeholder 
concerns.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Hypothesis 
Based on the discounted cash flow model, a company's stock price is defined as 
the present value of all future cash flows. The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that 
capital markets respond quickly to impound new information into stock prices. If 
accounting earnings are seen as a proxy for cash flows then, together, these constructs 
suggest that the stock market will respond to any information that alters expectations of 
future earnings. Information considered to be "bad news" by the capital markets, i.e., 
information seen as indicative of a reduction in expected future earnings will cause a 
decrease in stock price. Similarly, information considered to be "good news" (indicative 
of increased income) leads to an increase in stock price.  
Prior research documents capital markets responses to environmental events, 
environmental disclosures, and environmental performance measures such as: 
Blaconniere and Patten (1994), Walden and Schwarte (1997), Klassen and McLaughlin 
(1996), Lorraine, Collison and Power (2004), and Freedman and Jaggi (1988). Consistent 
with the efficient markets hypothesis, these market responses are limited to the particular 
time horizon around the event date or the environmental information announcement.  
Prior literature has also assessed environmental performance via a single variable, such 
as: Lorraine, Collison and Power (2004), Patten (2002), and Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), or 
a number of variables combined to construct an index, such as: Ingram and Frazier 
(1980), Wiseman (1982), and Fryxell and Wang (1994). The results of these 
investigations are, however, inconclusive with respect to the impact of environmental 
performance of firm valuation. This may be due to the single variable's inability to proxy 
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for overall environmental performance. On the other hand, the use of number of variables 
to construct an index may lead to misleading results since some variables may outweigh 
or offset the effect of other variables.  
 In this study, I address the methodological gap in the prior literature by 
investigating whether stock market valuation (measured in terms of annual stock returns) 
is associated with environmental performance on an ongoing basis rather than simply in 
response to unique events. I do this by testing whether individual environmental 
performance variables and comprehensive environmental performance ratings are cross-
sectionally associated with stock returns. The association of firm value with both 
individual and comprehensive measures provides a unique depiction of how 
environmental variables combine to influence investor perceptions. The two levels 
investigation shed light on the influence of individual environmental constructs, the 
relative importance of some vis-a-vis others, and demonstrates how certain constructs 
outweigh others when combined into a comprehensive measure.  
The results of this study are of significant value to regulators and investors since 
they provide guidance as to the kind of environmental performance information that is 
considered most important by capital markets. This may direct regulators in deciding 
whether to impose new environmental disclosure requirements and, if so, what kinds of 
disclosures are most informative. Similarly, these results are of value to investors in that 
they identify those environmental factors having the greatest influence on security 
valuation.  
I employ six "environmental strength" [ES] measures and seven "environmental 
concerns” [EC] measures in this investigation. Each ES measure (ESi, where “i” ranges 
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from 0 to 6) is regressed against annual stock returns and then combined into a total 
strength rating variable (TES) which, in turn, is regressed against annual stock returns. 
Likewise, each environmental concern measure (ECi, where “i” ranges from 0 to 7) is 
regressed against the annual stock and then, similar to TES, combined into a total concern 
rating (TEC). This variable is then regressed against annual stock returns.  
I then construct a company profile by combining the total strength rating variable 
[TES] and total concern rating variable [TEC] into an overall environmental rating 
variable [OER]. This rating is used to test the association between firms’ overall 
environmental position and firms’ annual stock returns.  
Combining individual variables into an index or rating variable is a process that 
depends essentially on the nature of the variables that will be combined; two main 
characteristics of these variables, namely weights and independency, are of interest in the 
current context.  All environmental rating variables are assumed independent and equally 
weighted. Thus, the combination process was performed by simply adding the scores of 
both individual environmental strength variables and environmental concern variables 
into total environmental strength rating and total environmental concern rating variables 
and then adding the scores of both total rating variables into one overall environmental 
rating variable.  
I also investigate the association between the changes in firms’ annual returns and 
the changes in firms’ overall environmental rating (environmental profile scores). This 
analysis is conducted employing data for the 2006 to 2008 period to facilitate the 
development of inferences regarding whether improvement (deterioration) in the 
environmental ratings are associated with positive (negative) changes in firm’s value.  
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Previous studies investigating corporate social responsibility/environmental 
performance have used different approaches to assess this construct. These approaches 
include: Fortune magazine's ratings (an index comprised of financial soundness, long-
term investment value, use of corporate assets, quality of management, innovativeness, 
quality of products or services, use of corporate talent, and community and environmental 
responsibility) such as: McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988). These attributes are 
rated on a scale of 0 to 10. Ratings of 0 represent poor environmental performance while 
a rating of 10 represents excellent environmental performance. A "toxic release 
inventory" measure, which is a quantitative measure regarding more than 650 toxic 
chemicals and compounds that are used, manufactured, treated, transported, or released 
by certain industry groups as well as federal facilities has also been used (see  Hamilton 
(1995) and Freedman and Patten (2004)), as has the CEP index, which is based on a 
series of industry studies, published by the CEP, which examine the pollution control 
records regarding 50 firms in four different industries: petroleum refining; steel; pulp and 
paper; and electric utility industries (see Ingram and Frazier (1980) and Freedman and 
Wasley (1990)). 
In this research I employ the environmental performance measures from the KLD 
database. The KLD database is a data set that provides an annual snapshot of the 
environmental, social, and governance performance as assessed by KLD Research & 
Analytics, Inc. KLD covers approximately 80 indicators in seven major qualitative issue 
areas including community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights and product. The data are gathered from several research 
processes, which results in a full profile of companies’ performance. Based on the criteria 
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used for environmental performance measurement, the data is classified either as a 
“strength” or as a “concern.” Whenever a strength activity is performed by the firm it is 
coded “1,” otherwise “0.” Similarly whenever a concern activity is performed by the firm 
it is coded “1,” otherwise will be coded “0.” The firm’s overall environmental 
performance is assessed by using both the strengths score and concerns score and then by 
using the overall combined scores of both strengths and concerns. 
 
3.1 Methodology and Hypothesis Development 
I assess the general capital market response to environmental performance apart 
from any particular event or incidence. The market valuation of firms’ environmental 
performance is measured using annual stock market returns from the CRSP database. 
Thus, I examine the association between environmental performance and the annual stock 
market returns [levels of environmental performance]. The levels study is conducted in 
three stages, while a fourth stage assesses the association between stock market valuation 
and changes in firms’ environmental performance. 
Stage I involves testing whether individual environmental performance measures 
are, indeed, associated with firms' annual stock returns. Since the efficient markets 
hypothesis suggests that all information regarding a firm is impounded into price, the 
individual environmental variables (ESi and ECi) should be significantly associated with 
stock prices if they are viewed by market participants as impacting future cash flows. 
Thus my initial hypotheses are (in alternative form): 
H1: Individual environmental strength variables [ESi] are associated with firms’ 
annual stock returns. 
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H2: Individual environmental concern variables [ECi] are associated with firms’ 
annual stock returns. 
Stage II involves investigating the association between the total strength rating 
variable (TES) and firms’ annual stock returns and the association between the total 
concern rating variable (TEC) and firms’ annual stock returns. TES represents the 
accumulation of all environmental strength variables. Since these variables are 
dichotomous in nature, TES will range from 0 (in the case where a firm does not perform 
any strength activities), to 6 (in the case where a firm performs all of the identified 
strength activities). TEC represents the accumulation of all environmental concern 
variables. As with the ES measures, these variables are dichotomous in nature. TEC will 
thus range from 0 (in the case where a firm does not have any environmental concerns), 
to 7 (in the case where a firm is deemed to have all of the identified environmental 
concerns). As above, I hypothesize that each of these constructs will be significantly 
associated with stock returns.  My third and fourth hypotheses, in alternative form, are 
thus: 
H3: The total strength rating [TES] is associated with annual stock returns 
H4: The total concern rating [TEC] is associated with annual stock returns. 
Stage III involves investigating the association between the overall environmental 
rating variable [OER] and firms’ annual stock returns.  A firm’s overall environmental 
rating is the sum of the total strength rating score [TES] and total concern rating score 
[TEC] where OER= TES - TEC. The OER scores will range from +6 to -7. A +6 OER 
score will be achieved if the firm performs all strength activities while imposing no 
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environmental concerns. A -7 OER score will result if the firm does not perform any 
environmental strength activities while its operations evidence all 7 environmental 
concerns.  The overall environmental profile score is regressed against firms’ annual 
stock returns.  
The process of combining the strength and the concern variables is performed by 
the simple addition of the strength variables and the concern variables since they are all 
equally weighted. However, the interaction between these individual variables may affect 
the extent of the association. Factor analysis is used to highlight the interaction and 
association between the environmental performance variables.  
Factor analysis reduces the number of variables to “factors" where it is possible. 
For example, variations in three or four observed variables may be reflecting the variation 
in a single unobserved variable, or in a reduced number of unobserved variables. Factor 
analysis searches for the joint variations in response to unobserved latent variables. The 
observed variables are modeled as linear combinations of the potential components plus 
the error terms. In addition to factor analysis, the association between the environmental 
components and the annual stock returns is assessed using ordinary least square 
regression.  
If environmental concerns are seen as evidence of increased future costs (negative 
future cash flows) then it is possible to predict the direction of the association between 
stock returns and OER. When OER is negative (concerns outweigh strengths), and 
positive (strengths outweigh concerns), the association between stock returns and OER 
should be positive. My fifth hypothesis, in alternative form, is thus:   
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H5: Overall environmental rating [OER] is positively associated with annual stock 
returns. 
The final stage of this investigation entails assessing the market response to 
changes in firms’ overall environmental ratings. Firms are partitioned into those with 
overall environmental performance improvement, firms with overall environmental 
performance deterioration, and firms with no change in environmental performance.  This 
categorization is applied using the following coding procedure: any firm with 
environmental performance improvement, regardless of the number of points increased, 
is coded “1”; Any firm with environmental performance deterioration , regardless of the 
number of points decreased, is coded “-1”; Any firm with no environmental performance 
changes is coded “0”.  
This association is investigated two ways: First, using analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to detect any significant differences between the three groups. Then second, 
the association between the changes in the firm’s overall environmental rating and the 
changes of the firm’s annual stock returns over the 2006 to 2008 period is investigated 
using ordinary least square regression. Again, the efficient markets hypothesis leads to 
the prediction that changes in environmental ratings (new information impacting future 
cash flows) will lead to changes in stock prices. My sixth hypothesis, in alternative form, 
is thus: 
H6: A change in the overall environmental rating score [OES] is positively 
associated with the change in annual stock returns. 
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3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Environmental Performance Variables 
I use the KLD database to identify the environmental performance measures 
employed in this research. The measure assesses environmental performance based on 6 
environmental strength variables and 7 environmental concern variables. The 
environmental strength variables are: beneficial products and services, which will be 
considered an environmental strength only if the company derives substantial revenues 
from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote 
the efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental 
benefits; pollution prevention, which will be considered an environmental strength only if 
the company has notable strong pollution prevention programs including both emissions 
reductions and toxics-use reduction programs; recycling, which will be considered an 
environmental strength only if the company is either a substantial user of recycled 
materials as raw materials in its manufacturing processes , or a major factor in the 
recycling industry; clean energy, which will be considered an environmental strength 
only if the company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on climate 
change and air pollution through the use of renewable energy and clean fuel or through 
energy efficiency; management systems strength, which will be considered an 
environmental strength only if the company includes environmental objectives as part of 
the firm’s overall plans; other strengths, which will be considered an environmental 
strength only if the company has demonstrated a superior commitment to management 
systems, voluntary programs, or other environmentally proactive activities. 
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The environmental concern variables are: hazardous wastes, which will be 
considered an environmental concern only if the company’s liabilities for hazardous 
waste sites exceed $50 million, or the company has recently paid substantial fines or civil 
penalties for waste management violations; regulatory problems, which will be 
considered an environmental concern only if the company has recently paid substantial 
fines or civil penalties for violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, or 
it has a pattern of regulatory controversies under the clean air act, Clean Water Act or 
other major environmental regulations; ozone depletion chemicals, which will be 
considered an environmental concern only if the company is among the top 
manufacturers of ozone pollution chemicals such as HCFCs, Methyl chloroform, 
methylene chloride, or bromines; substantial emissions, which will be considered as 
environmental concern only if the company’s legal emissions of toxic chemicals from 
individual plants into the air and water are among the highest of the companies within the 
KLD database; agricultural chemicals, which will be considered an environmental 
concern only if the company is a substantial producer of other cultural chemicals such as 
pesticides or chemical fertilizers; climate change, which will be considered  an 
environmental concern only if the company derives substantial revenues from the sale of 
coal or oil and its derivative products, or the company derives substantial revenues 
indirectly from the combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products; other 
concerns, which will be considered an environmental concern only if the company has 
been involved in any environmental controversy that is not covered bythe other EC 
variables. 
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3.2.2 Annual Stock Returns 
 Monthly stock returns for the sample companies were obtained from the CRSP 
data base then transformed into annual [Cum_Ret] returns in the following fashion: 
–   
The cumulative annual returns are thus calculated by compounding the monthly 
returns where the initial base is 100% or 1, which corresponds to Cum_Ret at T=0. After 
one month, Cum_Ret will take the value 1*(1+Ret1), which is the accumulation of the 
initial base 100% and Ret1. After the second month, Cum_Ret will take the value 
1*(1+Ret1)*(1+Ret2). This process is repeated until the twelve months are compounded. 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
Prior research has documented that a number of firm-specific factors appear to be 
related to environmental performance. In order to more carefully investigate the 
association between firms’ environmental performance and stock returns, I control for 
these factors. Specifically, I control for firm size, environmentally sensitive industry 
membership, profitability, financial leverage, capital intensity, and return on assets. 
 
3.2.3.1 Firm Size (LnAs) and Environmentally Sensitive Industry Membership 
(SIC)  
Prior studies, such as: Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Cho, Roberts, and 
Patten (2009), have indicated that a significant association exists between firm size and 
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environmental performance, with larger companies performing different environmentally, 
than smaller companies. My proxy for firm size is the natural log of total assets.  
Similarly, various studies have indicated that companies in industries whose 
activities have a significant impact on the surrounding environment performed 
differently, with respect to the environment, than firms in other industries. I control for 
industry membership by employing a dichotomous variable coded “1” for firms that 
belong to environmentally sensitive industries and otherwise coded “0.”  
Patten (2002), Cho and Patten (2007), and Cho, Roberts, and Patten (2009) 
conclude that environmentally sensitive industries include firms that operate within the 
chemical (SIC code 28XX), metals (SIC code 33XX), mining (SIC code 10XX), oil 
exploration (SIC code13XX), paper and pulp (SIC code 26XX), and petroleum (SIC code 
2911) industries. I follow this classification in coding industry membership. 
 
3.2.3.2 Capital Intensity (Cap_Int), Return on Assets (ROA), and Profit Margin 
(Prf_Mrgn) 
Although not as consistently documented as firm size and industry, in some cases, 
capital intensity (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Clarkson et al, 2008; Reitenga, 2000) and  
profitability  (Bewley & Li, 2000; Magness, 2006; Al-Tuwaihri et al,2004) are found to 
be significantly related to firm environmental performance. Capital intensity is measured 
by dividing total assets by total revenues. Profitability is measured using return on assets 
(net income divided by total assets), and profit margin (net income divided by sales 
revenue). 
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3.2.3.2 Financial Leverage (Fin_Lev) 
Several studies have also employed financial leverage as one of the financial 
position control variables (Freedman and Jaggi, 1992; Cormier and Megnan, 1999). 
Financial leverage indicates the extent to which the business relies on debt financing and 
is measured by dividing long-term debt by stockholders equity.  
 
3.3 Models 
Inclusion of the control variables (above) yields the following empirical test 
models. All variables are illustrated in Exhibit 1. The models used to test hypotheses 1 
and 2 are: 
 ………… (M1) 
 ………… (M2) 
 
The tests of total environmental Strengths and Concerns (hypotheses 3 and 4) 
employ the following empirical models: 
 ………… (M3) 
 ………… (M4) 
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The test model for the Overall Environmental Profile variables (hypothesis 5) is: 
 ………… (M5) 
 
Lastly, the empirical model used to test hypothesis 6 regarding changes in ratings 
and changes in returns is:  
…..…… (M6) 
 
Exhibit 1 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variable 
Cum_Ret  = 
Cumulative annual stock market returns, which represents the 
accumulation of monthly returns for each firm year. For model 
6, ∆ Cum_Ret = Annual return2008 – Annual return2006. 
Control Variables 
LnAs  = Natural logarithm of Total Assets; 
SIC  = 1 In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, 0 otherwise; 
ROA  = Net Income / Average Total Assets; 
Fin_Lev  = (Debt in current liabilities + Debt in long term Liabilities) / Total Shareholder’s Equity; 
Prf_Mrgn  = Net income / Total sales; 
Cap_Int    Total Assets / Total Revenues. 
e  = Error term 
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Exhibit 1 (continued) 
Variables of Interest in each Model 
M1 ESi = 
Different environmental strength measures. “i” ranges from 1 to 6 where, i = 1 
refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial (green) products and services, i 
= 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management 
systems, i = 6 is other strengths. These variables will be employed in 
dichotomous manner where If a firm performs any of these environmental 
activities, it be coded 1 otherwise 0;  
M2 ECi  = 
Different environmental concerns. “i” ranges from 1 to 7,  i = 1 refers to 
climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to 
substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 
refers to hazardous waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers 
to other concerns. These variables will be employed in dichotomous manner 
where If a firm activities impose any of these concerns on the environment, it 
be coded 1 otherwise 0; 
M3 TES = Total environmental strength rating variable. It represents the simple addition of all environmental strength variables. TES = ∑ (ESi) 
M4 TEC = Total environmental concern rating variable. It represents the simple addition of all environmental concern variables. TEC = ∑ (ECi) 
M5 OER = Overall environmental rating variable. Total environmental strength rating  - total environmental concern rating  
M6 ∆OER  = Change in overall environmental rating = OEP2008 – OEP2006 
 
3.4 Sample Selection  
To be included in the study, the sample firms have to meet the following criteria: 
1. They must be listed in the ratings of corporate social and environmental 
performance compiled by KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. 
2. They must have the required financial accounting information available in the 
Standard & Poors’ COMPUSTAT database. 
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3. They must have stock prices data available on the CRSP Monthly Returns 
database. 
I collected the most recent environmental performance data available on the KLD 
database (years 2006, 2007, and 2008). Earlier years could not be included in the sample 
as prior to 2006 some of the environmental performance variables were not available thus 
limiting the comparability of environmental performance. A total of 6680 firm-years met 
the sample criteria and constituted the final sample as illustrated in Table 1.  
Comparison of environmental performance over the 2006 through 2008 period 
requires an identical sample set for each year. Data for 1654 firms were available for this 
analysis. 
Table1 
The overall cross-sectional sample set obtained for each year and the matched sample 
for years 2006 and 2008 
 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Environmental data 2,962 2,937 2,923 8,822 
(-) firms with no annual returns 236 218 44 498 
Environmental data and annual returns 2,726 2,719 2,879 8,324 
(-) firms missing some or all of the accounting data 544 477 623 1,644 
Final sample set 2,182 2,242 2,256 6,680 
 
Match sample: 2006 and 2008 1,654 
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Table 2 presents selected descriptive information for the sample of 6,682 firm-
year observations. More specifically, the table presents the minimum, maximum, mean, 
standard deviation, and variance of the variables used in the model. The table 
demonstrates, on average, that firms reported -0.055 annual returns. The low mean of the 
environmental variables indicates that most firms did not report any environmental 
activities, i.e. more firms reported 0 rather than 1 in regard to both environment strength 
and concern variables. Also it appears that most firms do not belong to environmentally 
sensitive industries. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in the models 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
lnAs 6680 1.231 14.598 7.593 1.647 2.713 
SIC_01 6680 0 1 0.149 0.356 0.127 
Fin_Lev 6680 -782.545 1726.896 1.498 30.871 953.006 
Prf_Mrgn 6680 -29319.000 21.846 -7.653 405.096 164103.117 
Cap_Int 6680 -164.092 54344.300 16.767 692.937 480161.619 
ROA 6680 -2.096 3.018 0.021 0.151 0.023 
Cum_Ret 6680 -0.980 7.952 -0.055 0.453 0.205 
Beneficial products and services 6680 0 1 0.024 0.153 0.023 
Pollution prevention 6680 0 1 0.013 0.114 0.013 
Recycling 6680 0 1 0.017 0.128 0.016 
Clean energy 6680 0 1 0.043 0.202 0.041 
Management system strength 6680 0 1 0.055 0.227 0.052 
Other strengths 6680 0 1 0.007 0.084 0.007 
Strength total 6680 0 4 0.158 0.532 0.283 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Hazardous waste 6680 0 1 0.043 0.203 0.041 
Regulatory problems 6680 0 1 0.069 0.254 0.065 
Ozone depletion chemicals 6680 0 1 0.001 0.024 0.001 
Substantial emissions 6680 0 1 0.055 0.227 0.052 
Agricultural chemicals 6680 0 1 0.006 0.077 0.006 
Climate change 6680 0 1 0.057 0.232 0.054 
Other concerns 6680 0 1 0.019 0.137 0.019 
Concern total 6680 0 5 0.250 0.693 0.480 
OEP 6680 -5 4 -0.092 0.690 0.476 
Valid  N 6680 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Discussion 
4.1 Stage I Results 
The models’ goodness of fit and the R-square for each environmental strength 
model as well as the analysis of variance results are  presented in table 3. ANOVA 
provides information about the variation accounted for as well as the residual variation 
not accounted for by the environmental strength models and the overall model 
significance in predicting the annual returns based on the variables included. The R-
square is the proportion of variation in the dependent variable explained by the regression 
model. While the adjusted R-square adjusts for the number of explanatory terms in a 
model to more closely reflect the goodness of fit of the model. The R-square for the 6 
models ranges from 0.0668 to 0.0670 which indicates that approximately seven percent 
of the variability in annual stock returns can be explained by the model. The adjusted R-
square for the 6 models ranges from 0.0658 to 0.0670. All models reported high residual 
sum of squares in comparison to regression sum of squares. However, the F statistic for 
all models was significant (the p-value was 0.000), which indicates that the independent 
variables significantly explained the variation in the dependent variable.  
Table 4 presents the coefficients of the environmental strength regression models. 
The unstandardized coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. 
The results indicate that, across all strength models, both industry classification and the 
ROA, as a measure of profitability, are positively associated with the sample firms’ 
annual returns while the coefficient on firm size is negative. Of the environmental 
strength variables, only Recycling (p = 0.075) and Other Strengths (p = 0.0037) are 
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significant at conventional levels. It is interesting to note, however, that while the 
coefficient on recycling is positively associated with returns, the coefficient on Other 
Strengths is negative. None of the other environmental strength variables would be 
significantly associated with returns, even if a one-tailed test could be justified. However, 
unlike the other strength variable it is positively related to firms’ annual returns. Thus, 
based on these results illustrated, H1 is rejected for all environmental strength variables 
except for Other Strengths and Recycling.  
The mixed results for the environmental strength variables are not conclusive. The 
association results are not significant for beneficial products and services, pollution 
prevention, clean energy, and management system strengths variables which is consistent 
with the findings of Mahapatra (1984), Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985), Jaggi and 
Freedman (1992), and Kreander et al. (2005) who report no association between firms’ 
environmental performance and the firms’ financial performance (expressed by the stock 
prices performance). The Positive association of recycling with returns (consistent with 
the results reported by Spicer 1978, Anderson and Frankel 1980; Ziegler et al. 2007) 
seems to support one perspective of McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988), which 
perceives environmental activities as an investment opportunity which yields positive net 
present values. The negative coefficient of Other Strengths seems (consistent with the 
results of Ingram and Frazier 1983 and Freedman and Jaggi 1982) to support another 
perspective of McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988): that environmental activities 
place an additional financial burden on firms and thus lead to an economic disadvantage. 
This disadvantage is ultimately expressed as reduced profitability and lower returns. 
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Given the mixed results and competing theoretical perspectives, it is not possible to make 
any conclusive assessments from the regression results for the uncombined ES variables. 
The ANOVA results of the tests for an association between the uncombined EC 
variables and returns are presented in Table 5. Similar to the ES results, the R-square for 
the 7 models range from 0.067 to 0.071 which indicates that approximately seven percent 
of the variability in the annual returns variable can be explained by the model. The 
adjusted R-square for the 7 models ranges from 0.066 to 0.070. All models reported high 
residual sum of squares in comparison to regression sum of squares. However, the F 
statistic for all models was significant, p-value = 0.000, which indicates that the 
independent variables did significantly explain the variation in the dependent variable.  
Table 6 presents the regression results of the tests for an association between the 
uncombined EC variables and returns. As in the ES regressions, these results indicate that 
both industry classification and the ROA, as a measure of profitability, are positively 
associated with firms’ annual returns while the coefficient on firm size is negative. The 
hazardous waste concern variable (p = 0.032), substantial emissions concern variable (p = 
0.008), and the agricultural chemicals concern variable (p = 0.000) are all significantly 
associated with returns. Interestingly, the coefficients on each of these are positive which 
is consistent with the results of Ingram and Frazier (1980) and Freedman and Jaggi 
(1982) who report a negative association between environmental and financial 
performance. Thus, it appears as though hazardous waste concerns, substantial emissions 
and the use of agricultural chemicals may translate into greater profitability.  
The positive association between Hazardous waste, substantial emission, and 
agricultural chemicals variables are consistent with the results reported by Spicer (1978), 
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Anderson and Frankel (1980), Ziegler et al. (2007). The regression results with respect to 
Regulatory problems, Ozone depletion chemicals, climate changes, and other concerns 
variables are consistent with Mahapatra (1984), Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985), 
Jaggi and Freedman (1992), and Kreander et al. (2005) who report no association 
between environmental and financial performance. Overall, the findings are consistent 
with McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis’ (1988) conjecture that there may be a 
negative association between social responsibility activities and firms’ financial 
performance. 
 
4.2 Stage II Results 
The models’ goodness of fit and the R-square for the firms’ total environmental 
strength rating model are illustrated in Table 7 - Panel A. The total environmental 
strength rating model R-square is 0.067, which indicates that approximately seven 
percent of the variability in annual returns can be explained by the model. The adjusted 
R-square for the model is 0.066. Even though a high residual sum of squares in 
comparison to regression sum of squares is reported, the overall regression model appears 
to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. This indicates that the independent 
variables significantly explain the variation in the dependent variable.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the regression results for the TES model. The results 
indicate that both industry classification and the ROA as a measure of profitability are 
positively associated with annual returns (p-values of 0.001 and 0.000 respectively), 
while the coefficient on firm size is, again, negative (p = 0.000). The total environmental 
strength rating variable is not significantly associated with firms’ annual returns at 
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conventional levels (p = 0.6866). From a comprehensive perspective, it appears that firm 
activities which are deemed environmental strengths do not translate into positive 
financial performance. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
Table 8 - Panel A presents the models’ goodness of fit and the R-square for the 
firms’ total environmental concern ratings model. The total environmental concern 
ratings model yields an R-square of 0.068 (indicating that approximately seven percent of 
the variability in annual returns variables can be explained by the model). The adjusted 
R-square is virtually identical at 0.067. Even though high residual sum of squares in 
comparison to regression sum of squares is reported, the overall regression model appears 
to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. This indicates that the independent 
variables did significantly explain the variation in the dependent variable. Panel B of 
Table 8 presents the results of the regression model. These results indicate, once again, 
that both industry classification and ROA as a measure of profitability, are positively 
associated with the firms’ annual returns (p-values of 0.011 and 0.000 respectively), 
while firms’ size is negatively associated (p = 0.000).  
The coefficient on the total Environmental Concern Rating variable is positive 
and significantly different from zero (p = 0.021). This finding is again consistent with the 
negative association perspective. Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
The evidence presented above indicates that, cross-sectionally, firms’ attempts to 
perform in an environmentally sensitive fashion are not associated with improved 
financial performance. Indeed, these results indicate that environmental disregard may be 
associated with higher returns which is consistent with the results reported by Ingram and 
Frazier (1980) and Jaggi and Freedman (1982). This could be because conducting 
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operations that may have a negative environmental affect without establishing clean up or 
pollution reduction activities could result in considerable future cost savings. Even if 
clean up or pollution reduction activities are ultimately mandated, pushing those costs 
into future periods would result in greater near term cash flows and a higher net present 
value of firm earnings. 
 
4.3 Stage III Results 
Although the overall environmental Rating (OER) could, theoretically, range 
from +6 to -7, the actual sample results ranged from +4 to -5. The models’ goodness of fit 
and the R-square for the firms’ overall environmental rating model are presented in Table 
9, Panel A. The overall environmental profile model R-square is 0.068 which, consistent 
with all of the prior models tested, indicates that approximately seven percent of the 
variability in annual returns variables can be explained by the model. The adjusted R-
square for the model is 0.067. The overall regression model appears to be statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.000 indicating that the independent variables did a 
significant job explaining the variation in the dependent variable.  
The regression results for the overall environmental rating model are presented in 
Panel B. Once again, the results indicate that both industry classification and the ROA, as 
a measure of profitability, are positively associated with annual returns (p-values of 0.005 
and 0.000 respectively), while firms’ size is negatively associated (p = 0.000). The 
coefficient on the overall environmental rating variable is negative and statistically 
significant in association with the firms’ annual returns (p = 0.014) which is consistent 
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with the results reported by Ingram and Frazier (1980) and Jaggi and Freedman (1982). 
This supports hypothesis 5.  
The OER is calculated by subtracting TEC from TES to create a measure of 
overall environmental performance. The higher the TES score the better a firm performs 
environmentally, while the higher the TEC score, the worse a firm's environmental 
performance. The results of my test indicate that the better a firm performs 
environmentally, the lower its annual returns, and that the poorer it's environmental 
performance, the greater its profitability.  
The hazardous waste variable; substantial emissions variable; and agricultural 
chemicals variable are all positively associated with annual returns indicating that when 
these concerns exist for a firm, the firm tends to have higher returns. On the other side of 
the spectrum, only recycling is positively associated with returns. This may be explained 
by the fact that recycling can lead to increased revenues or decreased costs for a firm, 
resulting in greater profitability. The other environmental strengths: pollution prevention, 
clean energy, etc. may only lead to increased costs.  
These results, consistent with other studies and conjecture in the literature, 
suggest the existence of a negative association between firms’ annual returns and 
environmental performance. This would imply that the costs of being socially responsible 
may place firms in unfavorable financial or competitive positions as compared to firms 
that are not socially responsible. 
To further explore this phenomenon, I use Factor Analysis (FA) to address the 
interactions between the entire set of 13 environmental variables. Although the majority 
of the model variables were statistically insignificant in association with firms’ annual 
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returns, the OER variable was significantly associated with returns which indicates that 
the few significant variables (other strengths; recycling variable; hazardous waste; 
substantial emissions, and the agricultural chemicals variable, outweighed all other 
insignificant variables. 
Table 10 presents the extraction communalities. Extraction communalities are 
estimates of the variance in each variable accounted for jointly by all factors (or 
components) in the factor solution. These range from a low of 0.1587 to a high of 0.6245. 
Communalities must be interpreted in relation to the interpretability of the factors rather 
than entirely on the absolute value of the commonality coefficient. In other words, what 
is critical is not the communality coefficient, but rather the extent to which the item plays 
a role in the interpretation of the factor (although this role is often greater when 
communality is high). 
Table 11 provides the eigenvalues, variance explained, and cumulative variance 
explained by the factor solution. The "Total" column gives the amount of variance in the 
observed variables accounted for by each component or factor. The "% of Variance" 
column gives the percent of variance accounted for by each specific factor or component, 
relative to the total variance in all the variables. The "Cumulative %" column gives the 
percent of variance accounted for by all factors or components up to and including the 
current one. I employed a Varimax rotation, which is an orthogonal rotation of the factor 
axes, in an attempt to maximize the variance of the squared loadings of a factor (column) 
on all the variables (rows) in a factor matrix, which has the effect of differentiating the 
original variables by extracted factor. Factor rotations do not affect the total variance 
accounted for by the model but do change how the variance is distributed among the 
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retained components. Each factor will tend to have either large or small loadings of any 
particular variable instead of having average loadings on 2 or more factors. The factor 
analysis results indicate that only 3 factors (with eigenvalues greater than one) should be 
used in the analysis (replacing the 13 environmental variables). The factor solution 
indicates that, based on the Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings, factor 1 accounted for 
16.6007 of the variance in all variables, factor 2 accounted for 14.9182 of the variance in 
all variables, and finally, factor 3 accounted for 9.6704 of the variance in all variables 
while the cumulative variance accounted for is 41.1929% .  
Panel A of Table 12 presents the factor loadings for each variable on the un-
rotated factors where each number represents the correlation between the item and the 
un-rotated factor. The un-rotated component matrix doesn’t show a clear block structure 
for the variables which would be the case if each and every variable had a high loading 
on one factor and a low loading on the other factor (i.e., no cross loading). Instead, 
almost all variables have cross loading in regards to the proposed three factor structure.  
The rotated component matrix, (Panel B of Table 12), presents the correlations 
between the items and the rotated factor. This provides a better factor loading block 
structure not just from the statistical point of view but also from the logical point of view, 
as all strength variables loaded to the second component accounted for 14.9182% of the 
variance. All non chemical concern variables such as the hazardous waste concern 
variable; the regulatory problems concern variable; the substantial emission concern 
variable; the climate changes concern variable; and the other concerns variable loaded to 
the first component accounted for 16.6007% of the variance. Both agricultural and ozone 
depletion chemical concern variables loaded together on the third component which 
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accounted for 9.6740% of the variance. Based on the rotated loading structure, I labeled 
factor one the environmental strengths factor, factor two the non-chemical concern factor, 
and the third factor, the chemical concern factors. 
 Table 13 presents the reproduced correlations and residuals for the factor analysis 
solution. In other words, it shows the predicted pattern of the relationships, if the factor 
analysis solution is correct. Residuals show the difference between the predicted and 
observed values. If the solution is a good one, the reproduced correlations will be close to 
the observed values which will consequently lead to small residuals. The residuals 
reported are all within the acceptable range for accepting (technically: not rejecting) the 
proposed factor structure. 
Table 14, the factor transformation matrix, describes the specific rotation applied 
to the factor solution. If the off-diagonal elements are close to zero, the rotation was 
relatively small. If the off-diagonal elements are large (greater than ±0.5), a larger 
rotation was applied. The results indicate that a large rotation was applied between the 
environmental strength factor and the non-chemical concern factor while a small one was 
applied between the non-chemical concern factor and the chemical concern factors and 
between the environmental strengths factor and Chemicals concern factors. 
 
Factors Regression Analysis 
4.3.1 Factor One: Non Chemical Concern Factor  
The models’ goodness of fit and the R-square for the firms’ non-chemical concern 
factor model are presented in Table 15, Panel A. The overall regression model appears to 
be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 indicating that the independent 
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variables and factor one provide a statistically significant explanation of the variation in 
the dependent variable. Panel B in Table 15 presents the regression coefficients. 
Consistent with all previous models, the results indicate that both industry classification 
and the ROA as a measure of profitability are positively associated with annual returns 
(p-values of 0.005 and 0.000 respectively), while the coefficient on firm size is negative 
(p = 0.000). The non-chemical concern factor is, however, not significantly associated 
with the firm returns. Factor one is composed of 5 concern variables, 3 of which are 
positively correlated with annual stock returns while the other 2 are negatively correlated. 
The substantial emissions concern variable, along with the other non-significant variables 
appear to dominate the sign of coefficient of factor one over the other 2 insignificant 
variables. The insignificant association reported is consistent with the results reported 
with Mahapatra (1984), Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985), Jaggi and Freedman 
(1992), and Kreander et al. 2005. 
 
4.3.2 Factor Two: Environmental Strengths Factor 
The models’ goodness of fit and the R-square for the firms’ environmental 
strengths factor model are illustrated in Table 16, Panel A. The overall regression model 
appears to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 indicating that the 
independent variables and factor two did significantly explain the variation in the 
dependent variable. Panel B of Table 16 presents the coefficients of the regression model. 
The results indicate that both industry classification and the ROA, as a measure of 
profitability, are positively associated with returns while firm size is negatively 
associated. The environmental strengths factor is not statistically significant in the model 
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(p-value of 0.626). Based on both methods of constituting the strengths index, simple 
addition and factor analysis, I conclude that the process of combining variables into one 
index may lead to the insignificant variables diluting the significance of the significantly 
correlated variables. The insignificant association reported is consistent with the results 
reported with Mahapatra (1984), Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985), Jaggi and 
Freedman (1992), and Kreander et al. (2005). 
 
4.3.3 Factor Three: Chemicals Concern Factor 
The models’ goodness of fit and the R-square for the firms’ chemicals concern 
factor model are presented in Table 17, Panel A. The overall regression model appears to 
be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. This indicates that the independent 
variables and factor three did significantly explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
Panel B in Table 17 presents the regression coefficients for this model. Industry 
classification and the ROA are positively, and firm size negatively, associated with 
returns (p-values of 0.003, 0.000 and 0.000 respectively). Unlike the other two factors, 
however, the chemicals concern factor is positive and statistically significant in the model 
(p-value = 0.000). The positive association results of the concern rating variable are 
consistent with the negative association results reported be Ingram and Frazier (1980) and 
Jaggi and Freedman (1982). 
The overall results suggest a negative relationship between social responsibility 
and financial performance. This may be due to the additional costs of better 
environmental performance which places such firms at a cost or competitive 
disadvantage. The positive association of poor environmental performance (expressed by 
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more environmental concerns and/or a higher environmental concern rating) and the 
firms’ annual returns can be explained, according to Muoghalu, Robinson and Glascock 
(1990), as retaining an expected positive present value while the negative association of 
good performance (expressed by more environmental strengths and/or higher 
environmental strength ratings) and the firms’ annual returns can be explained by the 
extra costs the firms need to incur to improve their environmental performance. 
As stated earlier this study investigates the effects of combining variables together 
to build an overall rating or a comprehensive measure.  The direct combination of 
variables indicates that significantly correlated variables may outweigh insignificant 
variables. This occurs in case of the TEC as well as OER, where both variables are 
composed of significant and insignificant components. Both comprehensive variables are, 
however, significantly associated with annual returns. The insignificance of the TES 
rating variable may, however, be explained by the possibility that insignificant variables 
outweighed significant variables. 
The factors structure is, to an extent, consistent with the logical grouping of 
environmental variables where nonchemical environmental concern variables loaded 
together in the first factor, all strength variables loaded together in the second factor, and 
the chemical environmental concern variables loaded in the third factor. The overall 
factor analysis results are consistent with the previous environmental profiling 
methodology applied by combining individual environmental variables into a 
comprehensive environmental measure. The environmental strength factor is statistically 
insignificant just like the TES rating variable. The breakdown of the concern variables 
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into 2 factors did not allow for a clear comparison between both the nonchemical 
concerns factor and the chemical concerns factor and the TEC.   
 
4.4 Stage IV Results 
Table 18 displays the nature of the change in the environmental performance 
scores for the matched sample firms over the 2006 to 2008 period.  Changes in 
environmental performance ranged from -3 to +3.  If the change was between -3 and -1, 
the observation was categorized as “Deterioration.” If the change was equal to 0 either 
because of equivalent but opposite changes or no changes at all then the observation was 
categorized as “No Change.” If the change was between 1 and 3 then the observation was 
categorized as “Improvement.” As discussed earlier, the match between 2006 and 2008 
yielded a total of 1654 firm-year observations. Around 5.01% of the sample, 83 firms, 
experienced deterioration in their environmental ratings score. More than 86.09% of the 
sample, 1424 firms, experienced no change at all, while 0.6%, 10 firms experienced an 
equivalent but opposite change with no overall change in the environmental rating score. 
One-hundred-thirty-seven firms, or 8.28% of the sample, had an improvement in the 
environmental rating score.  
The mean differences of the annual return change variable (CH_Cum_Ret) are 
investigated amongst the three groups in the sample. The one way ANOVA results are 
presented in Table 19. These results show no significant mean differences between the 
three groups (p-value = 0.61). 
The Pearson correlations show no significant correlation (p = 0.42) between the 
annual return change variable and the OER change variable (Table 20). The models’ 
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goodness of fit and the R-square for the firms’ overall environmental changes model are 
presented in Table 21, Panel A. The overall environmental changes model appears to be 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. This indicates that the independent 
variables did significantly explain the variation in the dependent variable. Panel B of 
Table 21 presents the coefficients of the regression model. The results indicate that 
profitability using profit margin, ROA, and capital intensity are all positively correlated 
to annual returns (p-values of 0.061, 0.070, and 0.000 respectively), while firm size is 
negatively correlated (p-value = 0.000).  The overall environmental change variable is 
statistically insignificant in the model. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is rejected. 
I further investigate the association between the overall environmental change 
variable and the firms’ annual return changes for individual groups rather than in total. 
More specifically, I investigate the deterioration and the improvement group changes in 
association with the firm’s annual return changes. The results of these tests, presented in 
Table 22, Panel A indicate that the individual group’s model is also not significant. The 
deterioration group had a p-value of 0.128 while the improvement group had a p-value of 
0.276. Likewise, each group’s environmental change variable was not significantly 
associated with annual return changes (a p-value of 0.2980 and a coefficient of -0.1168 
for the deterioration group (Table 22, Panel B), and a p-value of 0.3259 and a coefficient 
of -0.1173 for the improvement group (Table 22, Panel C). I thus conclude that the 
capital markets did not respond to changes in the sample firms’ environmental 
performance. 
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Chapter 5 
Sensitivity Tests 
 I performed 6 sets of tests to check the sensitivity of the results. The sensitivity 
tests include employing the variables all together in one model (instead of addressing 
them in different models); using alternative dependent variables; and utilizing different 
models to assess the sensitivity of the association results obtained in the previous 
analysis.  
The first set of sensitivity tests includes (1) all environmental variables which 
were tested individually in Models 1 and 2, in one regression model with annual returns 
as the dependent variable and (2) the total environmental strength rating variable and the 
total environmental concern rating variable together in one regression model. Third, the 
variables which loaded on the chemical concern factor were added together into a 
chemical concerns rating variable and then regressed against the firms’ annual returns 
and likewise for the variables which loaded on the nonchemical concern factor. Finally, 
both chemical and nonchemical concern rating variables were included in one regression 
model. 
Table 23 illustrates the association between the firms’ annual returns and the 
firms’ environmental variables. Panel A displays the model’s goodness of fit, the R-
square, and the ANOVA results for the model. The environmental variables model yields 
an R-square of 0.075 (indicating that approximately eight percent of the variability in 
annual returns can be explained by the model). The adjusted R-square was 0.072. The 
overall regression model appeared to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. 
Panel B of Table 23 presents the results of the regression model which indicates that both 
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industry classification and ROA are positively, significantly associated with annual 
returns (p-values of 0.016 and 0.000 respectively), while firms’ size was negatively 
associated with returns (p-value = 0.000). The coefficients of the environmental variables 
were negative and significant for management systems strength (p-value = 0.043) and 
other strengths (p-value = 0.004), while positive and significant for recycling (p-value = 
0.032), substantial emissions (p = 0.027), and agricultural chemicals (p = 0.000).  
The results are not consistent with the results of Models 1 and 2. Besides the other 
strengths variable, which was the only significant environmental strength variable, two 
environmental strength variables (management systems strength and recycling) are 
reported significant. The environmental concern variables previously had hazardous 
waste, substantial emissions, and agriculture chemicals as significant variables; however, 
in this test only substantial emissions and agricultural chemicals are significant. 
Table 24 illustrates the results of the association between both the total 
environmental strength and concern rating variables and the firms’ annual returns. Panel 
A displays the model’s goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The 
environmental rating variables model yields an R-square of 0.068 (indicating that 
approximately seven percent of the variability in annual returns can be explained by the 
model). The adjusted R-square is 0.067. The overall regression model appears to be 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 24 presents the results 
of the regression model which indicate that both industry classification and ROA are 
positive and significantly associated with annual returns (p-values of 0.011 and 0.000 
respectively), while firms’ size was significant and negatively associated (p = 0.000). The 
coefficient of the total environmental strength rating variable was insignificant (p-value = 
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0.239) while the coefficient of the total environmental concern rating variables was 
significant (p-value = 0.010). These results are consistent with the results of Models 3 
and 4.   
Table 25 presents the association between the chemical concern rating variable 
(composed of the agricultural concern variable and the ozone depletion chemical concern 
variable) and the firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the model’s goodness of fit, the 
R-square, and the ANOVA results. The chemical concern rating model yields an R-
square of 0.070 (indicating that seven percent of the variability in annual returns variables 
can be explained by the model). The adjusted R-square is 0.069. The overall regression 
model appears to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 25 
illustrates the results of the regression model. The chemical concern rating variable is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.000) which was consistent with the results reported 
previously for the chemical concern factor (p = 0.000). Industry classification and return 
on assets are significant and positively associated with annual returns while firm size is 
significant but negatively associated with the annual returns. These results are also 
consistent with the original tests. 
Table 26 presents the association between the non-chemical concern rating 
variable (composed of the hazardous and waste concern variable, regulatory problems 
concern variable, substantial emission concern variable, climate changes concern 
variable, and other concerns variable) and the firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the 
model’s goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The non-chemical 
concern rating variables model yielded an R-square of 0.067 (indicating that 
approximately seven percent of the variability in annual returns variables can be 
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explained by the model). The adjusted R-square is 0.066. The overall regression model 
appears to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 26 
presents the results of the regression model which indicates that the non-chemical 
concern rating variable is insignificant (p = 0.096). This is consistent with the results 
reported for the chemical concern factor (p = 0.122). The industry classification and 
return on assets variables are significant and positively associated with the firms’ annual 
returns while firms’ size was significant but negatively associated with annual returns. 
These findings are consistent with previous results.  
Table 27 presents the results of the association between the concern rating 
variables (chemical concern rating variable and the non-chemical concern rating variable) 
and the firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of fit, the R-square, 
and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variables model yields an R-square of 
0.070 (indicating that seven percent of the variability in annual returns variables can be 
explained by the model). The adjusted R-square is 0.069. The overall regression model 
appears to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 27 
presents the results of the regression model. These results are consistent with the prior 
individual associations for the chemical concern rating variable and the non-chemical 
concern variable. The non-chemical concern rating variable was not significantly 
associated with annual returns while the chemical concern rating variable was positive 
and significantly associated with annual returns (p-value = 0.000). The control variables 
are consistent, with both the industry classification and return on assets significant and 
positively associated with annual return while firm size is significant and negatively 
associated with returns. 
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   The second set of sensitivity analyses includes addressing the association 
between the environmental variables and the annual returns for each individual year 
rather than the 3-year cross-sectional sample set. For each year, the individual 
environmental variables and the environmental rating variables are regressed against the 
year’s annual return. 
Table 28 illustrates the results of tests for the year 2006, between the 
environmental strength variables and firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results for the models. The environmental 
strengths model yields an R-square of 0.015 (indicating that one and one half percent of 
the variability in annual returns is explained by the model). The adjusted R-square ranged 
from 0.011 to 0.012. The overall regression models are statistically significant with p-
values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 28 illustrates the results of the regression models which 
indicate, again, that firm size is negative and significantly associated with annual returns 
(p-values of 0.000) while return on assets variable is positive and significantly associated 
with returns (p-values of 0.000). All environmental strength variables, including the other 
strengths variable, are not significantly associated with annual returns. This is consistent 
with the results of Model 1 (except for the other strengths variable which was significant 
in Model 1). 
Table 29 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2006, between the 
environmental concern variables and annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental concern 
variables model yields an R-square that ranges from 0.015 and 0.019 (indicating that 
approximately 2 percent of the variability in annual returns variable is explained by the 
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models). The adjusted R-square ranges from 0.012 to 0.016. The overall regression model 
is statistically significant with a p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 29 presents the 
results of the regression model. Firms size is negatively associated with annual returns (p-
value = 0.000) while the return on assets variable was positive and significantly 
associated with the firms’ annual returns (p-values of 0.000). In regard to the 
environmental concern variables, the regression results are not consistent with the results 
of Model 2. Only the coefficient on the agricultural chemicals concern variable, which 
was positive, is significantly associated with annual returns (p-value =0.002).  
Table 30 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2006, between the 
environmental rating variables and firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable 
models yield R-squares that range from 0.014 and 0.015 (indicating that approximately 
one and one-half percent of the variability in the annual returns variable can be explained 
by the models). The range of the adjusted R-squares is 0.011 to 0.012. The overall 
regression models are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 30 
presents the results of the regression models. Firm size is negative and significantly 
associated with annual returns (p-value of 0.000) while the return on assets variable is 
positive and significantly associate with the returns (p-value of 0.000). In regard to the 
environmental rating variables, the regression coefficients were not consistent with the 
results of Models 4 and 5 where both the total environmental concern rating variable and 
the overall environmental rating variable were not significantly associated with annual 
returns. However, consistent with the results of Model 3, the total environmental strength 
rating variable is not significantly associated with the firms’ annual returns. 
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Table 31 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2007, between the 
environmental strength variables and firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA. The environmental strength variable 
models yield R-squares that range from 0.057 to 0.063 (indicating that approximately six 
percent of the variability in current year annual returns variable can be explained by the 
models). The adjusted R-squares ranged from 0.054 to 0.060. The overall regression 
models are statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 31 presents 
the results of the regression models which indicate that firm size is negatively associated 
with annual returns (p-values less than 1%) while the return on assets and the industry 
classification variables are positively associated with returns (p-values of 0.000). 
Beneficial products and services, recycling, clean energy, and management system 
strength variables are positive and significantly associated with the firm’s annual returns 
(p-values = 0.004, 0.000, 0.000, and 0.002 respectively) while pollution prevention and 
other strengths variables were insignificant. These results were not consistent with the 
results of Model 1 where the other strengths variable was the only significant 
environmental variable. 
Table 32 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2007, between the 
environmental concern variables and the firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the 
models’ goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental 
concern variable models yield R-squares that range from 0.056 to 0.077 (indicating that 
six to seven percent of the variability in annual returns variable can be explained by the 
models). The range of the adjusted R-squares is between 0.054 and 0.074. The overall 
regression models are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 32 
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illustrates the results of the regression models which indicate that firm size variable is 
negative and significantly associated with the annual returns (p-values less than 1%) 
while return on assets and the industry classification variables are positively associated 
with annual returns (p-values of 0.000). In regard to the environmental concern variables: 
hazardous waste, regulatory problems, substantial emissions, agricultural chemicals, and 
climate change variables are all positively associated with returns (p-values = 0.001, 
0.000, 0.000, 0.000, and 0.011 respectively), while ozone depletion chemicals and other 
concerns variables are insignificant. These results are not consistent with the results of 
Model 2 where only hazardous waste, substantial emissions, and agriculture chemicals 
were significantly associated with the annual returns   
Table 33 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2007, between the 
environmental rating variables and firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable 
models yields R-squares that range from 0.064 to 0.076 (indicating that approximately 
seven percent of the variability in annual returns variable can be explained by the 
models). The adjusted R-squares range from 0.061 to 0.073. The overall regression 
models are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 33 presents 
the results of the regression models which indicate that firm size is negative and 
significantly associated with annual returns (p-values = 0.000) while the return on assets 
and the industry classification variables are positive and significantly associated with 
annual returns (p-values of 0.000). In regard to the environmental rating variables, the 
regression coefficient results are consistent with the results of Models 4 and 5 where both 
the total environmental concern rating variable and the overall environmental rating 
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variable are positive and significantly associated with the annual returns (p-values = 
0.000). However, the total environmental strength rating variable is positive and 
significantly associated with the firms’ annual returns (p-value =0.000) which is 
inconsistent with the results of Model 3. 
Table 34 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2008, between the 
environmental strength variables and firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental strength 
variable models yield R-squares that range from 0.087 to 0.090 (indicating that 
approximately nine percent of the variability in annual returns variable can be explained 
by the models). The adjusted R-squares range from 0.084 to 0.087. The overall regression 
models are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 34 illustrates 
the results of the regression models which indicate that the significance of firm size is 
inconclusive. It is significant in the beneficial products and services model (p-value = 
0.036), pollution prevention model (p-value = 0.041), clean energy model (p-value = 
0.037), and other strengths model (p-value = 0.043), but not significant in the recycling 
model and the management systems model. The return on assets variable is positive and 
significantly associated with the firms’ annual returns (p-values of 0.000).  Management 
system strength variable is negative and, unlike the results of Model 1 where the other 
strengths variable was the only significant variable, management systems is the only 
strength variable that is significantly associated with the firm’s annual returns (p-value = 
0.010). 
Table 35 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2008, between the 
environmental concern variables and the firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the 
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models’ goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental 
concern variable models yield an R-square that ranges from 0.087 to 0.089 (indicating 
that approximately nine percent of the variability in annual returns variable can be 
explained by the models). The range of the adjusted R-squares is between 0.084 and 
0.086. The overall regression models are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. 
Panel B of Table 35 illustrates the results of the regression models which indicate that the 
significance of the firm size variable is inconclusive. It was only significant in the ozone 
depletion chemicals model (p-value = 0.036), agricultural chemicals model (p-value = 
0.038), and other concerns model (p-value = 0.048). Return on assets is positively, 
significantly associated with annual returns (p-values of 0.000).  In regard to the 
environmental concern variables, none of the environmental concern variables is 
significantly associated with annual returns. This is inconsistent with the results of Model 
2 where hazardous waste, substantial emission, and agriculture chemicals concern 
variables are positive and significantly associated with the firms’ annual returns. 
Table 36 illustrates the results of the association, for the year 2008, between the 
environmental rating variables and firms’ annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable 
models yield R-squares that range from 0.088 to 0.089 (indicating that approximately 
nine percent of the variability in annual returns variable can be explained by the models). 
The adjusted R-squares range from 0.085 to 0.086. The overall regression models are 
statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 36 presents the results of 
the regression models which indicate that return on assets is positively, significantly 
associated with annual returns (p-values of 0.000). In regard to the environmental rating 
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variables, the regression coefficient results are consistent with the results of Models 3 and 
5 where the total environmental strength rating variable is insignificant while the overall 
environmental rating variable is positively, significantly associated with annual returns 
(p-value =0.041). The total environmental concern rating variable was, however, not 
significantly associated with the annual returns variable which is inconsistent with the 
results of Model 4. 
The third set of sensitivity tests employs earning levels as the dependant variable 
instead of the annual returns. Net income is used to measure the firms earning levels, 
thus; the regression analysis will include the firms’ net income as the dependent variable; 
also, unlike the other regression models, ROA was not used as a control variable.  
Table 37 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental 
strength variables and the firms’ net income. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of 
fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental strength variable models 
yield R-squares that range from 0.052 to 0.063 (indicating that five to six percent of the 
variability in annual returns variables can be explained by the models). The range of the 
adjusted R-squares is almost identical (0.051 and 0.062). The overall regression models 
are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 37 presents the 
results of the regression models which indicate that both of industry classification and 
firms’ size are positive and significantly associated with the earning levels (p-values of 
0.000 for both variables). The regression coefficient results are, however,  opposite to the 
results of Model 1. All the environmental strength variables appear to be positive and 
significantly associated with earnings levels except the other strengths variable which is 
insignificant.  
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Table 38 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental 
concern variables and firms’ net income. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of fit, 
the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental concern variable models yield 
R-squares that ranged from 0.052 to 0.071 (indicating that five to seven percent of the 
variability in annual returns variables can be explained by the models). The adjusted R-
squares ranged from 0.051 to 0.070. The overall regression models are statistically 
significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 38 presents the results of the 
regression models which indicate that both industry classification and firm size are 
positive and significantly associated with earnings levels (p-values of 0.000 for both 
variables). All environmental concern variables are positive and significantly associated 
with earning levels except the Ozone Depleting Chemicals Concern and Agricultural 
Chemicals Concern. These regression results are different from the results of Model 2 
where only hazardous waste, substantial emissions, and agriculture chemicals concern 
variables were significant. 
Table 39 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental rating 
variables and firms’ net income. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of fit, the R-
square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable models yield R-
squares that range from 0.065 to 0.078 (indicating that seven to eight percent of the 
variability in earning levels variable can be explained by the models). The adjusted R-
squares range from 0.064 to 0.07). The overall regression models are statistically 
significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 39 presents the results of the 
regression models which indicate that both industry classification and firms’ size are 
positive and significantly associated with earnings (p-values of 0.000 for both variables). 
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The regression coefficient results are consistent with the results of Models 4 and 5 in that 
both the total environmental concern rating variable and the overall environmental rating 
variable are positive and significantly associated earnings earning levels (p = 0.000 for 
both variables). Unlike the results of Model 3, however, the total environmental strength 
rating variable was positive and significantly associated with earnings (p = 0.000). 
The fourth set of sensitivity tests includes the use of the firms’ year-end stock 
prices instead of the firms’ annual returns. The individual environmental variables and 
the environmental rating variables are regressed against the year-end stock prices as the 
dependent variable. 
The results of the association between the environmental strength variables and 
firms’ yearend stock prices are displayed in Table 40. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental strength 
variable models yields an R-square of 0.051 (indicating that approximately five percent 
of the variability in yearend stock prices variables can be explained by the models) and 
an adjusted R-square of 0.049. The regression models appear to be statistically significant 
with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 40 presents the results of the regression models 
which indicate that firm size and return on assets are positive and significantly associated 
with year-end price (p-values of 0.000 for both variables). Unlike the previous models, 
however, industry classification was not significant. The regression results, also, indicate 
that none of the environmental strength variables were significantly associated with year-
end price. 
Table 41 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental 
concern variables and firms’ year-end stock price. Panel A displays the models’ goodness 
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of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental concern variable models 
yield R-squares that range from 0.051 to 0.064 (indicating that five to six percent of the 
variability in yearend stock prices variable can be explained by the models). The adjusted 
R-squares ranged from 0.049 to 0.063. The regression models appear to be statistically 
significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 41 presents the results of the 
regression models which indicate that firm size and return on assets are positively 
associated with year-end price (p-values of 0.000 for both variables); however, Industry 
classification was not a significant variable in the models. These regression results are 
different from the results of Model 2. No environmental concern variables were 
significantly associated with year-end stock prices except for the regulatory problems and 
other concerns variables which were significant at p = 0.000 for both variables.  
Table 42 illustrates the results of the association test between the environmental 
rating variables and firms’ yearend stock prices. Panel A displays the models’ goodness 
of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating models yield R-
squares that range from 0.051 to 0.052 (indicating that approximately five percent of the 
variability in the yearend stock prices variables can be explained by the models). The 
adjusted R-squares ranged from 0.049 to 0.051. The overall regression models are 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 42 presents the results 
of the regression models which indicate that firm size and return on assets are positively 
associated with the year-end stock price (p-values of 0.000 for both variables). These 
regression results are consistent with the results of Models 3 and 4. 
The fifth set of sensitivity tests includes the use of a one year lag annual return as 
the dependant variable instead of the current year annual returns. Thus, the regression 
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analysis included the annual return of ‘07 regressed against the environmental variables 
of ‘06, the annual return of ‘08 regressed against the environmental variables of ‘07, and 
the annual return of ‘09 regressed against the environmental variables of ‘08.  
The results of the association between the environmental strength variables and 
firms’ following year annual returns are displayed in Table 43. Panel A displays the 
models’ goodness of fit, the R-square, the ANOVA results. The environmental strength 
variable models yield R-squares that range from 0.020 to 0.021 (indicating that 
approximately two percent of the variability in following year annual returns can be 
explained by the model) and adjusted R-squares that range from 0.018 to 0.020. The 
regression models appear to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of 
Table 43 presents the results of the regression models which indicate that industry 
classification and capital intensity are positive and significantly associated with the 
following year's annual returns (p-values less than 0.01 and p-values less than 0.034 
respectively).  Return on assets is negatively associated with the following year returns 
(p-values = 0.000). The results for firms size are inconclusive as the coefficients on that 
variable are insignificant in all strength models except in the models of the clean energy 
strength variable (p-values= 0.002) and management system strength variable (p-value = 
0.022). Only the management system strength variable is significant in association to the 
following year annual returns (p-value = 0.007).  
Table 44 displays the results of the association between the environmental 
concern variables and firms’ following year annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental concern 
variable models yields R-squares that range from 0.020 to 0.021 (indicating that 
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approximately two percent of the variability in following year annual returns can be 
explained by the models) and adjusted R-squares that range from 0.018 to 0.020. The 
regression models appear to be statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of 
Table 44 illustrates the results of the regression models which indicate that industry 
classification and capital intensity are positively associated with the following year 
annual returns (p-values less than 0.012 and 0.035 respectively). Return on assets is 
negative and significantly associated with the following year returns (p-values = 0.000). 
Firm size is not significant except in the models of the hazardous waste concern (p-value 
= 0.029), regulatory problems concern (p-value = 0.028), and substantial emissions 
concern (p-value = 0.017). The regression results also reveal that only the substantial 
emission concern variable is positive and significant (p-values = 0.006).  
Table 45 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental rating 
variables and firms’ following year annual returns. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable 
models yield R-squares that range from 0.021 to 0.022 (indicating that approximately two 
percent of the variability in the following year annual returns can be explained by the 
models). The adjusted R-squares range from 0.020 to 0.021. The overall regression 
models are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 45 presents 
the results of the regression models which indicate that firms’ size and return on assets 
variables are negative and significant (p-values less than 0.014 and 0.000 respectively). 
The industry classification is positive and significant (p-value less than 0.044). The 
regression coefficient results are consistent with the results of Models 4 and 5 where both 
the total environmental concern rating variable and the overall environmental rating 
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variable are positive and significantly associated with the firms’ following year annual 
returns (p = 0.003 and 0.000 respectively). Unlike the results of Model 3, however, the 
total environmental strength rating variable is positive and significantly associated with 
the firms’ following year annual returns (p = 0.005). 
The sixth set of the sensitivity tests involves employing Ohlson's clean surplus 
model. The environmental variables and then the environmental ratings were regressed 
individually against the firms’ year-end stock price. The financial data are standardized 
by book value per share. 
The results of the association between the environmental strength variables and 
year-end stock prices are displayed in Table 46. Panel A displays the models’ goodness 
of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental strength variable models 
yield R-squares that range from 0.810 to 0.811 (indicating that approximately eighty 
percent of the variability in year-end stock prices can be explained by the models) and the 
adjusted R-square ranged from 0.0810 to 0.811. The regression models are statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of Table 46 presents the results of the 
regression models. Both book value per share and earnings per share, are positively 
associated with year-end stock prices (p-values of 0.000) across all environmental 
strength models. All environmental strength variables, with the exception of other 
strengths variable, are positive and significantly associated with the firms’ year-end stock 
price (p-values less than 0.02). The results are different from those of the results of 
Model 1 where only the other strengths variable is significant. 
Table 47 presents the results of the association between the environmental 
concern variables and firms’ year-end stock prices. Panel A displays the models’ 
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goodness of fit, the R-square, the ANOVA results. The environmental concern variable 
models yield R-squares of 0.90 (indicating that ninety percent of the variability in 
yearend stock prices can be explained by the model). The adjusted R-square ranges from 
0.810 to 0.811. The regression models are statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. 
Panel B of Table 47 presents the results of the regression models which indicate that both 
book value per share and the earnings per share are significant across all environmental 
concern models at p-values of 0.000. The regression results also reveal that only the 
hazardous waste concern variable (p-value = 0.003), substantial emission concern 
variable (p-value = 0.001), and other concerns variable (p-value = 0.001) are positivey 
associated with the firms’ year-end stock prices. 
Table 48 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental rating 
variables and firms’ year-end stock prices. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of fit, 
the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable models yield R-
squares ranging from 0.810 to 0.811 (indicating that approximately eighty one percent of 
the variability in year-end stock prices can be explained by the model). The range of the 
adjusted R-squares is virtually identical (0.810 to 0.811). The overall regression models 
are statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 48 presents the 
results of the regression models which indicate that both book value per share and 
earnings per share are positive and significant across the environmental rating models 
with p-values of 0.000. The regression coefficient results are consistent with the results of 
Models 4 and 5 where both the total environmental concern rating variable and the 
overall environmental rating variable are positive and significantly associated with firms’ 
year-end stock prices at p-values = 0.008 and 0.000 respectively. However, unlike the 
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results of Model 3, the total environmental strength rating variable was positively 
associated with yearend stock price (p-value = 0.000). 
The results of the association between the environmental strength variables and 
the firms’ year-end stock prices standardized by the book value per share are displayed in 
Table 49. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA 
results. The environmental strength variable models yield an R-square and adjusted R-
square of 0.92 (indicating that ninety two percent of the variability in standardized 
yearend stock prices can be explained by the models). The regression models are 
statistically significant with p-values of 0.000. Panel B of Table 49 presents the results of 
the regression models where the standardized earnings per share variable is positive and 
significantly associated with the firms’ stock prices at p-value of 0.000 across all 
environmental strength models. No environmental strength variables were significantly 
associated with the standardized year-end stock price, which is inconsistent with the 
results from Model 1. 
Table 50 displays the results of the association between the environmental 
concern variables and firms’ yearend stock prices standardized by the book value per 
share. Panel A displays the models’ goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA 
results. The environmental concern variable models yield an R-square and an adjusted R-
square of 0.92 (indicating that ninety two percent of the variability in the standardized 
year-end stock prices can be explained by the model). The regression models are 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. Panel B of table 50 presents the results of 
the regression models which indicate that the standardized earnings per share variable is 
significant across all environmental concern models at p-values of 0.000. The regression 
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results also reveal that none of the environmental concern variables were associated with 
the standardized year-end stock price. Again this is inconsistent with results from Model 
2.  
Table 51 illustrates the results of the association between the environmental rating 
variables and firms’ standardized year-end stock prices. Panel A displays the models’ 
goodness of fit, the R-square, and the ANOVA results. The environmental rating variable 
models yield an R-square and an adjusted R-square of 0.92 (indicating that ninety two 
percent of the variability in standardized yearend stock prices can be explained by the 
models).  The overall regression models are statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.000. Panel B of Table 51 presents the results of the regression models which indicate 
that the standardized earnings per share were significant across all environmental rating 
models at p-value = 0.000, however, no environmental rating variables were significantly 
associated with the firms’ standardized year-end stock prices. This result is inconsistent 
with the results previously obtained from Models 4 and 5. 
The final set of the sensitivity tests involves investigating the association between 
the changes in the firms’ earning levels and changes in the firms’ overall environmental 
rating. The investigation was performed at the total level, where the entire sample was 
used to test for the association, and at the group level, where the sample was partitioned 
by groups (“improvement” environmental performance group and “deterioration” 
environmental performance group).  
The results of the tests for an association between the changes in the firms’ 
earning levels and changes in the firms’ overall environmental rating are displayed in 
Table 52. The regression model is not significant (p-value of 0.112). Panel B of Table 52 
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presents the results of the regression models which indicate that firms’ size is positive 
and significant while profit margin and capital intensity are negative and significant. The 
change in changes in the firms’ overall environmental rating is not significantly 
associated with the changes in the firms’ earning levels. The association test result was 
consistent with the results of Model 6. 
The results of the test for an association between the changes in the firms’ earning 
levels and group changes in the firms’ overall environmental rating are displayed in 
Table 53. The regression models are significant with a p-value of 0.000 for the 
deterioration model and a p-value of 0.025 for the improvement model. Panel B of Table 
53 presents the results of the regression models which indicate that, out of all the control 
variables, only profit margin is positive and significant in, only, the improvement model. 
The changes in the improvement group are insignificant and consistent with prior results; 
however, the deterioration group results are positive and significantly associated with the 
changes in the firms’ earning levels which is inconsistent with the results obtained in the 
main analysis.  
In summary, the control variables as well as the rating variables show relatively 
more consistent results than the individual environmental variables. ROA, as a measure 
of profitability, is the most consistent control variable across the sensitivity tests which 
reflects the notion belief that environmental performance and profitability are connected. 
The significance of the results of the environmental performance measures are not, 
however, consistent across the sensitivity tests. This can be explained, partially, by the 
dichotomous nature of the variables where any partitioning of the full sample may 
significantly affect the variability in the performance measures that may lead to changes 
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in the results; also, the majority of the sample observations reported no environmental 
performance (expressed as more “0s” than “1s”) which magnifies the inconsistencies in 
the results when partitioned. The nature of the environmental rating variables, as a 
combination of variables, can be seen as a step closer to variability of continuous 
variables, which leads to a more structured variation that is not affected greatly by 
partitioning of the sample. Thus, it appears that the use of the rating variables yield more 
reliable results than the individual variables which yield results that are sample sensitive. 
The steady performance of the profitability measure highlights one side of the nature of 
the environmental performance which indicates that firms, as profit maximizing 
institutions, view the environmental efforts in light of making more profits rather than 
incurring extra costs that would reduce their profitability. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
In this research, I have investigated whether measures of firms’ environmental 
performance are associated with those firms’ annual returns independent of any particular 
environmental event. The association analysis was based on the most recent 
environmental data for years 2006, 2007, and 2008. The individual environmental 
performance measures were extracted from the KLD database which provides 13 
different measures/variables regarding firms’ environmental performance. Six variables, 
herein referred to as environmental strength variables, are related to firms’ activities and 
efforts to preserve the surrounding environment and/or reduce/control pollution. The 
remaining seven variables, herein referred to as environmental concern variables, are 
related to the negative impact of the firms’ operations on the environment.  
Prior research has provided no definitive guidance as to whether environmental 
strengths or concerns should be positively or negatively associated with firms’ value. The 
relationship between environmental performance and the firms’ value can be viewed in 3 
theoretical perspectives. Their first perspective suggests a negative relationship since 
higher environmental performance would results in additional costs that put the firm at an 
economic disadvantage. The second perspective suggests a positive association where 
better environmental performance may lead ultimately to costs reduction and/or improved 
profitability such as waste management or recycling. The third perspective suggests that 
an overall positive association that results from more gains than losses, in other words, 
even though the costs of improving environmental performance can be significant, other 
costs may be reduced and/or revenues may increase. I provide evidence shedding light on 
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this issue in that the underlying factors in the associations I discovered, are likely related 
to increased revenues or decreased costs, and only tangentially related to environmental 
concerns. My results support one of the alternatives suggested by McGuire, Sundgren, 
and Schneeweis (1988), in that environmental activities place an additional financial 
burden on firms which thus leads to an economic disadvantage.   
The results of my first stage tests indicate that only five out of the thirteen 
environmental variables, i.e. the other strengths variable; the recycling variable; the 
hazardous waste concern variable; the substantial emissions concern variable; and the 
agricultural chemicals concern variable, are significantly associated with the firms’ 
annual returns. The coefficients of the individual measures support the perspective of the 
negative association between environmental and financial performance. This is logical 
given the nature of the constructs.  However, the positive association between firms’ 
value and the recycling activities supports the positive association suggested by McGuire, 
Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988). Firms that engage in recycling activities would reap 
the additional revenues associated with selling recyclable bi or waste products, or the 
reduced costs associated with incorporating recycled materials into their products. 
Similarly, profit maximizing firms that choose to deal with hazardous wastes, emissions 
and agricultural chemicals in a manner that does not neutralize their environmental 
impact, would only do so -ceteris paribus - because alternative, environmentally friendly 
measures are more costly. Both perspectives can be integrated into a framework that 
suggests that profit maximization, as a primary objective for firms, will be sought either 
by engaging in environmental strength activities that increase the profitability (such as 
recycling) or by performing environmental concern activities (such as hazardous waste) 
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since it is the cheaper option as compared to other options that reduce or eliminates the 
negative impact of these activities. 
The results of my second stage analysis, when I test whether the individual 
environmental indicators are informative when combined into a single metric, reveal a 
negative association between the total environmental concerns rating and firms’ annual 
returns. This result is consistent with the stage one results and leads to similar 
conclusions. The total environmental strength rating was not, however, significantly 
correlated to annual returns. A look at the components of the environmental strength 
measure shows that other than recycling, none of the others are easily tied to increased 
revenues or decreased costs. 
The results of the third stage analysis demonstrate the interaction between the 
significant and insignificant variables that yield an overall environmental rating measure 
that was significantly associated with firms’ annual returns. Principle component analysis 
was conducted to further investigate the interaction between the environmental variables. 
All the strength variables were loaded onto one factor which, consistent with previous 
results, was not significantly associated with returns.  Concern variables were loaded to 
two factors, the chemical concern factor and the non-chemical concern factor. Only the 
chemical concern factor was statistically significant in its association with firm’s annual 
returns. The fact that the concern variables were loaded onto two factors rather than a 
single factor did not allow for the direct comparison between the concern factors 
regression results and the total environmental concern rating regression results. 
Nevertheless, these results suggest that chemical pollution may be more costly to correct, 
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and that minimizing corrective actions may yield more significant cost savings than the 
other environmental concerns.  
The final stage of my analysis investigated the association between changes in the 
firms’ annual returns and changes in the firms’ environmental performance measures. 
The results reveal no significant differences between the various groups (deterioration, no 
improvement, and improvement). It is also important to note that no significant 
associations were found between the changes in annual returns and the changes in the 
environmental performance variable for either the deterioration group or the 
improvement group. This finding is significant for a number of reasons. First the result 
seems counterintuitive to the efficient markets hypothesis. It may be, however, that the 
markets anticipated these changes and thus no association is revealed by my tests. The 
result is also important from a regulatory standpoint because the lack of an association 
could be an artifact of investors' reluctance to spend the time an effort necessary to assess 
environmental performance in the absence of uniform environmental disclosures.  
Together, these results suggest that individual environmental protection or 
remediation activities impose additional costs on firms that in turn lead to an economic 
disadvantage. The Stage II and Stage III analyses leads me to further conclude that 
indices and/or comprehensive measures may need further consideration and perhaps 
weighting before they can be applied in a meaningful sense as depictions of corporate 
behavior. Future research is required to develop and model the constructs regarding 
environmental performance, as there is some level of vagueness which raises the question 
of whether or not a component index assesses the same constructs that the individual 
measures address. In the case of the total environmental concern rating and the overall 
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environmental rating, significant factors outweighed insignificant variables, while in the 
case of the total strength rating insignificant factors may have outweighed significant 
variables.  
The results of the combination process do, however, provide evidence of the 
negative association between environmental and financial performance. Overall, the 
results provide support for the view that environmentally friendly activities place an 
additional financial burden on firms which often, if not always, lead to an economic 
disadvantage. 
The sensitivity tests reveal that the use of the rating variables delivers more 
reliable results than the individual variables which could deliver results that are sample 
sensitive. The steady performance of the return on assets as a profitability measure 
highlights that firms, as profit maximizing institutions, perceive the environmental efforts 
as a way to maximize profits and/or reduce costs.  
The limitations of the dissertation are related to the research design, data, and 
period of the analysis. The use of environmental variables in a dichotomous manner 
affects the stability of the results. Also, the majority of the observations didn’t report 
environmental activities engagement which magnifies the sensitivity of the results to any 
partitioning of the sample. The use of 3 years time period between 2006 and 2008, which 
could be affected by the current market conditions, could be a bad timing to test the 
firms’ willingness to engage in environmental activities when they are struggling to 
survive. So including more years and/or different time periods in the analysis may 
provide more power to results. The use of factor analysis doesn’t offer any flexibility in 
the variables loading on various factors which limited the comparison of results. 
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The future work would be as follows: first, I plan to conduct the same research 
design for different time periods and then compare the results to my dissertation results 
which would provide insight into how the existing market conditions affect the firms 
environmental attitude and behavior; second, I will calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
for firms that reported environmental activities and firms that didn’t report any 
environmental activities then compare the results from more groups which would shed 
light on the extent to which environmentally responsible firms out/underperform other 
firms; finally, a validation test could be conducted by comparing of the results of the 
chemical concern variables and other commonly used chemical concern measures such as 
the TRI.  
This research contributes to the environmental performance literature by 
presenting evidence on the nature of the general association between environmental 
performance and firms’ market value instead of just focusing on the immediate effect of a 
particular environmental event. It also illuminates our understanding of how 
environmental performance variables interact together when combined into summary 
measures.  
Understanding how these environmental activities affect capital markets likewise 
is important to how regulatory agencies motivate and enforce environmentally sensitive 
regulations. This study provides some additional guidance for regulators and standard 
setters as they contemplate the nature and level of future environmental disclosures. 
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Appendix 
Table 3 
Model Summary and ANOVA Results of the Association between the Environmental Strength Variables and the Firms’ Annual 
Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
  Environmental strength variable  Model Summary ANOVA 
    R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 11  
Beneficial products & services 
strength  (ES1) 0.0668 0.0658 91.549 1278.603 0.000 
Model 12  Pollution prevention strength  (ES2) 0.0669 0.0659 91.647 1278.504 0.000 
Model 13 Recycling strength (ES3) 0.0669 0.0659 92.083 1278.069 0.000 
Model 14 Clean energy strength (ES4) 0.0668 0.0658 91.511 1278.641 0.000 
Model 15 
Management systems strength 
(ES5) 
0.067 0.066 91.742 1278.410 0.000 
Model 16 Other strengths (ES6) 0.0679 0.067 93.093 1277.059 0.000 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
(green) products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other 
strengths; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 4  
Regression Results of the Association between the Environmental Strength Variables and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 4 
Model1 Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Environment
al strength 
variable  
Beneficial 
products and 
services (ES1) 
Pollution 
prevention  (ES2) Recycling  (ES3) 
Clean energy  
(ES4) 
management 
system strength  
(ES5) 
Other strengths  
(ES6) 
  B  Sig. B  Sig. B  Sig. B  Sig. B  Sig. B  Sig. 
(Constant) 0.0701 0.0070 0.0673 0.0100 0.0741 0.0050 0.0721 0.0070 0.0643 0.0150 0.0636 0.0150 
lnAs -0.0198 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 -0.0204 0.0000 -0.0201 0.0000 -0.0188 0.0000 -0.0187 0.0000 
SIC_01 0.0506 0.0010 0.0518 0.0010 0.0494 0.0010 0.0504 0.0010 0.0524 0.0010 0.0527 0.0000 
ROA 0.7898 0.0000 0.7914 0.0000 0.7887 0.0000 0.7905 0.0000 0.7920 0.0000 0.7913 0.0000 
Fin_lev 0.0000 0.8540 0.0000 0.8560 0.0000 0.8490 0.0000 0.8520 0.0000 0.8690 0.0000 0.8590 
Prf_Mrgn 0.0000 0.7620 0.0000 0.7670 0.0000 0.7570 0.0000 0.7620 0.0000 0.7710 0.0000 0.7680 
Cap_Int 0.0000 0.6540 0.0000 0.6590 0.0000 0.6490 0.0000 0.6540 0.0000 0.6630 0.0000 0.6610 
ESi 0.0215 0.5401 -0.0448 0.3457 0.0749 0.0753 0.0115 0.6745 -0.0286 0.2396 -0.1872 0.0037 
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Table 4 (continued)  
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
(green) products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other 
strengths; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 5 
Model Summary and ANOVA Results of the Association between the Environmental Concern Variables and the Firms’ Annual 
Returns   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
  Environmental concern variable  Model Summary ANOVA 
    R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 21 Hazardous and waste concern (EC1) 0.067 0.066 92.358 1277.794 0.000 
Model 22 Regulatory problems concern (EC2) 0.067 0.066 91.905 1278.246 0.000 
Model 23 
Ozone depletion chemicals concern 
(EC3) 
0.067 0.066 91.629 1278.522 0.000 
Model 24 Substantial emission concern (EC4) 0.068 0.067 92.806 1277.345 0.000 
Model 25 Agricultural chemicals concern (EC5) 0.071 0.070 96.840 1273.312 0.000 
Model 26 Climate changes concern (EC6) 0.067 0.066 91.704 1278.448 0.000 
Model 27 Other concerns (EC7) 0.067 0.066 91.540 1278.611 0.000 
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Table 5 (continued)  
Where: 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to 
hazardous waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 6 
Regression Results of the Association between the Environmental Concern Variables and the Firms’ Annual Returns   
Table 6 
Model2 Model 21  Model 22  Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
Environmental 
variable  
Hazardous and 
waste concern 
(EC1) 
Regulatory 
problems 
concern (EC2) 
Ozone 
depletion 
chemicals 
concern (EC3) 
Substantial 
emission 
concern (EC4) 
Agricultural 
chemicals 
concern (EC5) 
Climate 
changes 
concern (EC6) 
Other 
concerns 
(EC7) 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 0.084 0.002 0.079 0.003 0.070 0.007 0.085 0.001 0.074 0.004 0.067 0.010 0.068 0.009 
lnAs -0.022 0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.020 0.000 -0.022 0.000 -0.020 0.000 -0.019 0.000 -0.020 0.000 
SIC_01 0.046 0.003 0.046 0.003 0.050 0.001 0.043 0.006 0.041 0.007 0.054 0.000 0.052 0.001 
ROA 0.789 0.000 0.788 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.785 0.000 0.784 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.791 0.000 
Fin_lev 0.000 0.845 0.000 0.870 0.000 0.854 0.000 0.907 0.000 0.856 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.859 
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.752 0.000 0.754 0.000 0.763 0.000 0.747 0.000 0.756 0.000 0.765 0.000 0.765 
Cap_Int 0.000 0.643 0.000 0.645 0.000 0.655 0.000 0.638 0.000 0.646 0.000 0.659 0.000 0.658 
ECi 0.059 0.032 0.033 0.135 0.195 0.373 0.066 0.008 0.370 0.000 -0.026 0.277 -0.023 0.565 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Where: 
 EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 7 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Total 
Environmental Strength Rating Variable and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 7 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  
R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 3 0.067 0.066 91.508 1278.643 0 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  
B Sig. 
(Constant) 0.068 0.011 
lnAs -0.019 0.000 
SIC_01 0.052 0.001 
ROA 0.791 0.000 
Fin_lev 0.000 0.858 
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.766 
Cap_Int 0.000 0.658 
TES -0.004 0.687 
Where:  
TES (total environmental strength rating) = clean energy + beneficial (green) products & 
services + pollution prevention + recycling + and environmentally friendly management 
systems; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
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Table 7 (continued)  
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 8 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Total 
Environmental Concern Rating Variable and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 8 
Panel A      
 Model Summary ANOVA 
 R Square Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 4 0.068 0.067 92.500 1277.651 0.000 
Panel B 
     
Regression coefficients      
  B Sig.    
(Constant) 0.088 0.001    
lnAs -0.023 0.000    
SIC_01 0.040 0.011    
ROA 0.787 0.000    
Fin_lev 0.000 0.870    
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.746    
Cap_Int 0.000 0.635    
TEC 0.020 0.021    
Where: 
TEC (total environmental concern rating) = climate changes concern + regulatory 
concern + emission concern + ozone depletion concern + hazardous and waste concern + 
agricultural chemical concern + other concerns variable, and all other control variables 
are as defined above.   
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
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Table 8 (continued)  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 9 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Overall Environmental Rating Variable and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 9 
Overall Environmental rating variable analysis 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 5 0.068 0.067 92.630 1277.520 0.000 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) 0.077 0.003 
lnAs -0.021 0.000 
SIC_01 0.043 0.005 
ROA 0.789 0.000 
Fin_lev 0.000 0.887 
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.759 
Cap_Int 0.000 0.648 
OER -0.020 0.014  
Where: 
OER (Overall Environmental rating) = total environmental strength rating (TES) - total 
environmental concern rating (TEC); 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
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Table 9 (continued)  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 10 
Factor Analysis Commonalties (Variances Extracted by the Proposed Factor Structure) 
 
Table 10 
Commonalities 
 
  Initial Extraction 
Beneficial products & services 1 0.15867883 
Pollution prevention 1 0.39929481 
Recycling 1 0.24684652 
Clean energy 1 0.38259151 
Management systems 1 0.56129573 
Other strengths 1 0.18302204 
Hazardous and waste 1 0.4876325 
Regulatory problems 1 0.55792777 
Ozone depletion chemicals 1 0.59319513 
Substantial emission 1 0.46839297 
Agricultural chemicals 1 0.6244549 
climate changes 1 0.48624233 
other concerns 1 0.20549935 
Where: 
OER (Overall Environmental rating) = the factors created by factor analysis; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
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Table 10 (continued)  
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 11 
Total Variance Explained by the Three Factor Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 2.8333 21.7943 21.7943 2.8333 21.7943 21.7943 2.1581 16.6007 16.6007 
2 1.2968 9.9752 31.7695 1.2968 9.9752 31.7695 1.9394 14.9182 31.5189 
3 1.225 9.4234 41.1929 1.225 9.4234 41.1929 1.2576 9.674 41.1929 
4 0.9712 7.4709 48.6638 
  
5 0.9555 7.3503 56.0142 
6 0.8961 6.8932 62.9073 
7 0.8494 6.5341 69.4414 
8 0.8272 6.3633 75.8046 
9 0.7484 5.7566 81.5613 
10 0.697 5.3612 86.9225 
11 0.6258 4.8141 91.7366 
12 0.5619 4.3226 96.0591 
13 0.5123 3.9409 100 
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Table 11 (continued)  
Where: 
OER (Overall Environmental rating) = the factors created by factor analysis; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table12 
Factor Analysis Component Matrix and Rotated Component Matrix  
 
Table 12 
Panel A Panel B 
Component Matrix Rotated Component Matrix       
  Component   Component 
  1 2 3   1 2 3 
Beneficial products & services 0.2663 -0.2795 0.0981 Beneficial products & services 0.0087 0.398 0.0141 
Pollution prevention 0.5096 -0.337 0.1612 Pollution prevention 0.138 0.6116 0.0784 
Recycling 0.3141 -0.3831 0.0375 Recycling 0.006 0.491 -0.0755 
Clean energy 0.6001 -0.1369 -0.0608 Clean energy 0.3939 0.4754 -0.0378 
Management systems 0.6485 -0.3641 0.0905 Management systems 0.2507 0.7057 0.0195 
Other strengths 0.2875 -0.303 0.0922 Other strengths 0.0133 0.4276 0.0022 
Hazardous and waste 0.649 0.2389 -0.0971 Hazardous and waste 0.6563 0.2254 0.0785 
Regulatory problems 0.6342 0.3674 -0.1441 Regulatory problems 0.7339 0.1117 0.0829 
Substantial emission 0.6739 0.1124 -0.0403 Substantial emission 0.5842 0.3462 0.085 
climate changes 0.2783 0.4848 -0.4168 climate changes 0.6239 -0.265 -0.1637 
other concerns 0.3733 0.2355 -0.1034 other concerns 0.4491 0.0477 0.0392 
Agricultural chemicals 0.2125 0.3521 0.6748 Agricultural chemicals 0.1348 0.0308 0.778 
Ozone depletion chemicals 0.034 0.3098 0.7043 Ozone depletion chemicals -0.0333 -0.0477 0.768 
Where: 
OER (Overall Environmental rating) = the factors created by factor analysis; 
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Table12 (continued) 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 13  
Reproduced and Residual Matrix  
Table 13 
Reproduced Correlation matrix 
 
Beneficial 
products 
& 
services 
Pollution 
prevention Recycling 
Clean 
energy 
Management 
systems 
Other 
strengths 
Hazardous 
and waste 
Regulatory 
problems 
Ozone 
depletion 
chemicals 
Substantial 
emission 
Agricultural 
chemicals 
climate 
changes 
other 
concerns 
Beneficial 
products & 
services 
0.159 0.246 0.194 0.192 0.283 0.17 0.097 0.052 -0.008 0.144 0.024 -0.102 0.023 
Pollution 
prevention 0.246 0.399 0.295 0.342 0.468 0.264 0.235 0.176 0.026 0.299 0.098 -0.089 0.094 
Recycling 0.194 0.295 0.247 0.239 0.347 0.21 0.109 0.053 -0.082 0.167 -0.043 -0.114 0.023 
Clean 
energy 0.192 0.342 0.239 0.383 0.434 0.208 0.363 0.339 -0.065 0.391 0.038 0.126 0.198 
Management 
systems 0.283 0.468 0.347 0.434 0.561 0.305 0.325 0.264 -0.027 0.392 0.071 -0.034 0.147 
Other 
strengths 0.17 0.264 0.21 0.208 0.305 0.183 0.105 0.058 -0.019 0.156 0.017 -0.105 0.026 
Hazardous 
and waste 0.097 0.235 0.109 0.363 0.325 0.105 0.488 0.513 0.028 0.468 0.156 0.337 0.309 
Regulatory 
problems 0.052 0.176 0.053 0.339 0.264 0.058 0.513 0.558 0.034 0.474 0.167 0.415 0.338 
Ozone 
depletion 
chemicals 
-0.008 0.026 -0.082 -0.065 -0.027 -0.019 0.028 0.034 0.593 0.029 0.592 -0.134 0.013 
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Table 13 (continued) 
 
Beneficial 
products 
& 
services 
Pollution 
prevention Recycling 
Clean 
energy 
Management 
systems 
Other 
strengths 
Hazardous 
and waste 
Regulatory 
problems 
Ozone 
depletion 
chemicals 
Substantial 
emission 
Agricultural 
chemicals 
climate 
changes 
other 
concerns 
Substantial 
emission 0.144 0.299 0.167 0.391 0.392 0.156 0.468 0.474 0.029 0.468 0.156 0.259 0.282 
Agricultural 
chemicals 0.024 0.098 -0.043 0.038 0.071 0.017 0.156 0.167 0.592 0.156 0.624 -0.051 0.092 
climate 
changes -0.102 -0.089 -0.114 0.126 -0.034 -0.105 0.337 0.415 -0.134 0.259 -0.051 0.486 0.261 
other 
concerns 0.023 0.094 0.023 0.198 0.147 0.026 0.309 0.338 0.013 0.282 0.092 0.261 0.205 
Residual 
 
Beneficial 
products & 
services 
 -0.152 -0.146 -0.021 -0.101 -0.125 -0.014 0.04 0.005 -0.044 0.002 0.081 0.012 
Pollution 
prevention -0.152  -0.147 -0.08 -0.114 -0.116 -0.033 -0.037 -0.029 -0.078 -0.005 0.111 0.014 
Recycling -0.146 -0.147  -0.093 -0.111 -0.151 -0.056 0.049 0.078 0.007 0.033 0.107 0.027 
Clean 
energy -0.021 -0.08 -0.093  -0.112 -0.066 -0.068 -0.096 0.06 -0.132 0.013 0.023 -0.054 
Management 
systems -0.101 -0.114 -0.111 -0.112  -0.12 -0.049 -0.027 0.021 -0.033 -0.012 0.048 -0.008 
Other 
strengths -0.125 -0.116 -0.151 -0.066 -0.12  0 0.032 0.017 -0.05 0 0.092 0.027 
Hazardous 
and waste -0.014 -0.033 -0.056 -0.068 -0.049 0  -0.088 -0.003 -0.076 -0.068 -0.187 -0.129 
Regulatory 
problems 0.04 -0.037 0.049 -0.096 -0.027 0.032 -0.088  -0.041 -0.107 -0.012 -0.168 -0.114 
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Table 13 (continued) 
 
Beneficial 
products 
& 
services 
Pollution 
prevention Recycling 
Clean 
energy 
Management 
systems 
Other 
strengths 
Hazardous 
and waste 
Regulatory 
problems 
Ozone 
depletion 
chemicals 
Substantial 
emission 
Agricultural 
chemicals 
climate 
changes 
other 
concerns 
Ozone 
depletion 
chemicals 
0.005 -0.029 0.078 0.06 0.021 0.017 -0.003 -0.041  -0.008 -0.356 0.128 -0.016 
Substantial 
emission -0.044 -0.078 0.007 -0.132 -0.033 -0.05 -0.076 -0.107 -0.008  -0.038 -0.08 -0.124 
Agricultural 
chemicals 0.002 -0.005 0.033 0.013 -0.012 0 -0.068 -0.012 -0.356 -0.038  0.032 -0.018 
climate 
changes 0.081 0.111 0.107 0.023 0.048 0.092 -0.187 -0.168 0.128 -0.08 0.032  -0.15 
other 
concerns 0.012 0.014 0.027 -0.054 -0.008 0.027 -0.129 -0.114 -0.016 -0.124 -0.018 -0.15  
Where: 
OER (Overall Environmental rating) = the factors created by factor analysis; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 14  
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
Table 14 
Component 
Non chemical 
concern 
factor 
Environmental 
strengths 
factor 
Chemicals 
concern 
factors 
Non chemical concern factor 0.7522 0.6485 0.1171 
Environmental strengths factor 0.5683 -0.7283 0.3829 
Chemicals concern factors -0.3336 0.2214 0.9164 
Where: 
OER (Overall Environmental rating) = the factors created by factor analysis; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 15  
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Non-
Chemical Concern Factor and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 15 
Non-Chemical concern factor  
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 5 0.067 0.066 91.935 1278.22 0.000 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) 0.085 0.002 
lnAs -0.022 0.000 
SIC_01 0.044 0.005 
ROA 0.789 0.000 
Fin_lev 0.000 0.862 
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.753 
Cap_Int 0.000 0.643 
Non-Chemical 
concern factor 0.009 0.122  
Where: 
OER = Non-Chemical concern factor; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
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Table 15 (continued) 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 16  
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Environmental Strengths Factor and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 16 
Environmental strengths factor 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 5 0.067 0.066 91.522 1278.629 0.000 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) 0.067 0.011 
lnAs -0.019 0.000 
SIC_01 0.051 0.001 
ROA 0.791 0.000 
Fin_lev 0.000 0.857 
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.766 
Cap_Int 0.000 0.658 
Environmental 
strengths factor -0.003 0.626  
Where: 
OER = Environmental strengths factor; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
176 
 
Table 16 (continued) 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 17  
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Chemicals Concern Factors and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 17 
Chemicals concern factors 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 5 0.069 0.068 94.52 1275.631 0.000 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) 0.072 0.006 
lnAs -0.020 0.000 
SIC_01 0.046 0.003 
ROA 0.786 0.000 
Fin_lev 0.000 0.861 
Prf_Mrgn 0.000 0.760 
Cap_Int 0.000 0.651 
Chemicals concern 
factors 0.021 0.000 
 
Where: 
OER = Chemicals concern factors; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
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Table 17 (continued) 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues) 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 18  
Changes of Environmental Performance between 2006 and 2008 
 
Table 18 
Changes of Environmental performance between 2006 and 2008 
Magnitude of 
change 
Number of 
firms Categories  
-3 2 
Deterioration  
-2 5 
-1 76 
0 10 
Equivalent opposite 
changes 
0 1424 No changes 
1 125 
Improvement 
2 11 
3 1 
Where: 
∆OER (change in overall environmental rating) = OER2008 – OER2006; 
∆ Cum_Ret = Cumulative annual return2008 – Cumulative annual return2006; 
∆ LnAs (Size) = LnAs2008 – LnAs2006;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
∆ ROA (Return on Assets) = ROA2008 – ROA 2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = Fin_Lev2008 - Fin_Lev2006; 
∆ Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = Prf_Mrgn2008 - Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = Cap_Int2008 - Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 19  
Mean Differences in Annual Returns among Environmental Change Groups 
 
 
Table 19 
One way ANOVA 
∆ Cum_Ret            
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 0.21 2 0.11 0.49 0.61 
Within Groups 355.89 1651 0.22   
Total 356.11 1653   
Where: 
∆OER (change in overall environmental rating) = OEP2008 – OEP2006; 
∆ Cum_Ret = Cumulative annual return2008 – Cumulative annual return2006; 
∆ LnAs (Size) = LnAs2008 – LnAs2006;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
∆ ROA (Return on Assets) = ROA2008 – ROA 2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = Fin_Lev2008 - Fin_Lev2006; 
∆ Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = Prf_Mrgn2008 - Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = Cap_Int2008 - Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 20 
Person Correlation Coefficient 
 
Table 20 
Correlations ∆ Cum_Ret ∆ OER 
∆ Cum_Ret 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.02 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.42 
N 1654 1654 
∆ OER 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.02 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.42   
N 1654 1654 
Where: 
∆OER (change in overall environmental rating) = OEP2008 – OEP2006; 
∆ Cum_Ret = Cumulative annual return2008 – Cumulative annual return2006; 
∆ LnAs (Size) = LnAs2008 – LnAs2006;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
∆ ROA (Return on Assets) = ROA2008 – ROA 2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = Fin_Lev2008 - Fin_Lev2006; 
∆ Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = Prf_Mrgn2008 - Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = Cap_Int2008 - Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 21 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Change in the Overall Environmental Rating Variable and the change in the Firms’ 
Annual Returns 
 
Table 21 
Overall environmental rating change  
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Model 6 0.037 0.032 13.001 343.106 0.000 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) -0.5152 0.000 
∆ lnAs -0.196 0.000 
SIC 0.0099 0.755 
∆ ROA 0.5474 0.000 
∆ Fin_Lev -0.0001 0.708 
∆ Prf_Mrgn 0.0006 0.061 
∆ Cap_Int 0.0009 0.070 
∆ OER -0.0355 0.1873  
Where: 
∆OER (change in overall environmental rating) = OEP2008 – OEP2006; 
∆ Cum_Ret = Cumulative annual return2008 – Cumulative annual return2006; 
∆ LnAs (Size) = LnAs2008 – LnAs2006;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
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Table 21 (continued) 
∆ ROA (Return on Assets) = ROA2008 – ROA 2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = Fin_Lev2008 - Fin_Lev2006; 
∆ Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = Prf_Mrgn2008 - Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = Cap_Int2008 - Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 22 
Model summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Change of the Overall Environmental Rating Groups (Deterioration and Improvement 
Groups) and the change in the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 22 
Overall environmental rating change by groups  
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
Model 6_DET /  
Model 6_IMP  R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares  
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
Improved 
Environmental 
performance 
0.082 0.032 1.904 21.309 0.128 
Deteriorated 
Environmental 
performance 
0.106 0.023 1.252 10.544 0.276 
Panel B 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) -0.467 0.001 
∆ lnAs -0.1282 0.316 
SIC -0.0899 0.251 
∆ Fin_lev -0.0028 0.476 
∆ Prf_Mrgn 0.7312 0.006 
∆ Cap_Int 0.0148 0.461 
∆ ROA -1.0461 0.016 
∆ OEP_IMP -0.1168 0.298 
Panel C 
  
Regression coefficients  
  B Sig. 
(Constant) -0.6332 0 
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Table 22 (continued) 
∆ lnAs -0.2866 0.007 
SIC -0.028 0.757 
∆ Fin_lev 0 0.89 
∆ Prf_Mrgn 0.0269 0.857 
∆ Cap_Int 0.0263 0.461 
∆ ROA 0.1633 0.669 
∆ OEP_DET -0.1173 0.3259 
Where: 
∆ OEP_DET = firms with deteriorated financial performance; 
∆ OEP_IMP = firms with improved financial performance; 
∆ Cum_Ret = Cumulative annual return2008 – Cumulative annual return2006; 
∆ LnAs (Size) = LnAs2008 – LnAs2006;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
∆ ROA (Return on Assets) = ROA2008 – ROA 2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = Fin_Lev2008 - Fin_Lev2006; 
∆ Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = Prf_Mrgn2008 - Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = Cap_Int2008 - Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 23 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between both 
Environmental Strength Variables and the Environmental Concern Variables and the 
firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 23 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
Sum of 
Squares 
Residual 
Sum of 
Squares 
Model 
significance  
All environmental 
variables model .075 .072 102.540 1267.611 .000 
Panel B 
Regression coefficients 
 
  
  B Sig. 
 
  
(Constant) .083 0.003 
 
  
lnAs -.022 0.000 
 
  
SIC .038 0.016 
 
  
Fin_Lev .000 0.938 
 
  
Prf_Mrgn .000 0.748 
 
  
Cap_Int .000 0.638 
 
  
ROA .781 0.000 
  Beneficial Products and Services (ES1) .021 0.566 
 
  
Pollution Prevention (ES2) -.066 0.197 
 
  
Recycling (ES3) .093 0.032 
 
  
Clean Energy (ES4) .012 0.678 
 
  
Management Systems Strength (ES5) -.057 0.043 
 
  
Other Strengths (ES6) -.189 0.004 
 
  
Hazardous Waste Concern (EC1) .054 0.082 
 
  
Regulatory Problems (EC2) .006 0.798 
 
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals (EC3) -.097 0.667 
 
  
Substantial Emissions (EC4) .062 0.027 
 
  
Agriculture Chemicals (EC5) .367 0.000 
 
  
Climate Change (EC6) -.035 0.153 
 
  
Other concerns (EC7) -.039 0.333     
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Table 23 (continued) 
Where:  
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 
refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial products and services, i = 3 pollution 
prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other 
strengths; 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to 
climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial 
emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / 
total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 24 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between both 
Total Environmental Strength Rating Variable and Total Environmental Concern Rating 
Variable and  Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 24 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
Squares 
Residual 
sum of 
Squares 
Model 
significance 
Environmental 
ratings model 
.068 .067 92.766 1277.385 .000 
Panel B 
Regression coefficients 
  
  
  B Sig. 
  
  
(Constant) .084 0.002 
  
  
lnAs -.022 0.000 
  
  
SIC .040 0.011 
  
  
Fin_Lev .000 0.884 
  
  
Prf_Mrgn .000 0.752 
  
  
Cap_Int .000 0.640 
  
  
ROA .788 0.000 
  
  
TES rating -.013 0.239 
  
  
TEC rating .023 0.010       
Where: 
TES (Total environmental strength rating) = clean energy + beneficial products and 
services + pollution prevention + recycling + and environmentally friendly management 
systems; 
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Table 24 (continued) 
Table 24 (continued) 
TEC (Total environmental concern rating) = climate changes concern + regulatory 
concern + emission concern + ozone depletion concern + hazardous and waste concern + 
agricultural chemical concern + other concerns variable; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 25 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Chemical Concern Rating Variable and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 25 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
Sum of 
Squares 
Residual 
Sum of 
Squares 
Model 
significance  
Chemical concern 
rating model .070 .069 96.240 1273.912 0.000 
Panel B 
Regression coefficients   
  
  B Sig. 
  
  
(Constant) .074 0.004 
  
  
lnAs -.020 0.000 
  
  
SIC .042 0.006 
  
  
Fin_Lev .000 0.856 
  
  
Prf_Mrgn .000 0.756 
  
  
Cap_Int .000 0.646 
  
  
ROA .784 0.000 
  
  
ECChemical .312 0.000       
 
Where: 
ECChemical = agricultural chemicals variable + ozone depletion chemical concern variable; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
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Table 25 (continued) 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 26 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Non-
Chemical Concern Rating Variable and the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 26 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance 
Non-chemical 
concern rating model .067 .066 92.006 1278.145 .000 
Panel B 
Regression coefficient 
  
  
  B Sig. 
  
  
(Constant) .083 .002 
  
  
lnAs -.022 .000 
  
  
SIC .043 .006 
  
  
Fin_Lev .000 .866 
  
  
Prf_Mrgn .000 .751 
  
  
Cap_Int .000 .641 
  
  
ROA .788 .000 
   ECNon-chemical .015 .096       
 
Where: 
ECNon-hemical = hazardous and waste concern variable + regulatory problems concern 
variable + substantial emission concern variable + climate changes concern variable + 
and other concerns variable; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
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Table 26 (continued) 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 27 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between both the 
Chemical Concern Rating Variable and the Non-Chemical concern Rating Variable and 
the Firms’ Annual Returns 
 
Table 27 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
Sum of 
Squares 
Residual 
Sum of 
Squares 
Model 
significance  
Concern ratings model .070 .069 96.536 1273.616 .000 
Panel B 
Regression coefficients 
  
  
  B   
  
  
(Constant) .084 0.002 
  
  
lnAs -.022 0.000 
  
  
SIC .036 0.021 
  
  
Fin_Lev .000 0.864 
  
  
Prf_Mrgn .000 0.747 
  
  
Cap_Int .000 0.635 
  
  
ROA .782 0.000 
  
  
ECNon-chemical .011 0.213 
  
  
ECChemical .305 0.000       
Where: 
ECNon-hemical = hazardous and waste concern variable + regulatory problems concern 
variable + substantial emission concern variable + climate changes concern variable + 
and other concerns variable; 
ECChemical = agricultural chemicals variable + ozone depletion chemical concern variable; 
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Table 27 (continued) 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
Table 28  
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2006, of the Association between the Environmental Strength Variables 
and the Annual Returns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
   
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
   
  
Beneficial Product and Services .015 .012 4.273 277.040 .000 
   
  
Pollution Prevention  .015 .012 4.190 277.122 .000 
   
  
Recycling  .015 .012 4.296 277.017 .000 
   
  
Clean Energy  .015 .011 4.106 277.206 .000 
   
  
Management Systems Strength  .015 .012 4.165 277.148 .000 
   
  
Other Strengths .015 .012 4.201 277.112 .000 
   
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  
Beneficial 
Product and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems 
Strength  
Other Strengths 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .336 .000 .332 .000 .339 .000 .332 .000 .330 .000 .334 .000 
lnAs -.019 .000 -.019 .000 -.020 .000 -.019 .000 -.018 .000 -.019 .000 
SIC  -.003 .896 -.002 .939 -.005 .824 -.003 .907 -.001 .951 -.002 .944 
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Table 28 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
Fin_Lev .000 .847 .000 .843 .000 .859 .000 .846 .000 .837 .000 .850 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .730 .000 .734 .000 .776 .000 .738 .000 .722 .000 .743 
Cap_Int .000 .801 .000 .806 .000 .850 .000 .810 .000 .793 .000 .814 
ROA .330 .000 .331 .000 .320 .000 .328 .000 .332 .000 .328 .000 
ESi -.064 .200 -.065 .319 .083 .178 -.026 .563 -.033 .374 -.118 .300 
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Table 29 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2006, of the Association between the Environmental Concern Variables 
and the Annual Returns 
 
Table 29 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
    
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significan
ce 
    
  
Hazardous Waste  .015 .012 4.216 4.216 .000 
  
  
Regulatory Problems  .015 .012 4.319 276.993 .000 
    
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .015 .012 4.354 276.959 .000 
    
  
Substantial Emissions  .015 .012 4.322 276.990 .000 
    
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .019 .016 5.335 275.978 .000 
    
  
Climate Change .016 .013 4.501 276.811 .000 
    
  
Other Concerns  .015 .012 4.325 276.988 .000 
    
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .346 .000 .348 .000 .337 .000 .347 .000 .340 .000 .329 .000 .330 .000 
lnAs -.021 .000 -.021 .000 -.020 .000 -.021 .000 -.020 .000 -.018 .000 -.019 .000 
SIC  -.007 .737 -.009 .669 -.004 .846 -.009 .672 -.011 .616 .003 .897 .001 .966 
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Where:  
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Table 29 (continued) 
 
Hazardous 
Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
Fin_Lev .000 .869 .000 .767 .000 .854 .000 .767 .000 .859 .000 .834 .000 .848 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .794 .000 .811 .000 .760 .000 .808 .000 .783 .000 .712 .000 .726 
Cap_Int .000 .869 .000 .887 .000 .833 .000 .885 .000 .861 .000 .780 .000 .797 
ROA .324 .000 .320 .000 .326 .000 .318 .000 .323 .000 .330 .000 .333 .000 
ECi .044 .274 .047 .157 .381 .132 .050 .154 .329 .002 -.065 .064 -.081 .152 
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Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 30 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2006, of the Association 
between the Environmental Rating Variables and the Annual Returns 
 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or 
Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or Overall Environmental rating; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
Table 30 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA   
  
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance   
TES .015 .012 4.200 277.113 .000   
TEC .015 .012 4.162 277.151 .000   
OER .014 .011 4.064 277.249 .000   
Panel B 
  Regression coefficient 
  
Total 
Environmental 
strength rating 
variable  
Total Environmental 
Concern rating 
variable  
Overall 
Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .328 .000 .346 .000 .336 .000 
lnAs -.018 .000 -.021 .000 -.019 .000 
SIC  -.001 .969 -.009 .691 -.003 .881 
Fin_Lev .000 .836 .000 .821 .000 .852 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .712 .000 .802 .000 .756 
Cap_Int .000 .782 .000 .878 .000 .828 
ROA .334 .000 .321 .000 .326 .000 
Environmental ratings -.016 .301 .011 .380 .000 .972 
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Table 30 (continued) 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 31 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2007, of the association between the Environmental Strength Variables 
and the Annual Returns  
Table 31 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
    
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regressio
n sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
    
  
Beneficial Product and Services .060 .057 27.887 436.753 .000 
    
  
Pollution Prevention  .057 .054 26.404 438.236 .000 
    
  
Recycling  .062 .059 28.813 435.827 .000 
    
  
Clean Energy  .063 .060 29.092 435.548 .000 
    
  
Management Systems Strength  .061 .058 28.129 436.511 .000 
    
  
Other Strengths .057 .054 26.473 438.167 .000 
    
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  
Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems Strength  Other Strengths 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .100 .031 .092 .048 .115 .013 .135 .004 .122 .009 .094 .043 
lnAs -.018 .003 -.016 .007 -.020 .001 -.023 .000 -.021 .001 -.016 .006 
SIC  .183 .000 .186 .000 .180 .000 .177 .000 .178 .000 .186 .000 
Fin_Lev .000 .497 .000 .502 .000 .506 .000 .511 .000 .512 .000 .502 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .793 .000 .767 .000 .804 .000 .806 .000 .819 .000 .769 
Cap_Int .000 .772 .000 .746 .000 .783 .000 .785 .000 .798 .000 .749 
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Table 31 (continued) 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
 
 
Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems Strength  Other Strengths 
ROA .571 .000 .579 .000 .577 .000 .575 .000 .571 .000 .580 .000 
ESi .184 .004 -.072 .364 .265 .000 .183 .000 .132 .002 -.171 .279 
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Table 32 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2007, of the Association between the Environmental Concern Variables 
and the Annual Returns  
Table 32 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
   
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of squares 
Residual sum 
of squares  
Model 
significance 
   
  
Hazardous Waste  .061 .058 28.228 436.412 .000 
   
  
Regulatory Problems  .064 .061 29.518 435.122 .000 
   
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .056 .054 26.246 438.394 .000 
   
  
Substantial Emissions  .067 .064 31.014 433.626 .000 
   
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .077 .074 35.861 428.779 .000 
   
  
Climate Change .059 .056 27.523 437.117 .000 
   
  
Other Concerns  .057 .054 26.517 438.123 .000 
   
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .133 .005 .139 .003 .096 .037 .149 .002 .106 .021 .109 .019 .102 .028 
lnAs -.022 .000 -.023 .000 -.017 .005 -.025 .000 -.018 .002 -.019 .002 -.018 .003 
SIC  .171 .000 .161 .000 .184 .000 .158 .000 .161 .000 .173 .000 .180 .000 
Fin_Lev .000 .512 .000 .514 .000 .503 .000 .477 .000 .509 .000 .508 .000 .505 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .826 .000 .853 .000 .774 .000 .865 .000 .823 .000 .810 .000 .787 
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Table 32 (continued) 
 
Hazardous 
Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems 
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals 
Substantial 
Emissions 
Agriculture 
Chemicals 
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns 
Cap_Int .000 .806 .000 .833 .000 .753 .000 .845 .000 .803 .000 .791 .000 .767 
ROA .574 .000 .566 .000 .578 .000 .561 .000 .561 .000 .579 .000 .575 .000 
ECi .152 .001 .161 .000 -.062 .889 .215 .000 .811 .000 .107 .011 .082 .236 
Where:  
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 33 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2007, of the Association 
between the Environmental Rating Variables and the Annual Returns 
 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or 
Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or Overall Environmental rating; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
Table 33 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA   
  
R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance   
TES .064 .061 29.828 434.812 .000   
TEC .074 .071 34.180 430.460 .000   
OER .076 .073 35.083 429.557 .000   
Panel B 
  Regression coefficient 
  
Total 
Environmental 
strength rating 
variable  
Total 
Environmental 
Concern rating 
variable  
Overall 
Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .141 .003 .188 .000 .201 .000 
lnAs -.024 .000 -.031 .000 -.033 .000 
SIC  .173 .000 .132 .000 .137 .000 
Fin_Lev .000 .512 .000 .510 .000 .516 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .844 .000 .951 .000 .963 
Cap_Int .000 .823 .000 .933 .000 .945 
ROA .568 .000 .556 .000 .553 .000 
Environmental ratings .080 .000 .096 .000 .069 .000 
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Table 33 (continued) 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 34 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2008, of the Association between the Environmental Strength Variables 
and the Annual Returns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
  
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual sum of 
squares  
Model 
significan
ce 
  
  
Beneficial Product and 
Services .087 .084 20.975 219.435 .000 
  
  
Pollution Prevention  .087 .084 20.988 219.423 .000 
  
  
Recycling  .088 .085 21.100 219.311 .000 
  
  
Clean Energy  .087 .084 20.981 219.430 .000 
  
  
Management Systems Strength  .090 .087 21.628 218.783 .000 
  
  
Other Strengths .087 .084 20.990 219.421 .000 
  
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Beneficial Product and Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems Strength  
Other 
Strengths 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -.301 .000 -.302 .000 -.305 .000 -.300 .000 -.317 .000 -.303 .000 
lnAs -.008 .036 -.008 .041 -.008 .051 -.009 .037 -.006 .157 -.008 .043 
SIC  -.024 .187 -.024 .195 -.023 .211 -.025 .183 -.020 .277 -.024 .189 
Fin_Lev .000 .524 .000 .523 .000 .527 .000 .523 .000 .572 .000 .524 
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Table 34 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
  Beneficial Product and Services 
Pollution 
Prevention Recycling Clean Energy 
Management 
Systems Strength 
Other 
Strengths 
Prf_Mrgn .001 .062 .001 .064 .001 .067 .001 .061 .001 .085 .001 .063 
Cap_Int .001 .054 .001 .055 .001 .058 .001 .053 .001 .075 .001 .055 
ROA .565 .000 .565 .000 .566 .000 .565 .000 .566 .000 .565 .000 
ESi .002 .970 -.023 .718 -.058 .259 .007 .816 -.073 .010 -.023 .700 
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Table 35  
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2008, of the Association between the Environmental Concern Variables 
and the Annual Returns  
Table 35 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
   
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
 
  
Hazardous Waste  .087 .084 20.986 219.424 .000 
   
  
Regulatory Problems  .087 .085 21.006 219.405 .000 
   
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .087 .084 20.985 219.426 .000 
   
  
Substantial Emissions  .089 .086 21.342 219.069 .000 
   
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .087 .085 21.025 219.385 .000 
   
  
Climate Change .089 .086 21.280 219.130 .000 
   
  
Other Concerns  .088 .085 21.038 219.372 .000 
   
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -.304 .000 -.306 .000 -.301 .000 -.315 .000 -.302 .000 -.307 .000 -.304 .000 
lnAs -.008 .053 -.008 .064 -.008 .036 -.006 .129 -.008 .038 -.007 .068 -.008 .048 
SIC  -.024 .207 -.022 .238 -.024 .193 -.017 .373 -.023 .221 -.018 .327 -.022 .230 
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Table 35 (continued) 
 
Hazardous 
Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
Fin_Lev .000 .523 .000 .527 .000 .523 .000 .514 .000 .520 .000 .516 .000 .540 
Prf_Mrgn .001 .065 .001 .068 .001 .063 .001 .078 .001 .064 .001 .075 .001 .066 
Cap_Int .001 .057 .001 .059 .001 .054 .001 .068 .001 .056 .001 .066 .001 .057 
ROA .565 .000 .565 .000 .565 .000 .567 .000 .566 .000 .563 .000 .566 .000 
ECi -.011 .739 -.015 .576 -.097 .755 -.061 .053 -.063 .474 -.049 .077 -.039 .421 
Where:  
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
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Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 36 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results, for year 2008, of the Association 
between the Environmental Rating Variables and the Annual Returns 
 
Table 36 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA   
  
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance   
TES .088 .085 21.180 219.093 .000   
TEC .089 .086 21.318 219.093 .000   
OER .089 .086 21.384 219.027 .000   
Panel B 
  Regression coefficient 
  
Total 
Environmental 
strength rating 
variable  
Total Environmental 
Concern rating 
variable  
Overall 
Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -.313 .000 -.319 .000 -.323 .000 
lnAs -.007 .120 -.006 .192 -.005 .263 
SIC_01 -.021 .247 -.014 .472 -.014 .448 
Fin_Lev .000 .539 .000 .528 .000 .539 
Prf_Mrgn .001 .076 .001 .087 .000 .093 
Cap_Int .001 .067 .001 .077 .001 .082 
ROA .566 .000 .566 .000 .566 .000 
Environmental 
ratings -.018 .148 -.019 .061 -.014 .041 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or 
Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or Overall Environmental rating. 
Cum_Ret = cumulative annual stock market returns; 
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LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
Table 36 (continued) 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 37 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the association between Environmental Strengths Variables and the Earning 
Levels  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 37 
Panel A 
 
Model summary ANOVA 
    
  
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression sum 
of squares 
Residual sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance 
   
  
Beneficial Product  and 
Services  .054 .053 1494228796.98 26068775874.35 .000 
  
  
Pollution Prevention .058 .057 1606052484.32 25956952187.01 .000 
   
  
Recycling .054 .052 1476087861.84 26086916809.50 .000 
   
  
Clean Energy .063 .062 1742647733.79 25820356937.54 .000 
   
 
Management Systems  .058 .057 1605337399.54 25957667271.79 .000 
   
  
Other Strengths .052 .051 1440298673.34 26122705998.00 .000 
   
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
 
Beneficial 
Product and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention Recycling Clean Energy 
Management 
Systems Strength Other Strengths 
 B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -2166.56 .000 -2072.74 .000 -2144.77 .000 -1910.43 .000 -2019.17 .000 -2182.07 .000 
lnAs 303.53 .000 291.00 .000 301.20 .000 265.70 .000 281.26 .000 307.02 .000 
SIC 558.06 .000 526.39 .000 558.64 .000 517.80 .000 518.49 .000 571.60 .000 
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Table 37 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
NI = net income used as a proxy for earning levels; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
 
Beneficial 
Product and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention Recycling Clean Energy 
Management 
Systems Strength Other Strengths 
Fin_Lev -.12 .890 -.10 .907 -.11 .903 -.09 .921 -.03 .970 -.12 .895 
Prf_Mrgn -.11 .707 -.10 .717 -.11 .709 -.10 .734 -.1 .730 -.11 .703 
Cap_Int -.08 .638 -.07 .650 -.08 .640 -.07 .666 -.075 .665 -.08 .633 
ESi 793.93 .001 1619.45 .000 744.56 .009 1264.67 .000 854.74 .000 82.23 .836 
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Table 38 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between Environmental Concern variables and the Earning 
Levels  
Table 38 
Panel A 
 
Model summary ANOVA 
  
  
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression sum 
of squares 
Residual sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance 
 
  
Hazardous Waste .063 .062 1744965928.174 25818038743.168 .000 
 
  
Regulatory Problems  .059 .058 1617550762.430 25945453908.912 .000 
 
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .052 .051 1440236802.758 26122767868.584 .000 
 
  
Substantial Emissions  .067 .065 1833910066.492 25729094604.850 .000 
 
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .052 .051 1440093849.975 26122910821.367 .000 
 
  
Climate Change C .054 .053 1479175865.576 26083828805.766 .000  
Other Concerns  .071 .070 1958181453.978 25604823217.363 .000   
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  
Hazardous 
Waste   
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change  
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig 
(Constant) -1856.82 .00 -1967.42 .00 -2185.14 .00 -1854.71 .00 -2184.99 .00 -2136.59 .00 -1989.08 .00 
lnAs 259.400 .00 274.11 .00 307.48 .00 258.18 .00 307.46 .00 298.90 .00 278.07 .00 
SIC 453.38 .00 461.39 .00 573.46 .00 408.42 .00 573.50 .00 528.57 .00 437.29 .00 
Fin_Lev -.09 .92 -.20 .82 -.12 .89 -.34 .70 -.12 .89 -.11 .90 -.01 .98 
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Table 38 (continued) 
 Hazardous 
Waste   
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change  
Other 
Concerns  
Prf_Mrgn -.09 .74 -.10 .73 -.11 .70 -.09 .74 -.11 .70 -.11 .70 -.10 .72 
Cap_Int -.07 .68 -.07 .67 -.08 .63 -.06 .68 -.08 .63 -.08 .64 -.07 .66 
ECi 1214.64 .00 767.06 .00 -202.60 .86 1262.17 .00 -28.58 .95 364.93 .00 2166.47 .00 
Where: 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
NI = net income used as a proxy for earning levels; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 39 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Environmental Rating Variables and the Earning 
Levels  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 39 
Panel A 
 
Model summary ANOVA 
 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression sum 
of squares 
Residual sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance   
TES .065 .064 1801801830.962 25761202840.380 .000   
TEC .074 .073 2037116479.727 25525888191.614 .000   
OER .078 .077 2160646487.828 25402358183.514 .000   
Panel B 
 
Regression coefficients 
  
Total Environmental 
strength rating variable  
Total Environmental 
Concern rating variable  
Overall 
Environmental rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -1859.592 .000 -1634.861 .000 -1526.926 .000 
lnAs 256.715 .000 223.258 .000 206.053 .000 
SIC 469.407 .000 265.029 .004 261.754 .004 
Fin_Lev -.043 .962 -.223 .805 -.142 .875 
Prf_Mrgn -.095 .749 -.086 .769 -.079 .788 
Cap_Int -.070 .687 -.059 .729 -.055 .748 
Environmental ratings 552.751 .000 524.099 .000 401.748 .000 
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Table 39 (continued) 
Where: 
ERi (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or Total Environmental Concern rating variable, 
or Overall Environmental rating; 
NI = net income used as a proxy for earning levels; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term.
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Table 40 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between Environmental Strength Variables and the Yearend 
Prices  
Table 40 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
   
  
  R 
Square 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual sum 
of squares  
Model 
significan
ce 
   
  
Beneficial Product and Services .051 .049 668543.700 12551904.455 .000 
   
  
Pollution Prevention  .051 .049 668578.255 12551869.899 .000 
   
  
Recycling  .051 .049 668475.604 12551972.551 .000 
   
  
Clean Energy  .051 .049 668522.056 12551926.099 .000 
   
  
Management Systems Strength  .051 .049 670245.625 12550202.530 .000 
   
  
Other Strengths .051 .049 670656.046 12549792.109 .000 
   
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  
Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems 
Strength  
Other Strengths 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -5.253 .132 -5.360 .127 -5.291 .130 -5.155 .149 -5.800 .101 -5.529 .114 
lnAs 4.658 .000 4.676 .000 4.666 .000 4.645 .000 4.746 .000 4.701 .000 
Table 40 (continued) 
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Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems 
Strength  
Other Strengths 
SIC .151 .938 .207 .915 .176 .928 .145 .940 .349 .858 .282 .884 
Fin_Lev -.004 .836 -.004 .836 -.004 .836 -.004 .837 -.004 .826 -.004 .836 
Prf_Mrgn -.002 .730 -.002 .729 -.002 .729 -.002 .730 -.002 .724 -.002 .728 
Cap_Int -.001 .836 -.001 .835 -.001 .836 -.001 .837 -.001 .830 -.001 .834 
ROA 44.765 .000 44.807 .000 44.784 .000 44.780 .000 44.888 .000 44.799 .000 
ESi .945 .862 -1.327 .834 -.365 .954 .540 .883 -2.805 .403 -8.102 .353 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
P = Calendar year end prices; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 41 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between Environmental Concern Variables and the Yearend 
Prices  
Table 41 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA   
  R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual sum 
of squares  
Model 
significanc
e 
  
  
Hazardous Waste  .051 .049 668492.202 12551955.952 .000 
  
  
Regulatory Problems  .054 .053 715243.855 12505204.300 .000 
  
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .051 .049 668621.194 12551826.961 .000 
  
  
Substantial Emissions  .051 .049 669409.147 12551039.008 .000 
  
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .051 .049 669194.911 12551253.244 .000 
  
  
Climate Change .051 .049 670732.846 12549715.309 .000 
  
  
Other Concerns  .064 .063 848365.070 12372083.085 .000 
  
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -5.180 .151 -1.846 .605 -5.262 .131 -5.759 .107 -5.232 .133 -5.640 .108 -1.877 .590 
lnAs 4.649 .000 4.137 .000 4.661 .000 4.735 .000 4.657 .000 4.728 .000 4.153 .000 
SIC .134 .946 -1.654 .403 .147 .940 .427 .829 .026 .990 .505 .797 -2.392 .219 
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Table 41 (continued) 
 
Hazardous 
Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems 
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals 
Substantial 
Emissions 
Agriculture 
Chemicals 
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns 
Fin_Lev -.004 .837 -.006 .782 -.004 .836 -.004 .851 -.004 .836 -.004 .834 -.002 .905 
Prf_Mrgn -.002 .730 -.002 .755 -.002 .730 -.002 .725 -.002 .730 -.002 .727 -.002 .759 
Cap_Int -.001 .837 -.001 .869 -.001 .836 -.001 .831 -.001 .837 -.001 .832 -.001 .873 
ROA 44.767 .000 44.044 .000 44.761 .000 44.958 .000 44.679 .000 44.767 .000 42.973 .000 
ECi .349 .921 12.461 .000 6.220 .805 -1.956 .542 5.360 .592 -2.778 .345 40.412 .000 
Where: 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
P = Calendar year end prices; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
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Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 42 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Environmental Rating Variables and the Yearend 
Prices 
 
Table 42 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA   
 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual sum 
of squares 
Model 
significa
nce   
TES .051 .049 669047.290 12551400.865 .000   
TEC .052 .051 691999.111 12528449.044 .000   
OER .051 .050 677417.790 12543030.365 .000   
Panel B 
  Regression coefficient 
  
Total Environmental 
strength rating variable  
Total Environmental 
Concern rating variable  
Overall Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -5.676 .113 -1.927 .597 -3.017 .413 
lnAs 4.726 .000 4.150 .000 4.315 .000 
SIC  .301 .878 -1.781 .382 -.938 .643 
Fin_Lev -.004 .833 -.005 .808 -.004 .831 
Prf_Mrgn -.002 .726 -.002 .754 -.002 .747 
Cap_Int -.001 .832 -.001 .869 -.001 .857 
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Table 42 (continued) 
 
Total Environmental 
strength rating variable  
Total Environmental 
Concern rating variable  
Overall Environmental 
rating 
ROA 44.842 .000 43.986 .000 44.305 .000 
Environmental ratings -.700 .633 3.295 .002 1.418 .060 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or 
Overall Environmental rating; 
P = Calendar year end prices; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 43 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between Environmental Strength Variables and the Following 
Year Annual Returns 
 
Table 43 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA       
  R Square 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Regressio
n sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significan
ce    
  
Beneficial Product  and Services .020 .019 79.703 3915.590 .000      Pollution Prevention  .020 .018 78.223 3917.070 .000      Recycling  .020 .019 79.636 3915.657 .000      Clean Energy  .020 .019 80.102 3915.191 .000      Management Systems Strength  .021 .020 84.000 3911.293 .000      Other Strengths .020 .019 79.636 3915.657 .000       
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Beneficial Product  and Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems Strength  
Other 
Strengths 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .149 .015 .146 .018 .156 .011 .168 .008 .177 .005 .153 .013 
lnAs -.014 .069 -.014 .086 -.015 .054 -.017 .037 -.018 .022 -.015 .063 
SIC .106 .002 .109 .002 .105 .002 .104 .002 .098 .004 .105 .002 
Fin_Lev .000 .665 .000 .663 .000 .659 .000 .658 .000 .631 .000 .662 
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Table 43 (continued) 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
Cum_Rett+1 = cumulative annual stock market returns for the following year; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
 
Beneficial Product  
and Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems Strength  Other Strengths 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .063 .000 .063 .000 .064 .000 .064 .000 .066 .000 .063 
Cap_Int .000 .033 .000 .032 .000 .033 .000 .033 .000 .034 .000 .033 
ROA -.668 .000 -.666 .000 -.670 .000 -.665 .000 -.672 .000 -.667 .000 
ESi .131 .171 -.008 .945 .191 .084 .100 .123 .160 .007 .206 .181 
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Table 44 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the Environmental Concern Variables and the 
Following Year Annual Returns  
Table 44 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
     
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of squares 
Residual sum 
of squares  
Model 
significance 
     
  
Hazardous Waste Concern .020 .019 80.680 3914.612 .000 
     
  
Regulatory Problems Concern .020 .019 81.228 3914.065 .000 
     
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals Concern .020 .018 78.300 3916.993 .000 
     
  
Substantial Emissions Concern .021 .020 84.165 3911.127 .000 
     
  
Agriculture Chemicals Concern .020 .018 79.372 3915.920 .000 
     
  
Climate Change Concern .020 .019 79.481 3915.812 .000 
     
  
Other Concerns .020 .018 78.633 3916.659 .000 
     
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial  
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .176 .006 .174 .006 .147 .017 .185 .003 .148 .016 .155 .012 .152 .014 
lnAs -.018 .029 -.018 .028 -.014 .081 -.019 .017 -.014 .077 -.015 .056 -.014 .068 
SIC .098 .005 .094 .007 .108 .002 .088 .012 .103 .003 .100 .004 .104 .003 
Fin_Lev .000 .658 .000 .686 .000 .663 .000 .724 .000 .664 .000 .660 .000 .658 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .065 .000 .065 .000 .063 .000 .066 .000 .063 .000 .064 .000 .064 
Table 44 (continued) 
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  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial  
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
Cap_Int .000 .034 .000 .034 .000 .033 .000 .035 .000 .033 .000 .033 .000 .033 
ROA -.669 .000 -.672 .000 -.666 .000 -.680 .000 -.670 .000 -.666 .000 -.669 .000 
ECi .109 .078 .100 .051 .142 .749 .155 .006 .213 .228 .066 .207 .061 .470 
Where: 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
Cum_Rett+1 = cumulative annual stock market returns for the following year; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 45 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Environmental Rating Variables and the Following Year Annual Returns 
 
 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or 
Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or Overall Environmental rating; 
Cum_Rett+1 = cumulative annual stock market returns for the following year; 
LnAs (Size) = natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
Table 45 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA   
  
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares 
Model 
signific
ance   
TES .021 .020 84.337 3910.956 .000   
TEC .021 .020 85.189 3910.104 .000   
OER .022 .021 87.935 3907.358 .000   
Panel B 
Regression coefficient 
  
Total 
Environmental 
strength rating 
variable 
Total Environmental 
Concern rating 
variable 
Overall 
Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .188 .003 .204 .002 .221 .001 
lnAs -.020 .014 -.022 .007 -.025 .003 
SIC  .095 .006 .075 .038 .072 .044 
Fin_Lev .000 .644 .000 .689 .000 .671 
Prf_Mrgn .000 .066 .000 .068 .000 .069 
Cap_Int .000 .035 .000 .036 .000 .037 
ROA -.673 .000 -.680 .000 -.682 .000 
Environmental ratings .072 .005 .057 .003 .047 .000 
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Table 45 (continued) 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
ROA (Return on Assets) = net income/ average total assets; 
Fin_Lev (Financial leverage) = (debt in current liabilities + debt in long term debt) / total 
shareholder’s equity; 
Prf_Mrgn (Profit margin) = (net income / total sales); 
Cap_Int (Capital Intensity) = (total assets / total revenues); 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 46 
Results of the Ohlson Clean Surplus Model Investigating the Association between Environmental Strength Variables and the Yearend 
Stock Prices  
Table 46 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA     
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression sum 
of squares 
Residual sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance     
Beneficial Product and Services .810 .810 10712394.066 2507188.377 .000     
Pollution Prevention  .811 .810 10715812.546 2503769.896 .000     
Recycling  .811 .810 10715410.387 2504172.056 .000     
Clean Energy  .811 .811 10718470.823 2501111.620 .000     
Management Systems Strength  .811 .810 10715729.322 2503853.120 .000     
Other Strengths .810 .810 10709970.494 2509611.949 .000     
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  
Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention  Recycling  Clean Energy  
Management 
Systems 
Strength  
Other Strengths 
 B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 11.952 .000 11.918 .000 11.923 .000 11.779 .000 11.790 .000 12.035 .000 
BVPS 1.067 .000 1.068 .000 1.067 .000 1.066 .000 1.068 .000 1.066 .000 
EPS 2.356 .000 2.349 .000 2.351 .000 2.351 .000 2.347 .000 2.360 .000 
ESi 5.649 .020 9.747 .000 9.422 .001 6.573 .000 5.035 .001 3.144 .418 
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Table 46 (continued) 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
P = yearend stock price; 
BVPS = book value per share;  
EPS = earnings per share; 
and e is an error term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
Table 47  
Results of the Ohlson Clean Surplus Model Investigating the Association between Environmental Concern Variables and the Yearend 
Stock Prices  
Table 47 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
   
  
  R Square Adjusted R Square 
Regression 
sum of squares 
Residual sum 
of squares  
Model 
significance 
   
  
Hazardous Waste  .900 .810 10714159.662 2505422.781 .000 
   
  
Regulatory Problems  .900 .810 10710553.399 2509029.044 .000 
  
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .900 .810 10710157.142 2509425.300 .000 
  
  
Substantial Emissions  .900 .811 10715013.443 2504569.000 .000 
  
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .900 .810 10710317.918 2509264.525 .000 
  
  
Climate Change .900 .810 10711117.222 2508465.221 .000 
  
  
Other Concerns  .900 .811 10715046.565 2504535.878 .000 
  
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 11.846 .000 11.948 .000 12.047 .000 11.790 .000 12.029 .000 12.199 .000 11.950 .000 
BVPS 1.066 .000 1.066 .000 1.066 .000 1.068 .000 1.066 .000 1.066 .000 1.063 .000 
EPS 2.350 .000 2.352 .000 2.359 .000 2.343 .000 2.357 .000 2.361 .000 2.350 .000 
ECi 4.414 .003 1.657 .179 11.411 .311 4.420 .001 5.135 .247 -2.187 .088 6.948 .001 
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Table 47 (continued) 
Where: 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
P = yearend stock price; 
BVPS = book value per share;  
EPS = earnings per share; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 48 
Results of the Ohlson Clean Surplus Model Investigating the Association between Environmental Rating Variables and the Yearend 
Stock Prices  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 48 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
TES .811 .811 10724375.532 2495206.911 .000 
TEC .810 .810 10713162.699 2506419.744 .000 
OER .811 .811 10719614.583 2499967.859 .000 
Panel B 
Regression coefficient 
  
Total Environmental 
strength rating 
variable  
Total Environmental 
Concern rating variable  
Overall 
Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 11.556 .000 11.758 .000 11.509 .000 
BVPS 1.069 .000 1.066 .000 1.067 .000 
EPS 2.337 .000 2.345 .000 2.333 .000 
Environmental ratings 3.354 .000 1.147 .008 1.336 .000 
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Table 48 (continued) 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or 
Overall Environmental rating; 
P = yearend stock price; 
BVPS = book value per share;  
EPS = earnings per share; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 49 
Results of the Ohlson Clean Surplus Model Standardized by Book Value per Share Investigating the Association between 
Standardized Yearend Stock Prices and Environmental Strength Variables  
Table 49 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA       
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual sum 
of squares  
Model 
significance       
Beneficial Product and Services .092 .092 892287.837 8811801.312 .000       
Pollution Prevention  .092 .092 892288.916 8811800.233 .000       
Recycling  .092 .092 892267.182 8811821.967 .000       
Clean Energy  .092 .092 892323.777 8811765.372 .000       
Management Systems Strength  .092 .092 894385.006 8809704.143 .000       
Other Strengths .092 .092 892269.345 8811819.803 .000       
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
 
Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention Recycling Clean Energy 
Management 
Systems Strength Other Strengths 
 B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 2.674 .000 2.691 .000 2.683 .000 2.706 .000 2.835 .000 2.685 .000 
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Table 49 (continued) 
 
Beneficial 
Product  and 
Services 
Pollution 
Prevention Recycling Clean Energy 
Management 
Systems Strength Other Strengths 
EPS/BVPS 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.769 .000 1.767 .000 
ESi .489 .914 -.578 .912 -.026 .996 -.526 .859 -2.966 .276 -.256 .972 
Where: 
ES “i” range from 1 to 6 indicating different environmental strength measures. i = 1 refers to clean energy, i = 2 refers to beneficial 
products and services, i = 3 pollution prevention, i = 4 refers to recycling, and i = 5 management systems, i = 6 is other strengths; 
P/BVPS = yearend stock price divided by the book value per share; 
BVPS/BVPS = 1;  
EPS/BVPS = earnings per share divided by the book value per share; 
and e is an error term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Table 50 
Results of the Ohlson Clean Surplus Model Standardized by Book Value per Share Investigating the Association between 
Standardized Yearend Stock Prices and Environmental Concern Variables  
Table 50 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA 
    
  
  R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of squares 
Residual sum 
of squares 
Model 
significance 
    
  
Hazardous Waste  .092 .092 892454.167 8811634.982 .000 
    
  
Regulatory Problems  .092 .092 892334.435 8811754.713 .000 
    
  
Ozone Depleting Chemicals  .092 .092 892267.138 8811822.011 .000 
    
  
Substantial Emissions  .092 .092 893612.367 8810476.781 .000 
    
  
Agriculture Chemicals  .092 .092 892267.525 8811821.624 .000 
    
  
Climate Change .092 .092 892485.356 8811603.793 .000 
    
  
Other Concerns  .092 .092 893874.821 8810214.328 .000 
    
  
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  Hazardous Waste  
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change Other Concerns  
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 2.727 .000 2.716 .000 2.683 .000 2.552 .000 2.684 .000 2.739 .000 2.772 .000 
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Table 50 (continued) 
 
Hazardous 
Waste 
Regulatory 
Problems  
Ozone 
Depleting 
Chemicals  
Substantial 
Emissions  
Agriculture 
Chemicals  
Climate 
Change 
Other 
Concerns  
EPS/BV 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.765 .000 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.768 .000 
ECi -.896 .746 -.446 .846 .004 1.000 2.206 .385 -.122 .988 -.839 .726 -3.753 .342 
Where: 
EC “i” range from 1 to 7, indicating different environmental concerns. i = 1 refers to climate changes concern, i = 2 refers to 
regulatory problems, i = 3 refers to substantial emissions, i = 4 refers to ozone depletion chemicals concern, i = 5 refers to hazardous 
waste, i = 6 refers to agricultural chemicals, and i = 7 refers to other concerns; 
P/BVPS = yearend stock price divided by the book value per share; 
BVPS/BVPS = 1;  
EPS/BVPS = earnings per share divided by the book value per share; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 51 
Results of the Ohlson Clean Surplus Model Standardized by Book Value per Share Investigating the Association between 
Standardized Yearend Stock Prices and Environmental Rating Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 51 
Panel A 
  Model Summary ANOVA   
  R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Regression 
sum of 
squares 
Residual 
sum of 
squares 
Model 
significance   
TES .092 .092 892788.163 8811300.985 .000   
TEC .092 .092 892338.936 8811750.212 .000   
OER .092 .092 892552.393 8811536.756 .000   
Panel B 
Regression Coefficients 
  
Total 
Environmental 
strength rating 
variable 
Total Environmental 
Concern rating variable 
Overall Environmental 
rating 
  B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 2.775 .000 2.728 .000 2.779 .000 
EPS/BV 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 1.767 .000 
Environmental ratings -.630 .589 -.163 .841 -.225 .689 
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Table 51 (continued) 
Where: 
ER (environmental rating variable) = Total Environmental strength rating variable, or Total Environmental Concern rating variable, or 
Overall Environmental rating; 
P/BVPS = yearend stock price divided by the book value per share; 
BVPS/BVPS = 1;  
EPS/BVPS = earnings per share divided by the book value per share; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 52 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Changes in the Firms’ Earning Levels and Changes in the Firms’ Overall Environmental 
Rating 
 
Table 52 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Regression 
sum of squares 
Residual sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
OER  .008 .003 145379587.453 18271586233.500 .112 
Panel B 
  Regression coefficient     
  
Overall environmental 
rating change  
  
  
  B Sig. 
  
  
(Constant) -464.160 .000 
  
  
LnAs 723.314 .017 
  
  
SIC .192 .999 
  
  
Fin_Lev .264 .930 
  
  
Prf_Mrgn -6.342 .026 
  
  
Cap_Int -9.232 .027 
  
  
OER 53.462 .825       
Where: 
∆OER (change in overall environmental rating) = OER2008 – OER2006; 
∆ NI = NI2008 – NI2006; 
∆ lnTA = LnTA2008 – LnTA2006; 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
∆ROA = ROA2008 – ROA2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev = Fin_Lev2008 – Fin_Lev2006; 
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Table 52 (continued)  
∆ Prf_Mrgn = Prf_Mrgn2008 – Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int = Cap_Int2008 – Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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Table 53 
Model Summary, ANOVA, and Regression Results of the Association between the 
Changes in the Firms’ Earning Levels and Changes in the Firms’ Overall Environmental 
Rating Groups (Deterioration and Improvement groups) 
 
Table 53 
Panel A 
  Model summary ANOVA 
  
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Regression sum 
of squares 
Residual sum of 
squares  
Model 
significance 
∆ IMP .128 .078 208398432.512 1414666262.417 .025 
∆ DET .346 .286 81235282.189 153484142.674 .000 
Panel B 
  Regression coefficient   
  
Environmental rating 
Improvement Environmental rating deterioration   
  B Sig. B Sig.   
(Constant) -195.069 .878 2739.557 .000   
∆ lnAs 1534.932 .220 -17.980 .968   
SIC -519.843 .507 110.978 .780   
∆ Fin_Lev -15.423 .711 .483 .741   
∆ Prf_Mrgn 11555.930 .001 743.202 .072   
∆ Cap_Int -72.103 .701 97.927 .508   
∆ OERi 64.307 .951 2892.105 .000   
Where: 
∆OERi = change in the overall environmental rating variable for the improvement group 
and the deterioration group; 
∆ NI = NI2008 – NI2006; 
∆ lnTA = LnTA2008 – LnTA2006; 
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Table 53 (continued) 
SIC (Industry classification) = “1” In case the firm operates in industries classified as 
environmentally unsafe, “0” otherwise; 
∆ROA = ROA2008 – ROA2006; 
∆ Fin_Lev = Fin_Lev2008 – Fin_Lev2006; 
∆ Prf_Mrgn = Prf_Mrgn2008 – Prf_Mrgn2006; 
∆ Cap_Int = Cap_Int2008 – Cap_Int2006; 
and e is an error term. 
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